Prior to the Act of March 4, 1915, c. 169, 38 Stat. 1192, and
after the Act of February 17, 1911, c. 103, 36 Stat. 913, the state
police power extended to the regulation of the character of
headlights used on
Page 242 U. S. 256
locomotives employed in interstate commerce.
Atlantic Coast
Line v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280.
A judgment which correctly refused injunctive relief against
such state regulation may not be attacked on writ of error as a
judgment infringing federal rights (Judicial Code, § 237) upon the
ground that the same field of regulation has since been occupied by
tho federal government under an act of Congress enacted after the
judgment was rendered.
The question whether, because of the Act of 1915,
supra, or action of the Interstate Commerce Commission
thereunder, further enforcement of the order of the state
commission here involved would infringe the plaintiff's rights may
be raised and determined in another action without prejudice from
this one.
An order of a state commission requiring a carrier to equip its
locomotives with headlights of a specified minimum candlepower is
not objectionable as lacking due process when made on notice and
full hearing, and where the law under which the commission acted
afforded opportunity for review in the courts, of which the
complaining carrier availed itself.
Complaint that such an order is so indefinite and uncertain as
to amount to a denial of due process will not be heard where the
party complaining failed to take advantage of a legal opportunity
to have the order revised through a rehearing before the
commission.
182 Ind. 382 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Railroad Commission of Indiana was created and broad powers
were conferred upon it by an act approved February 28, 1905, and an
amendatory act approved March 9, 1907 (Acts 1905, p. 83; Acts 1907,
p. 454; Burns'
Page 242 U. S. 257
Ann.Ind..Stat.1908, §§ 5531
et seq.). By a later act
(Acts 1909, p. 323), the Commission was specifically authorized and
directed to investigate the condition and efficiency of headlights
then in use on locomotive engines on the railroads in the state,
determine the most practicable and efficient headlight for all
purposes, and make and enforce against the railroad companies the
necessary orders for the installation of such headlights. Pursuant
to this authority, it conducted an investigation, upon notice to
plaintiff in error and all other steam railroad companies operating
in the state, the result of which was an order, made January 6,
1910, reciting the investigation, declaring that the oil headlights
commonly in use were inadequate for the protection of persons and
property, and ordering that all engines used in the transportation
of trains over any line of railroad in the state should be equipped
"with headlights of not less than 1,500 candlepower." About one
month thereafter, plaintiff in error brought an action in a state
court of competent jurisdiction seeking to enjoin enforcement of
the order upon the ground that the Act of 1909 and the order made
pursuant to it were repugnant to the "commerce clause" of the
Constitution of the United States and the statutes enacted
thereunder, and to the "due process clause" of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Among other grounds of attack, it was averred that the
order was so vague, indefinite, and uncertain in its description of
the headlight required as to be meaningless and void, because it
failed to specify at what distance from the source of light the
illuminating power was to be measured, and whether it was to be
determined by averaging the intensity of the light at a given
distance from its source, and if so at what distance; that the
order did not specify the character of the reflector, nor whether
the required candle power might be developed by reflectors or
lenses, or whether the light must be of 1,500 candle power
independent of such lenses or reflectors,
Page 242 U. S. 258
it being averred that each of these elements was an essential
factor in the ascertainment and measurement of the illuminating
capacity of headlights, and that there was no known standard by
which such capacity might be measured and expressed in terms of
candlepower in the absence of those factors. From an amended
complaint, and from the Commission's answer thereto, it was made to
appear that, after the making of the order, Mr. Houghton, chairman
of a committee appointed to represent the plaintiff and the other
railroad companies named in the order with respect to presenting a
petition to the Commission for a modification of its provisions,
made written application to the Commission for a suspension of the
order and a further hearing upon the subject; that the Commission
replied that, under the statute and the practice of the Commission,
it had authority to alter, change, or modify any final order made
by it, and that the Commission would not suspend the order in
question, but would treat Mr. Houghton's communication as an
application for its modification, and specifying a time for the
hearing of that application; that, on the date specified the
carriers appeared by Mr. Houghton, chairman of the committee, and
by counsel, and withdrew the application for modification,
whereupon it was dismissed. Plaintiff demurred to the answer, the
demurrer was overruled, and, plaintiff refusing to plead further,
final judgment was rendered against it, and, on appeal, this was
affirmed by the Supreme Court of Indiana, that court holding that
plaintiff's complaint did not show ground for the relief sought.
