A finding by the Interstate Commerce Commission in a general
investigation that an advance in a rate on specified commodity
between specified points is unreasonable inures to the benefit of
every shipper who has paid the unjust rate, provided however, that
he asserts his claim against the carrier within the time fixed by
law.
A shipper who paid charges prior to the passage of the Hepburn
Act and did not commence proceedings until more than one year after
the passage of that act cannot recover on the strength of a finding
of the Interstate Commerce Commission made in a general proceeding
to which he was not a party that the rate paid was
unreasonable.
The Conformity Act (Rev.Stat. 914) does not apply to a state
rule of practice prohibiting taking advantage of the statute of
limitations by general demurrer tc a cause arising under a federal
statute expressly limiting the time within which the right created
by the statute can be asserted -- in which case the lapse of time
not only bars the remedy, but destroys the liability.
The prohibitions of the Interstate Commerce Act against unjust
discriminations relate not only to inequality of facilities, but
also to giving preferences by means of consent judgments or waivers
of defenses open to the carrier.
Quaere whether connecting carriers participating in a
haul, the advanced
Page 236 U. S. 663
rate for which was held by the Commission to be excessive but
who were not responsible for advancing the rate, could be held
jointly and severally responsible for reparation before they had
been heard by the Commission.
The facts, which involve the right of a shipper to recover from
the carrier freight charges held to have been unreasonable by the
Interstate Commerce Commission and the provisions in the Hepburn
Act limiting the time within which claims of that nature can be
asserted, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE Lamar delivered the opinion of the Court.
The A. J. Phillips Company is a manufacturer of doors at Fenton,
Michigan. For use in its business, it purchased large quantities of
lumber, much of which was shipped from points in Alabama over the
lines of the Illinois Central, the Southern, the Grand Trunk
Western, and the Detroit & Milwaukee Railway Companies. Prior
to April, 1903, the rate to Fenton was 28 cents a hundred, of which
14 cents was the charge for the haul over the Southern and the
Illinois Central, from Alabama points to the Ohio river. The
remaining 14 cents represented the charge of the Grand Trunk and
the Detroit Companies for the haul from the Ohio River to
Fenton.
In April, 1903, the Illinois Central, the Southern Railway, and
other carriers operating in the Gulf states filed a tariff which
made an advance of 2 cents per hundred on lumber shipped from
Alabama mills to the Ohio River and beyond.
On July 24, 1903, the Yellow Pine Association filed a complaint
with the Interstate Commerce Commission, seeking to have this
increase declared to be unreasonable.
Page 236 U. S. 664
After a hearing the Commission held (10 I.C.C. 505-547) that
"the advance . . . of 2 cents . . . was not warranted under all
the facts in evidence, and that the resultant increased rate is
unreasonable and unjust. An order will be issued in accordance with
these views."
The carriers sought to have this order enjoined, but the action
of the Commission was sustained by the circuit court, and on May
27, 1907, that ruling was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the
United States (
206 U. S. 206 U.S.
441), after which, as appears from the official reports (Joice v.
Ill. Cent. R. Co., 15 I.C.C. 239), the Commission approved the
settlement of a number of claims for reparation which had been
previously filed. The Phillips Company was not a party to the
proceedings before the Commission, and made no claim for
reparation, but on May 11, 1909, it brought suit in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan
against the four carriers named above for the recovery of the
overcharge. The declaration, which, by reference, made the report
of the Commission in 10 I.C.C. 505 a part of the pleading
(
Robinson v. B. & O. R. Co., 222
U. S. 507), alleged that the four carriers had charged
plaintiff 30 cents per hundred, though they well knew that 28 cents
was the highest just and reasonable freight rate that could be
charged on lumber, and that anything in excess of 28 cents was
illegal, unjust, and excessive. It was also averred that the
Commission, on the complaint of the Yellow Pine Association, had
found the 2-cent advance to be unreasonable, and for that reason
the plaintiff claimed that the defendant carriers were each and all
bound to return to it the 2-cent overcharge on 218 cars of lumber.
There was a prayer for judgment for $5,000 damages and $2,000
attorneys' fees.
The Southern Railway was not served. The Illinois Central,
having no office in the district, was ultimately dismissed from the
case. The demurrer of the other two
Page 236 U. S. 665
defendants was sustained. That judgment was affirmed by the
circuit court of appeals, and the case brought here by writ of
error.
1. The Phillips Company, relying on a finding by the Commission
on the complaint of the Yellow Pine Association that a 2-cents
advance in a lumber rate was unreasonable, brought suit against
four carriers to recover an overcharge collected on 90,432,500
pounds of lumber shipped to it over their connecting lines. But, as
the plaintiff was not a party before the Commission, the defendants
insist that it cannot take advantage of the order that the rate was
unjust, so as to be able to maintain the present suit.
