Whether the cancellation of a land contract is governed by the
law of the situs or the law of the place of making and performance
is a question of local common law with which this Court is not
concerned in a case coming from a state tribunal.
In a suit in a state court to quiet title to land within its
jurisdiction, a resident of another state voluntarily appeared and,
as defendant and counterclaimant, asserted his right to possession
and control of the land under a contract of sale. The court
adjudged that his rights under the contract were gone as the result
of statutory proceedings
Page 242 U. S. 172
for forfeiture and cancellation taken pursuant to the
lex
loci rei sitae. Held that, whether the court was
right or wrong in upholding the cancellation proceeding as applied
to the contract, there was no denial of due process of law, since
due process was afforded in the suit to quiet title itself.
Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh, 226 U.
S. 112, distinguished.
Such proceedings as are required by Minnesota Revised Statutes,
1905, § 4442, and North Dakota Revised Code of Civil Procedure,
1905, ch. 30, Art. 3, pars. 7494-7497, in order to enable a vendor
to cancel and avoid a contract for a default of the vendee are not
judicial proceedings, but merely statutory conditions upon the
right of cancellation, and hence the absence of notice does not
involve a denial of due process.
No federal question arises under the contract clause from the
impairment of a contractual obligation by judicial decision
alone.
29 N.D. 28 affirmed.
The case is stated in the opinion.
Page 242 U. S. 173
MR. JUSTICE BRANDEIS delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case comes here on writ of error to the Supreme Court of
North Dakota to review a decree quieting title in the defendant in
error -- the plaintiff below -- to land situated in that state. The
plaintiff in error, a resident of Minnesota, claimed under an
executory contract for
Page 242 U. S. 174
the purchase of the land in controversy, and the rights of the
parties turned upon whether this contract was outstanding or had
been duly cancelled. Both Minnesota, where the contract was made
and to be performed, and North Dakota had statutes providing that a
vendor in a contract for the sale of land may not cancel and
terminate the same upon default except after written notice to the
vendee, giving him at least thirty days within which to make good
his nonperformance. Minn.R.S. 1905, § 4442; N.Dak.Rev.Code 1905,
Chap. 30, Art. 3. The material provisions of the latter statute are
copied in the margin.* The vendor in this case (grantor of
defendant
Page 242 U. S. 175
in error) had given to the sheriff of the county where the land
lay a written notice of cancellation to be served upon the
plaintiff in error if found within the said county, and upon return
of not found, caused the same to be published in a county
newspaper, and later filed for record affidavits of publication and
of nonredemption -- all in conformity with the North Dakota
statute, if it applied.
When the present action was brought to quiet title, plaintiff in
error defended, and asked for counter relief, contending that his
contract was still valid and subsisting, as the action prescribed
by the Minnesota statute to entitle a vendor to cancel had not been
taken. The trial court held that the North Dakota law governed;
that, under it, the contract had been "duly and legally cancelled;"
that the plaintiff in error having shown no right in the land,
title should be forever quieted in the defendant in error. This
decree was affirmed by the supreme court on appeal.
Wilson v.
Kryger, 29 N.D. 28. We are asked to review the case on the
ground that the state court deprived the plaintiff in error of
property without
Page 242 U. S. 176
due process of law and impaired the obligation of his contract
in holding that the cancellation proceeding, of which the plaintiff
in error had no actual notice, effectively terminated his rights
under the contract.
It is apparent from the above statement that there has been no
lack of due process. The court below, having jurisdiction of the
suit to quiet title, was called upon to determine the conflicting
claims to the land. The plaintiff in error voluntarily appeared,
and he availed himself of the opportunity to urge his claims to
equitable ownership under the contract of sale. The court decided
against him, holding the contract no longer outstanding. The most
that the plaintiff in error can say is that the state court made a
mistaken application of doctrines of the conflict of laws in
deciding that the cancellation of a land contract is governed by
the law of the situs instead of the place of making and
performance. But that, being purely a question of local common law,
is a matter with which this Court is not concerned.
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U.
S. 477;
Finney v. Guy, 189 U.
S. 335,
189 U. S. 346;
Allen v. Alleghany Co., 196 U. S. 458;
Marrow v. Brinkley, 129 U. S. 178.
