If the car is moving on a railroad engaged in interstate
commerce, it is subject to the provisions and penalties of the
Safety Appliance Act, although engaged at the time in intrastate
commerce.
United States v. Southern Ry., 222 U. S.
20.
The principle that an act may constitute a criminal offense
against
Page 236 U. S. 440
two sovereignties, so that punishment by one does not prevent
punishment by the other, only relates to cases where both
sovereignties have jurisdiction over the act. It has no application
where one of the governments has exclusive jurisdiction of the
subject matter, and therefore has the exclusive power to
punish.
Under the federal Constitution, the power of Congress to
regulate interstate commerce is such that, when exercised, it is
exclusive and
ipso facto supersedes existing state
legislation on the same subject.
Congress may so circumscribe its regulations in regard to a
matter within its exclusive jurisdiction as to occupy only a
limited field and leave a part of the subject open to incidental
legislation by the states; but the Safety Appliance Act extended to
the whole subject of equipping cars with safety appliances, to the
exclusion of further action by the states.
The Indiana statute requiring railway companies to place
grab-irons and hand-holds on the sides and ends of every car having
been superseded by the federal Safety Appliance Act, penalties
imposed by the former cannot be recovered as to cars operated on
interstate railroads although engaged only in intrastate
traffic.
The facts, which involve the effect of the Federal Safety
Appliance Act on state statutes relating to safety appliances on
railroad cars used in interstate commerce, are stated in the
opinion.
Page 236 U. S. 444
MR. JUSTICE LAMAR delivered the opinion of the Court.
The Indiana statute requires railway companies to place secure
grab-irons and hand-holds on the sides or ends of every railroad
car, under a penalty of $100 fine, to be recovered in a civil
action.
In March, 1910, the railroad commission of the state brought
such a suit against the Southern Railway Company, alleging that the
company on February 24, 1910, had transported from Boonsville,
Indiana, to Milltown,
Page 236 U. S. 445
Indiana, a car which did not have the required equipment. The
defendant filed an answer in which it denied liability under the
state law inasmuch as on February 24, 1910, the Federal Safety
Appliance Act imposed penalties for failing to equip cars with
hand-holds, and also designated the court in which they might be
recovered. The commission's demurrer to the answer was sustained.
The defendant refusing to plead further, judgment was entered
against the company. That judgment was affirmed by the state court,
and the case was brought here by writ of error.
The car alleged to have been without the required equipment,
though transporting freight between points wholly within the State
of Indiana, was moving on a railroad engaged in interstate
commerce, and the company was therefore subject to the provisions
and penalties of the Safety Appliance Act. 27 Stat. 531, § 4.
Southern Railway v. United States, 222 U. S.
20.
The defendant in error insists, however, that the railroad
company was also liable for the penalty imposed by the Indiana
statute. In support of this position, numerous cases are cited
which, like
Cross v. North Carolina, 132 U.
S. 131, hold that the same act may constitute a criminal
offense against two sovereignties, and that punishment by one does
not prevent punishment by the other. That doctrine is thoroughly
established. But, upon an analysis of the principle on which it is
founded, it will be found to relate only to cases where the act
sought to be punished is one over which both sovereignties have
jurisdiction. This concurrent jurisdiction may be either because
the nature of the act is such that at the same time it produces
effects respectively within the sphere of state and federal
regulation, and thus violates the laws of both, or where there is
this double effect in a matter of which one can exercise control,
but an authoritative declaration that the paramount jurisdiction of
one shall not
Page 236 U. S. 446
exclude that of the other.
Compare Rev.Stat. § 711, 37
Stat. 670.
But the principle that the offender may, for one act, be
prosecuted in two jurisdictions has no application where one of the
governments has exclusive jurisdiction of the subject matter, and
therefore the exclusive power to punish. Such is the case here
where Congress, in the exercise of its power to regulate interstate
commerce, has legislated as to the appliances with which certain
instrumentalities of that commerce must be furnished in order to
secure the safety of employees. Until Congress entered that field,
the states could legislate as to equipment in such manner as to
incidentally affect, without burdening, interstate commerce. But
Congress could pass the Safety Appliance Act only because of the
fact that the equipment of cars moving on interstate roads was a
regulation of interstate commerce. Under the Constitution, the
nature of that power is such that, when exercised, it is exclusive,
and
ipso facto supersedes existing state legislation on
the same subject. Congress, of course, could have "circumscribed
its regulations" so as to occupy a limited field.
Savage v.
Jones, 225 U. S. 502,
225 U. S. 533;
Atlantic Coast Line v. Georgia, 234 U.
S. 280,
234 U. S. 293.
But, so far as it did legislate, the exclusive effect of the Safety
Appliance Act did not relate merely to details of the statute and
the penalties it imposed, but extended to the whole subject of
equipping cars with appliances intended for the protection of
employees. The states thereafter could not legislate so as to
require greater or less or different equipment; nor could they
punish by imposing greater or less or different penalties. For, as
said in
Prigg v. Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, 16 Pet. 618:
"If Congress have a constitutional power to regulate a
particular subject, and they do actually regulate it in a given
manner, and in a certain form, it cannot be that the state
legislatures have a right to interfere; and, as
Page 236 U. S. 447
it were, by way of complement to the legislation of Congress, to
prescribe additional regulations, and what they may deem auxiliary
provisions for the same purpose. In such a case, the legislation of
Congress in what it does prescribe manifestly indicates that it
does not intend that there shall be any farther legislation to act
upon the subject matter. Its silence as to what it does not do is
as expressive of what its intention is as the direct provisions
made by it . . . ; the will of Congress upon the whole subject is
as clearly established by what it had not declared as by what it
has expressed."
Without, therefore, discussing the many cases sustaining the
right of the states to legislate on subjects which, while not
burdening, may yet incidentally affect, interstate commerce, it is
sufficient here to say that Congress has so far occupied the field
of legislation relating to the equipment of freight cars with
safety appliances as to supersede existing and prevent further
legislation on that subject. The principle is too well established
to require argument. Its application may be seen in rulings in the
closely analogous cases relating to state penalties for failing to
furnish cars, and to state penalties for retaining employees at
work on cars beyond the time allowed by the hours of service
law.
In
St. Louis, Iron Mt. & S. Ry. v. Hampton,
227 U. S. 267,
it was held that the Arkansas statute imposing a penalty for
failing to deliver cars had been superseded by the provisions of
the Hepburn Act, although the provisions of the two statutes were
not identical. In
Northern Pacific Ry. v. Washington,
222 U. S. 371,
it was held that congressional legislation as to hours of service
so completely occupied the field as to prevent state legislation on
that subject. In
Erie R. Co. v. New York, 233 U.
S. 671, a like ruling was made in a case where the New
York law punished a railroad company for allowing an employee to
work more than eight hours when the federal statute
Page 236 U. S. 448
punished the company for employing him for more than nine hours,
even though it was argued that the state legislation was not in
conflict with the federal act, but rather in aid of it. The same
contention is made here, inasmuch as the Indiana law requires
hand-holds on sides or ends of cars, while the federal statute
requires hand-holds to be placed both on the sides and ends of
cars.
The test, however, is not whether the state legislation is in
conflict with the details of the federal law or supplements it, but
whether the state had any jurisdiction of a subject over which
Congress had exerted its exclusive control. The Safety Appliance
Act having superseded the Indiana statute, the judgment imposing
the penalty must be reversed, and the case remanded for further
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.