But the proceeding before the Commission to determine the
reasonableness of the 2-cents advance was not in the nature of
private litigation between a lumber association and the carriers,
but was a matter of public concern in which the whole body of
shippers was interested. The inquiry as to the reasonableness of
the advance was general in its nature. The finding thereon was
general in its operation, and inured to the benefit of every person
that had been obliged to pay the unjust rate. Otherwise those who
filed the complaint or intervened during the hearing would have
secured an advantage over the general body of the public, with the
result that the order of the Commission would have created a
preference in favor of the parties to the record, and would have
destroyed the very uniformity which that body had been organized to
secure. The plaintiff and every other shipper similarly situated
was entitled by appropriate proceedings before the Commission or
the courts to obtain the benefit of that general finding and order.
See Abilene Case, 204 U. S. 446;
Robinson v. B. & O., 222 U. S. 507;
Baer Bros. v. Denver &c., 233 U.
S. 479,
233 U. S. 489,
and compare Nicola v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,
14 I.C.C. 200(4), 205.
2. But while every person who had paid the rate could
Page 236 U. S. 666
take advantage of the finding that the advance was unreasonable,
he was obliged to assert his claim within the time fixed by law.
When the overcharge was collected, a cause of action at once arose,
and the shipper at once had the right to file a complaint or to
intervene in proceedings instituted by others. If he failed to take
either of those steps, and there was a finding of unreasonableness
in the proceedings begun by others, he could, if in time, present
his claim and await the result of the litigation over the validity
of any order made at the instance of those parties. If it was
ultimately sustained by the court as valid, he would then be in
position to obtain reparation from the Commission, or a judgment
from a court of competent jurisdiction, on a claim that had been
seasonably presented. But neither proceedings begun by other
shippers nor findings of unreasonableness and orders issued thereon
by the Commission would save the rights of those who disregarded
the requirements of the Hepburn Amendment, that
"all complaints for the recovery of damages shall be filed with
the Commission within two years from the time the cause of action
accrues, and not after, and a petition for the enforcement of an
order for the payment of money shall be filed in the circuit court
within one year from the date of the order, and not after, provided
that claims accrued prior to the passage of this act may be
presented within one year."
34 Stat. 586.
In the present case, the overcharges were made and paid prior to
August, 1904. The present suit was brought May 9, 1909, less than
two years after the validity of the Commission's order was
sustained by the supreme court, but more than one year after the
passage of the Hepburn Amendment, and more than four years after
the plaintiff's cause of action arose.
3. It is argued, however, that, under the Conformity Act (R.S. ยง
914), the case is to be governed by the Michigan
Page 236 U. S. 667
practice, which does not permit a defendant to take advantage of
the statute of limitations by a general demurrer to the
declaration. But that rule does not apply to a cause of action
arising under a statute which indicates its purpose to prevent
suits on delayed claims, by the provision that all complaints for
damages should be filed within two years, and not after. Under such
a statute, the lapse of time not only bars the remedy, but destroys
the liability (
Finn v. United States, 123 U.
S. 227,
123 U. S.
232), whether complaint is filed with the Commission or
suit is brought in a court of competent jurisdiction. This will
more distinctly appear by considering the requirements of
uniformity which, in this as in so many other instances, must be
borne in mind in construing the Commerce Act. The obligation of the
carrier to adhere to the legal rate, to refund only what is
permitted by law, and to treat all shippers alike would have made
it illegal for the carriers, either by silence or by express
waiver, to preserve to the Phillips Company a right of action which
the statute required should be asserted within a fixed period. To
have one period of limitation where the complaint is filed before
the Commission, and the varying periods of limitation of the
different states where a suit was brought in a court of competent
jurisdiction, or to permit a railroad company to plead the statute
of limitations as against some and to waive it as against others,
would be to prefer some and discriminate against others in
violation of the terms of the Commerce Act, which forbids all
devices by which such results may be accomplished. The prohibitions
of the statute against unjust discrimination relate not only to
inequality of charges and inequality of facilities, but also to the
giving of preferences by means of consent judgments, or the waiver
of defenses open to the carrier. The railroad company therefore was
bound to claim the benefit of the statute here, and could do so
here by general demurrer. For when it appeared that the complaint
had not been
Page 236 U. S. 668
filed within the time required by the statute, it was evident as
matter of law that the plaintiff had no cause of action. The
carrier not being liable to the plaintiff for overcharges collected
more than four years prior to the bringing of this suit, it was
proper to dismiss the action.
4. There is the further contention that the connecting carriers
operating north of the Ohio River had to collect the filed tariff
rate of 30 cents per hundred even though they were not responsible
for the advance, and that in no event could they be held liable for
the refund until after they had been heard by the Commission. There
is nothing in this record indicating that the Commission undertook
to impose a liability upon those who had not been heard. But the
conclusion that the plaintiff's cause of action had been lost by
lapse of time makes it unnecessary to determine whether carriers
participating in the haul, but who did not put in the advance, or
who were not parties to the proceeding in which a portion of the
rate was held to be unreasonable, could be held jointly and
severally liable for the collections made by them while the 30-cent
rate was in force. The suit was properly dismissed on other
grounds, and the judgment is
Affirmed.