A state police statute regulating the basis for compensation of
miners on the run of the mine subject to regulations of an
industrial commission, but which makes the orders of the Commission
only
prima facie reasonable and provides for their prompt
judicial review, and which does not prevent employers from
screening the coal as they desire for marketing it, amply protects
the rights of the employers. Only alleged infractions of the
constitutional rights of those attacking the statute can be
considered in determining its constitutionality.
That a state may, without violating the due process provision of
the Fourteenth Amendment, place reasonable restraints upon liberty
of contract,
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. Maguire,
219 U. S. 549,
applies to prescribing methods for compensation of miners for
producing coal.
McLean v. Arkansas, 211 U.
S. 539.
Coal mining is a proper subject for police regulation, and it is
for the legislature of the state to determine, so long as its
action is not arbitrary,
Page 236 U. S. 339
the measure of relief in regard to evils to be corrected in
connection therewith.
It is not the province of the court to revise conclusions which
men versed in a business have found practicable; nor will this
Court do so in advance of the law authorizing a commission composed
of such men to prescribe regulations being put into effect.
A state police statute will not be declared unconstitutional as
denying due process of law on the ground that the penalties are
excessive in a suit brought to enjoin the enforcement of the
statute and in which penalties are not involved, nor where, as in
this case, the penalties are not so excessive as to prevent a
resort to the courts to test the constitutionality of the
statute.
The Ohio Run of Mine or Anti-Screen Law of 1914 is not
unconstitutional under the due process provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment either as taking the property of employees without due
process of law, or by denying them an opportunity to be heard, nor
by unreasonably abridging their liberty of contract, nor for
prescribing unreasonable conditions as to screening the coal and
ascertaining the amount of impurities therein by the Industrial
Commission, nor does it exceed the power of the legislature of the
state under the constitution of the state.
214 F. 273 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality both under the
Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and
similar provisions of the constitution of the Ohio of the "Run of
Mine" or "Anti-Screen" Coal Mine Law of 1914 of the State of Ohio,
are stated in the opinion.
Page 236 U. S. 342
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case is brought here by appeal from an order of the
District Court of the United States for the Northern District of
Ohio, refusing an application for interlocutory injunction upon the
petition of the Rail & River Coal Company, a West Virginia
corporation, against Wallace D. Yaple, Mathew B. Hammond, and
Thomas J. Duffy, as members of and constituting the Industrial
Commission of Ohio. The application was heard under § 266 of the
Judicial Code before a circuit judge and two district judges. The
object of the bill was to restrain the Industrial Commission from
putting into effect the so-called "run-of-mine" or "anti-screen"
law of the State of Ohio, passed February 5th, 1914, by the
legislature of that state, being entitled, "An Act to Regulate the
Weighing of Coal at the Mines." 104 Ohio Laws, 181. A copy of the
act is inserted in the margin.
*
Page 236 U. S. 343
Summarized, the bill sets forth that plaintiff is engaged in the
mining business in Ohio, owning a large tract of coal lands, of
approximately 32,000 acres, upon which it has four coal mines
properly developed, employing upward
Page 236 U. S. 344
of 2,000 persons; that in the State of Ohio there are about 600
coal mines, employing upwards of 45,000 persons; that in the year
1913, more than 36,000,000 tons of coal were produced, and there
was expended in wages to said employees upwards of $26,000,000;
that the defendants are the members of the Industrial Commission of
Ohio, vested by the legislature of that state with authority to
enforce the provisions of the "mine-run law;" that for many years
mining has been conducted in the State of Ohio by the miners
entering into contracts with their employers for a period of two
years; that the last contracts expired on April 1, 1914.
The bill set forth the provisions of the act, and alleged that
the same are unreasonable and arbitrary and impracticable in
operation, and that the act is unconstitutional, as in violation of
the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States,
and in violation of the Constitution of the State of Ohio, and that
it delegates legislative authority to the Industrial Commission of
the state, and although the bill was filed before the act went into
effect, it was alleged that the Industrial Commission, in putting
the same into effect, would work an irreparable
Page 236 U. S. 345
injury to the plaintiff. Upon application under this bill to the
district court, composed of three judges, the injunction was denied
(214 F. 273), and the case is appealed to this Court.
Under the system of wage payment and mining of coal in use
before the passage of this statute, miners in Ohio were paid at a
certain price per ton for screened lump coal, that is, for coal
which, after it is mined and brought to the surface, is passed over
a screen, the bars of which are 1 1/4 inches apart. The report of
the Ohio Coal Mining Commission, a public document, copies of which
have been filed by counsel in this case, shows that that system of
mining was regarded as objectionable by the miners on the ground
that they were not paid for mining of a considerable quantity of
marketable coal, and there was dissatisfaction because of the
wearing of the screens so as to increase the size of the apertures
between the bars above the standard. In Ohio, as in some other
states, there was much complaint because of this system. It appears
that the employers generally desired to preserve the screened-coal
basis of payment, and objected to the run-of-mine system, in which
the miner is paid for mining coal as it is when mined without
screening. Before enacting the legislation now in controversy in
the State of Ohio, the question was referred to a Coal Mining
Commission, which Commission, after full investigation of the
subject, made the report referred to, in which it appears that the
arguments pro and con were considered and reported upon, and a bill
was recommended in the form in which the legislature passed the
present law. The report of the Commission cannot be read without a
conviction that there was an earnest attempt to eliminate the
objections to the "run-of-mine" basis of payment to the miners, and
to enact a system fair alike to employer and miner.
