When a passenger claims damages from a carrier for the loss of
baggage accepted by the carrier for transportation between states,
the rights and liabilities of the parties depend upon the Acts of
Congress, the agreement of the parties and the common law
principles accepted and enforced by the federal courts.
In such case, the carrier is entitled to the presumption that
its business was being rightfully conducted.
Where a stipulation, limiting a carrier's liability for baggage
unless its value is stated and an extra charge paid, is printed on
the face of a ticket as an ingredient of the ticket contract, and
is, in substance, reiterated on a baggage check, one who,
purchasing the ticket, employs it at once in checking baggage,
receives the check and accepts and uses both ticket and check
without objection, may be presumed to have assented to the
stipulation, although he did not read it.
As bearing on its baggage liability, an interstate carrier has a
right to put in evidence applicable tariff schedules on file with
the Interstate Commerce Commission, and to have them duly
considered by the court.
In an action over lost baggage, copies of tariff schedules on
file with
Page 242 U. S. 149
the Interstate Commerce Commission, certified by its Chairman,
and containing clauses limiting baggage liability were offered by
the defendant and received in evidence notwithstanding objection to
the mode of certification. Judgment having been rendered on the
theory that the limitation could not bind the plaintiff without her
assent, the court below, on appeal, though holding such theory
erroneous, affirmed the judgment upon the ground that the
certification was insufficient and the copies therefore
inadmissible.
Held that whether the certification was
sufficient or not, it was error to affirm the judgment and thus
foreclose the defendant from protecting itself by introducing other
evidence on a new trial.
The case is stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
At its New York City station, in September, 1910, Miss Beaham
purchased of plaintiff in error a first-class ticket over its own
and connecting lines, on the face of which was printed:
"Issued by the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad.
Good for one passage of the class indicated on coupons attached to
Kansas City, Missouri, when stamped and sold by an agent holding
written authority as prescribed by law, and presented with coupons
attached. Subject to the following contract: . . . 5. Baggage
liability is limited to wearing apparel not to exceed one hundred
(100) dollars in value for a whole ticket and fifty (50) dollars
for a half ticket unless a greater value is declared by the owner,
and excess charge thereon paid at the time of taking passage. "
Page 242 U. S. 150
Immediately after purchasing the ticket, she presented it at the
baggage department; her trunk was received for transportation, and
she accepted a check or receipt therefor upon which were the words:
"See conditions on back. Value not stated." On the back this was
printed:
"Notice to passengers. Baggage consists of a passenger's
personal wearing apparel and liability is limited to $100 (except a
greater or less amount is provided in tariffs) on full fare ticket,
unless a greater value is declared by owner at time of checking and
payment is made therefor."
The trunk and contents having been lost, she sued plaintiff in
error for their full value in the Circuit Court, Jackson County,
Missouri. Admitting responsibility for $100, the company claimed
exemption from any larger recovery because of limitations specified
in the ticket and impliedly assented to when it was accepted and
used, and also because of the same limitations embodied in its
tariff schedules filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission.
A jury being waived, the cause was tried by the court.
Acceptance and use of both ticket and check were shown, and nothing
in the evidence indicated any purpose to deceive or mislead the
purchaser, or inability on her part to appreciate the provisions in
question; she disclaimed having read them, and denied their
validity under general principles of law. Counsel for the railroad
offered in evidence copies of its tariff schedules on file with the
Interstate Commerce Commission, certified by the chairman of that
body. These contained clauses limiting liability for baggage to
$100 unless greater value was declared and paid for, and they were
admitted notwithstanding an objection to mode of their
authentication.
The circuit court held no agreement limiting liability resulted
from acceptance and use of ticket and check,
Page 242 U. S. 151
and that,
"even if the local and interstate tariffs of excess baggage
rates introduced in evidence were filed with the Interstate
Commerce Commission of the United States, and properly posted as
required by the Interstate Commerce Act, still plaintiff would be
entitled to recover the reasonable value of her trunk and the
reasonable value of the articles of baggage contained therein,
unless she expressly assented to the provisions of said tariffs
limiting the liability of the defendant to $100 for loss of baggage
unless a greater value should be declared and paid for."
A judgment for $1,771.52 was affirmed by the Kansas City Court
of Appeals. It held that
Boston and Maine Railroad v.
Hooker, 233 U. S. 97, would
necessitate a reversal but for the fact that the record contained
no competent evidence to show a schedule on file with the
Commission specifying liability for baggage;
"the federal statute provides that copies of tariff rates on
file with that Commission shall be received in evidence, if
certified by the secretary, under the seal of the Commission,"
and certification by the chairman is insufficient. It therefore
wholly disregarded the copies in the record and treated the cause
as though they had not been introduced.
The transactions in question related to interstate commerce;
consequent rights and liabilities depend upon acts of Congress,
agreement between the parties, and common law principles accepted
and enforced in federal courts. And the carrier is entitled to the
presumption that its business is being conducted lawfully.
Southern Express Company v. Byers, 240 U.
S. 612,
240 U. S. 614;
Cincinnati, New Orleans & Texas Pacific Railway Co. v.
Rankin, 241 U. S. 319,
241 U. S.
326.
In the circumstances disclosed, acceptance and use of the ticket
sufficed to establish an agreement
prima facie valid which
limited the carrier's liability. Mere failure by the passenger to
read matter plainly placed before her
Page 242 U. S. 152
could not overcome the presumption of assent.
Railroad
Company v. Fraloff, 100 U. S. 24,
100 U. S. 27;
The Kensington, 183 U. S. 263;
Fonseca v. Cunard Steamship Co., 153 Mass. 553.
In order to determine the liability assumed for baggage, it was
proper to consider applicable tariff schedules on file with the
Interstate Commerce Commission, and the carrier had a federal right
not only to a fair opportunity to put these in evidence, but also
that, when before the court, they should be given due
consideration.
Southern Express Company v. Byers,
240 U. S. 614;
Kansas City Southern Railway Co. v. Jones, 241 U.
S. 181. After their admission in evidence by the trial
court, the schedules could not be disregarded arbitrarily without
denying the railroad's federal right, and we think they were so
treated by the court of appeals. We are cited to no decision of the
Supreme Court of Missouri recognizing any settled rule of practice
there which required such action, and the unjust consequences of it
are apparent. Assuming, without deciding, the correctness of its
opinion that the schedules as certified were inadmissible and
improperly received, nevertheless the court should not have
destroyed the carrier's opportunity to protect itself by
introducing other evidence upon a new trial.
Reverse and remand for further proceedings not inconsistent with
this opinion.
Reversed.
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY dissents.