Plaintiff was a conductor in charge of a train service south and
north between two stations in Kentucky, established chiefly because
of southbound traffic, which was more certain than the northbound
and generally included freight bound beyond the state. The trips
south and back were, however, distinct, and all freight obtainable
was taken, either way. Having made the southward journey, carrying
interstate freight, plaintiff was injured while returning with the
same engine, caboose, and crew, and with local freight only, and
while writing his report for the round trip.
Held that the
plaintiff was not employed in interstate commerce when injured, and
the case therefore was not within the Federal Employers' Liability
Act.
128 Minn. 119 reversed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action brought under the Federal Employers' Liability
Act to recover for personal injuries caused by a rear-end collision
in Kentucky. The railroad company denied that the case was governed
by the federal act, contending that the train upon which the
plaintiff was moving was engaged in local business only, between
two
Page 242 U. S. 293
points within the state. The issue was important as affecting
the rules of law to be applied. At a second trial, the judge,
intending to follow the previous decision of the supreme court of
the state, 123 Minn. 264, ruled that the accident happened in
interstate commerce, and that the act of Congress governed the
case. The defendant excepted, and assigned as error that the court
determined the matter of fact instead of leaving it to the jury, in
accordance with the intimation of the former decision, 123 Minn.
266, but the judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of the
state. 128 Minn. 119.
We are of opinion that the ruling was wrong, as, we think, will
be seen from a short statement of the facts. The plaintiff was a
freight conductor on the defendant's road, having his principal run
from Paducah, south, to Fulton, both in Kentucky, and the same day
back from Fulton, north, to Paducah. According to his testimony, he
took back the engine, caboose, and crew with which he started, and
was allowed 100 miles of mileage in compensation for the trip out
and back. The train out generally and on this occasion had freight
destined to beyond the limits of the state. That on the return
depended on what could be picked up, the engine and caboose
sometimes coming back alone. The accident happened when the engine
was returning to Paducah after having taken up a switch engine from
the Fulton yards seemingly in need of repairs at the Paducah shops,
and a pile driver and outfit on three flat cars, and having in the
rear, behind the last, the plaintiff's caboose. The pile driver was
dropped on the way at Mayfield, and the train thereafter consisted
of the two engines and the caboose. The plaintiff was sitting in
the caboose, making up a report of his trip out and back, when the
collision occurred.
Of course, the plaintiff treats the round trip as one, and the
return as merely the necessary complement of the trip out. The
conclusion is drawn that the plaintiff still
Page 242 U. S. 294
was engaged in interstate commerce because the train out had
cars destined to Tennessee. But, on the other hand, the trips out
and back were distinct, in opposite directions, with different
trains. The plaintiff's journey was confined wholly to Kentucky.
Only the circumstance that the south-bound train from Paducah
carried freight destined to beyond Fulton caused him to be engaged
in interstate commerce while on that trip. On the return, when he
was injured, all the freight had domestic destinations. It is true
that the greater certainty of getting traffic going south probably
was the chief reason for the establishment of the circuit, but they
got what they could coming back -- generally a train or a part of a
train. It seems to us extravagant to subordinate the northerly to
the southerly journey so completely that if, on the latter, there
happened to be a parcel destined beyond the state, the conductor
should be regarded as still engaged in commerce among the states
when going from Fulton to Paducah, even though he had a full train
devoted solely to domestic commerce. For it must be remembered
that, if the northerly movement is regarded as the incident of the
southerly, that subordination is independent of the character of
the commerce, and depends solely on the fact that southerly moving
business, no matter what, induced establishing the route. Therefore
it does not matter that the interstate traffic moving south was
greater than, for purposes of illustration, we have supposed.
Judgment reversed.