182 Ind. 382. The case comes here upon the federal questions, under
§ 237, Jud. Code.
So far as the attack upon the Act of 1909 and the order made
pursuant to it is based upon interference with interstate commerce,
it very properly is conceded that, but for a recent act of
Congress, the case would be controlled by
Atlantic Coast Line
R. Co. v. Georgia, 234 U. S. 280,
234 U. S.
290,
Page 242 U. S. 259
where it was held that, in the absence of federal legislation,
the states are at liberty, in the exercise of their police power,
to establish regulations for securing safety in the physical
operation of railroad trains within their territory, even though
such trains are used in interstate commerce, and that (p.
234 U. S. 293)
the Safety Appliance Acts of Congress, since they provided no
regulations for locomotive headlights, showed no intent to
supersede the exercise of state power with respect to this
subject.
But it is insisted that this decision is no longer controlling,
because Congress has since then "exercised its power as to
equipment over the entire locomotive and tender and all parts and
appurtenances thereof." The reference is to the act of March 4,
1915, c. 169, 38 Stat. 1192, amendatory of the act of February 17,
1911, requiring common carriers engaged in interstate commerce to
equip their locomotives with safe and suitable boilers and
appurtenances thereto. c. 103, 36 Stat. 913. The latter act was
among those referred to in the
Georgia case, and held not
to oust the authority of the state because it did not appear either
that Congress had acted, or that the Interstate Commerce
Commission, under the authority of Congress, had established any
regulations concerning headlights. The amendment of 1915 extends
the provisions respecting inspection, etc., to the entire
locomotive and all its appurtenances. Whether those provisions
authorize the Interstate Commerce Commission to prescribe any
particular type of headlight, or other appliance is a question upon
which we need not now pass, for the reason that the decision of the
Supreme Court of Indiana refusing an injunction to restrain the
enforcement of the state Commission's order was rendered and
judgment thereon entered before the passage by Congress of the act
referred to. Obviously we cannot say that, by that decision and
judgment, any right of plaintiff in error under a law of the United
States was infringed within the meaning
Page 242 U. S. 260
of § 237, Judicial Code, when the law creating the supposed
right was not enacted until after the judgment. If, however, by
virtue of the provisions of the Act of 1915, or of any action
heretofore or hereafter taken by the Interstate Commerce Commission
under it, plaintiff in error is entitled to an injunction against
the further enforcement of the order of the state Commission, that
right may be asserted in another action and will not be prejudiced
by our present decision.
With respect to the question of due process of law, it is
unnecessary to determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment requires
that state action, legislative in its nature, of the character of
the order of the Railroad Commission shall be preceded by notice
and an opportunity for a hearing. In the case before us, the
Supreme Court of Indiana construed the Act of 1909 as supplemental
to the Act of 1905, which, as amended in 1907 (Acts 1907, p. 469, §
6; Burns' Anno.Ind.Stat. 1908, § 5536), gave to any carrier or
other party dissatisfied with any order made by the Commission a
right to resort to the courts in an action to suspend it or set it
aside. Since the order in question was made after notice and a full
hearing, and plaintiff in error had and exercised the right to a
judicial review by action at law, we concur in the view of the
state court that there has been in this respect no deprivation of
property without due process of law.
The only other point requiring mention is the insistence that
the order is so indefinite and uncertain in its terms as not to
furnish an intelligible measure of the duty of plaintiff in error,
and is therefore a denial of due process of law. Upon this point
the state court held, following its previous decision in
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Railroad Comm., 175 Ind. 630,
638, that the Railroad Commission itself, by virtue of the act, had
power to grant relief through a rehearing, and that, without first
resorting to that method of procedure, plaintiff in error was not
entitled to have the
Page 242 U. S. 261
order set aside by the courts. The general rule is that one
aggrieved by the rulings of such an administrative tribunal may not
complain that the Constitution of the United States has been
violated if he has not availed himself of the remedies prescribed
by the state law for a rectification of such rulings.
Bradley
v. Richmond, 227 U. S. 477,
227 U. S. 485.
And since the record shows that plaintiff in error and its
associates were accorded a rehearing upon the very question of
modification, but abandoned it, nothing more need be said upon that
point.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE Clarke took no part in the consideration or decision
of this case.