In a suit in the state court under the Employers' Liability Act,
defendant's contentions that plaintiff's intestate was not engaged
in interstate commerce and that a state statute limiting amount of
recovery controlled involve federal questions, and, unless wholly
frivolous, this Court has jurisdiction.
In this case, however, as both of the propositions are so
wanting in substance
Page 239 U. S. 53
as not to require further argument, the judgment is affirmed
under Rule 6, paragraph 5.
Previous decisions of this Court have conclusively established
the exclusive operation of the Employers' Liability Act over the
subject with which it deals to the exclusion of all state statutes
relating thereto.
266 Ill. 248 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the Jurisdiction of this Court to
review a judgment of the state court on writ of error under § 237,
Jud.Code, and the disposition of such writ when frivolous under
Rule 6, par. 5, are stated in the opinion.
Memorandum opinion by MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE, by direction of
the court:
The recovery under the Employers' Liability Act in the trial
court, affirmed by the intermediate and supreme court, was for the
damage caused by the death of Mason through the negligence of the
defendant company. 266
Page 239 U. S. 54
Ill. 248. Two propositions are relied upon for reversal: first,
a refusal to instruct a verdict on the ground that there was no
evidence tending to show either negligence or that the company or
the deceased at the time of the particular transaction from which
the injury arose was engaged in interstate commerce, and second, a
further refusal to instruct that a state statute limiting the
amount of recovery was controlling although the suit was under the
act of Congress. These contentions are federal (
Seaboard Air
Line v. Padgett, 236 U. S. 668,
236 U. S. 673;
Central Vermont Ry. v. White, 238 U.
S. 507,
238 U. S.
509), and there is jurisdiction, as we do not find them
wholly frivolous.
Overruling the motion to dismiss, we come to consider whether we
should grant the motion to affirm, and for that purpose we must
decide whether the propositions are so wanting in substance as not
to require further argument. Rule 6, paragraph 5. We are of the
opinion that, as to both propositions, an affirmative answer is
required. We say this because, as to the first, it is apparent that
there is no ground upon which to rest the assertion that there was
no tendency of proof whatever on the subjects stated, but, to the
contrary, the record makes it clear, and the arguments in support
of the proposition demonstrate, that it alone involves a mere
dispute concerning the weight of conflicting tendencies of proof.
And the same conclusion is necessary as to the second, because, in
substance and effect, the want of merit in that proposition has by
necessary intendment been so conclusively established by the
previous decisions of this Court concerning the exclusive operation
and effect of the Employers' Liability Act over the subject with
which it deals as to exclude all ground for the contention which
the proposition makes.
Second Employers' Liability Cases,
223 U. S. 1,
223 U. S. 53-55;
Michigan Cent. R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S.
59,
227 U. S. 66-67;
St. Louis, Iron Mtn. & So Ry. v. Craft, 237 U.
S. 648,
237 U. S.
655.
Affirmed.