The argument of the plaintiff in error is seemingly based upon
the erroneous theory that his rights were foreclosed by the
cancellation proceeding, which, lacking the requisite notice,
deprived him of property without due process. But the action under
the cancellation statute was in no sense a judicial proceeding. It
was simply a statutory condition with which vendors were required
to comply before they could take advantage of a default by the
vendee. If the contract, properly interpreted, or the law, properly
applied, required that this condition be performed in Minnesota,
steps taken by him under the North Dakota statute would be
ineffective. Whether or not proper proceedings had been taken to
secure cancellation could be determined only by a court having
Page 242 U. S. 177
jurisdiction, and the North Dakota court had jurisdiction not
only over the land, but, through the voluntary appearance of
plaintiff in error, also over him. His rights have been foreclosed
not by the cancellation proceeding under the statute, but by a due
and regular judicial decree which was based upon the finding that a
default had occurred, of which the vendor was entitled to take
advantage, having complied with the proper law. If the plaintiff in
error had not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court,
the decree could have determined only the title to the land, and
would have left him free to assert any personal rights he may have
had under the contract. But, having come into court and
specifically asked in his cross-bill that he be declared entitled
to the "possession and control of the real estate described in the
complaint herein under a contract of sale," he cannot now complain
if he has been concluded altogether in the premises. The plaintiff
in error relies upon
Selover, Bates & Co. v. Walsh,
226 U. S. 112.
That was a personal action for breach of contract, and not, like
the present case, an action merely to determine the title to land;
and, as the court found on the facts there involved, that the
proper law as to cancellation had been applied, the case cannot be
construed as holding that an erroneous application thereof would
raise a question of due process.
The contention based on the contract clause is equally devoid of
merit, for there has been no subsequent legislation impairing the
obligation of the contract. Impairment by judicial decision does
not raise a federal question.
Cross Lake Shooting & Fishing
Club v. Louisiana, 224 U. S. 632.
Judgment affirmed.
* The title of this case, as originally docketed, was "
Henry
H. Kryger, plaintiff in error v. Edward H. Wilson." On October
9, 1916, the death of Edward H. Wilson was suggested, and the
appearance of Ida S. Wilson and J. E. Davis, administrators, as the
parties defendant in error, was filed and entered.
* N.Dak.Rev.Code of Civ.Pro. (1905), Chap. 30, Art. 3:
"Par. 7494. Owner must give written notice to vendee or
purchaser. No owner of real estate, or owner of any equity therein,
[who] shall hereafter make or execute a contract for deed, bond for
deed, or other instrument for the future conveyance of any such
real estate or equity therein, shall have the right to declare a
cancellation, termination or forfeiture thereof or thereunder,
except upon written notice to the vendee or purchaser, or his
assigns, as hereinafter provided, and such notice shall be given to
such vendee or purchaser or his assigns, notwithstanding any
provision or condition in any such instrument to the contrary."
"Par. 7495. In case of default. Contents of notice. Whenever any
default shall have been made in the terms or conditions of any such
instrument hereinafter made, and the owner or vendor shall desire
to cancel or terminate the same, [he] shall, within a reasonable
time after such default, cause a written notice to be served upon
the vendee or purchaser, or his assigns, stating that such default
occurred, and that said contract will be cancelled or terminated,
and shall recite in said notice the time when said cancellation or
termination shall take effect, which shall not be less than thirty
days after the service of such notice."
"Par. 7496. Notice, how served. Such notice shall be served upon
the vendee or purchaser, or his assigns, in the manner now provided
for the service of summons in the district court of this state, if
such person to be served resides within the state. If such vendee
or purchaser, or his assigns, as the case may be, resides without
the state or cannot be found therein, of which fact, the return of
the sheriff of the county in which said real estate is situated,
that such person to be served cannot be found in his county, shall
be
prima facie evidence, then such notice shall be served
by the publication thereof in a weekly newspaper within said
county; or, if there is no weekly newspaper within said county,
then in a newspaper published at the capital of this state for a
period of three successive weeks."
"Par. 7497. Time allowed. Such vendee or purchaser, or his
assigns, shall have thirty days after the service of such notice
upon him in which to perform the conditions or comply with the
provisions upon which the default shall have occurred, and upon
such performance, and upon making such payment, together with the
costs of service of such notice, such contract or other instrument
shall be reinstated and shall remain in force and effect the same
as if no default had occurred therein. No provision in any contract
for the purchase of land, or an interest in land, shall be
construed to obviate the necessity of giving the aforesaid notice,
and no contract shall terminate until such notice is given, any
provision in such contract to the contrary notwithstanding."
The provisions of the Minnesota statute are substantially to the
same effect.