An action against an interstate carrier for damages caused by
unfair and discriminatory departures from a rule of car
distribution in times of car shortage may be prosecuted in a state
court.
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Sonman Shaft Coal Co., ante,
242 U. S. 120.
The rule of car distribution relied on by the plaintiff having
been held discriminatory and illegal by the Interstate Commerce
Commission in due proceedings at the complaint of other shippers,
and this being proven by reports and orders of the Commission
produced in evidence,
held that the administrative
question so determined could not be revived by the carrier to oust
the jurisdiction of the court.
By such proceedings of the Commission, the Act to Regulate
Commerce intends no less to redress past discriminations than
prevent them in future, under the carrier's rule, and this for the
benefit of all shippers who have been or may be affected thereby,
and when the Commission finds the rule obnoxious not because of
temporary or changeable conditions, but inherently and from its
adoption, and, besides
Page 242 U. S. 299
ordering its discontinuance, recognizes that all injured
shippers are entitled to reparation and awards it to such as appear
and prove damages, the status of the rule is fixed for past as well
as future transactions under it.
Where a rule is found discriminatory by the Commission in the
circumstances indicated in the last preceding paragraph, a shipper,
though not a party before the Commission, cannot recover from the
carrier for its failures to obey the rule before the finding was
made.
241 Pa.St. 509 reversed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
In a state court in Pennsylvania, the coal company recovered a
judgment against the railroad company for damages resulting, as was
claimed, from unjust discrimination practiced in the distribution
of coal cars in times of car shortage, and the supreme court of the
state affirmed the judgment. 241 Pa. 509.
The suit related to both intrastate and interstate commerce, and
whether, in respect of the latter, it could be brought in a state
court consistently with the Interstate Commerce Act is the first
question presented.
The coal company was engaged in coal mining on the carrier's
line in Pennsylvania, and was shipping the coal to points in that
and other states. Other coal companies were engaged in like
operations in the same district. A
Page 242 U. S. 300
rule of the carrier provided for a
pro rata
distribution of the available supply of coal cars in times of car
shortage, but did not require or contemplate that individual cars
owned or controlled by the shipper should be charged against his
distributive share. Without questioning the reasonableness of this
rule, but, on the contrary, assuming that it was unobjectionable
and became the true measure of the shipper's right and the
carrier's duty, the coal company claimed that the carrier had
unjustly discriminated against it to its damage by furnishing it a
smaller number of cars, and some of its competitors a greater
number, than the rule contemplated or permitted. In other words,
the claim was not that the rule was discriminatory, but that it was
violated or unequally enforced by the carrier. Of such a suit was
said in
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Puritan Coal Mining Co.,
237 U. S. 121,
237 U. S.
131-132, where the provisions of the Interstate Commerce
Act were extensively considered:
"There is no administrative question involved, the courts being
called on to decide a mere question of fact as to whether the
carrier has violated the rule to plaintiff's damage. Such suits,
though against an interstate carrier for damages arising in
interstate commerce, may be prosecuted either in the state or
federal courts."
Adhering to this view, we think the suit was properly brought in
a state court.
See Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Sonman Shaft Coal
Co., ante, 242 U. S. 120.
But it is suggested that, in the course of the trial, an
administrative question -- one which the act intends the Interstate
Commerce Commission shall solve -- was brought into the suit, and
that this disabled the court from proceeding to a decision upon the
merits. The suggestion is grounded upon the fact that one of the
carrier's defenses at the trial was to the effect that the rule
invoked by the coal company as fixing its quota of the cars was
unjustly discriminatory, and therefore not an appropriate test of
the shipper's right or the carrier's duty. We think the
Page 242 U. S. 301
suggestion is not well taken. The administrative question, which
was whether the rule was reasonable or otherwise, was not then an
open one. It had been theretofore determined in the mode
contemplated by the act. Upon the complaint of other shippers, and
after a full hearing, the Commission had found that the rule was
unjustly discriminatory, and had directed the carrier to give no
further effect to it. 19 I.C.C. 356, 392; 23
ibid. 186.
This was shown by the reports and orders of the Commission, which
were produced in evidence. Thus, there was no jurisdictional
obstacle at this point.
The Commission deemed it essential to a fair distribution in
times of car shortage that individual cars owned or controlled by
the shipper should be charged against his distributive share, and,
because the rule here took no account of such cars, the Commission
found that it was unjustly discriminatory. This occurred two years
before the trial, but after the period covered by the suit. As part
of its defense, the carrier claimed that the cars distributed to
the coal company during that period included many individual cars
controlled by the latter, and that these were not charged against
its distributive share. Evidently intending to recognize that this
was so, and desiring to shorten the trial, the parties agreed that
a verdict should be taken for the coal company in a designated sum,
subject to the condition, among others, that "if, under the
practice, the law, and the rules," the court should conclude that
"the plaintiff company should have been charged with individual
cars," then judgment should be entered for the carrier
non
obstante veredicto. The verdict was taken and judgment entered
thereon, the court concluding that the rule should be respected
notwithstanding the Commission's finding. Complaint is made of this
decision, and we think it was wrong. That this shipper was not a
party to the proceeding before the Commission hardly needs notice,
no point being made of it in
Page 242 U. S. 302
the briefs. And it is not a valid objection that the finding
came after the period to which the suit relates. The act
contemplated that the proceeding should be conducted in the
interest of all the shippers who had been, or were likely to be,
affected by the rule, and not merely in the interest of those who
filed the complaint. The purpose was to determine the character of
the rule for the equal benefit of all, to the end not only that
discrimination thereunder in the future might be prevented, but
also that such discrimination in the past might be redressed. So
understanding the act, the Commission, upon finding the rule
unjustly discriminatory, ordered the carrier to cease giving effect
to it, and also recognized that shippers who had been injured
through its operation in the past were entitled to reparation. And
the Commission proceeded to award reparation to such shippers as
appeared and adequately proved their injury and the amount of
damages sustained. Not only so, but the Commission's report makes
it plain that the finding was not based upon any temporary or
changeable condition existing at the time, but upon what inhered in
the rule, and therefore was true from the time of its adoption. The
legal propriety of the Commission's finding is not questioned, but
only that it operates to discredit the carrier's rule as respects
earlier transactions.
In the circumstances stated, we are of opinion that effect must
be given to the Commission's finding, even though it came after the
transactions in question, and that a recovery by the coal company
cannot be permitted without departing from the uniformity and
equality of treatment which the act is intended to secure. Only
through an enforcement of the discriminatory rule, and of the
particular feature which made it discriminatory, can a recovery be
had. A right to recover independently of that is neither shown nor
claimed. In short, the coal company concedes that it received all
the cars to which it would have been entitled under a reasonable
rule, and yet seeks to recover
Page 242 U. S. 303
upon the ground that more cars were not delivered to it under a
rule which was unreasonable, because unduly discriminatory in its
favor. Consistently with the act, this cannot be done.
Judgment reversed.