The principal objections of the employers to the run-of-mine
system adopted in some of the states are a tendency
Page 236 U. S. 346
to produce coal unduly mixed and mingled with slate, sulphur,
rock, dirt, and other impurities, and to yield an increased
quantity of fine coal, to the loss of the employer.
As we have said, the result of the consideration of the
objections to this system by the Commission report was the
enactment of the present law.
Its first shows that it attempts to substitute for the system
theretofore in use in the state, where the terms of employment
required payment for mining or loading coal on the basis of the ton
or other weight, one by which the miner shall be paid according to
the total weight of all the coal contained in the mine car in which
the same has been removed from the mine; providing, however, that
no greater percentage of slate, sulphur, rock, dirt, or other
impurity shall be contained in the contents of such car than that
ascertained and determined by the Industrial Commission of
Ohio.
By the second section of the act, the Industrial Commission is
required to ascertain and determine the percentage of slate,
sulphur, rock, dirt, or other impurity unavoidable in the proper
mining or loading of such cars in the mines of the state. Evidently
this section recognized and considered the objections to the plan
of payment adopted in the first section, payment by run of mine,
and provided for ascertaining by means of the Commission of the
percentage of slate, sulphur, rock, dirt, or other impurity which
evidently the lawmakers regarded as impracticable to prevent
altogether in the mining of coal. In other words, the employer was
not obliged to compensate the miner for everything sent up in the
car, no matter how loaded with dirt and impurities. The object was
to ascertain the amount of unavoidable impurities in proper mining,
and place a limitation upon the miner to that extent.
In fixing the penalties for infractions of the act, § 7
Page 236 U. S. 347
penalizes the miner or loader for the contents of a car
containing a greater percentage of impurities than that ascertained
or determined by the Industrial Commission, and the miner for such
infraction is made guilty of a misdemeanor and punishable upon
conviction. Section 7 contains the important proviso that nothing
contained in the section shall affect the right of a miner or
loader and his employer to agree upon deductions by the system
known as docking, on account of such slate, sulphur, rock, dirt, or
other impurity.
In other words, the ascertainment of the Industrial Commission
which is provided in §§ 1 and 2 is not to be a limitation upon the
right of the employer and miner to agree upon deductions of their
own arrangement as to the amount of slate, sulphur, rock, dirt, or
other impurity permitted in the mining of coal. The employer and
miner may substitute their own agreement in that respect for the
ascertainment of the Commission, and the law fixes no penalty for
the mining of coal with such measure of impurities as the employer
and miner have thus agreed upon.
Section 3 makes it the duty of the miner and employer to agree
upon and fix the percentage of fine coal commonly known as nut,
pea, dust, and slack allowed in the output of the mines, and where
they do not agree, the Industrial Commission may fix such
percentage, which percentage thus established shall remain in force
until otherwise agreed upon between miner and employer, and the
Commission, when it finds the percentage of fine coal as fixed by
the Industrial Commission has been exceeded, may make, enter, and
cause to be enforced such order or orders as will result in
reducing the percentage of fine coal to the amount fixed by it.
The report of the Coal Commission (pages 59 and 60) shows the
consideration which that body gave to this subject in the interest
of fair mining, and its desire to
Page 236 U. S. 348
obviate by this provision the undue production of fine coal to
the disadvantage of the employer.
By § 5, the Industrial Commission is given power from time to
time, upon investigation, to change the percentage by it
ascertained and determined, or fixed by its previous orders.
The only penalty fixed by the law against the employer is
contained in § 6, where it is made unlawful for the employer to
pass the coal over a screen or other device for the purpose of
ascertaining and calculating the amount to be paid the miner or
loader for mining or loading such contents, whereby the total
weight of such contents shall be reduced or diminished.
There is nothing in the law to prevent the employer from
screening his coal as he sees fit for other purposes, and so as to
fit it for the market in such wise as he may deem advisable. The
inhibition on screening is only upon that operation when it is done
for the purpose of calculating the amount to be paid to the miner
for mining the coal. Moreover, it is important to be considered in
this connection that the orders of the Commission are not final,
but are subject to review under the statute of Ohio found in 103
Ohio Laws at 95, where the orders of the Commission are declared to
be only
prima facie reasonable, and any employer or other
person interested is entitled upon petition to a hearing upon the
reasonableness and lawfulness of the order before the Commission,
and under § 38 of the law, any employer or other person in
interest, being dissatisfied with any order of the Commission, may
commence an action in the Supreme Court of Ohio to vacate or amend
any such order upon the ground that the same is unreasonable or
unlawful, and the supreme court is authorized to hear and determine
such action, and may, in its discretion (§ 41) suspend all or any
part of the order of the Commission. The statute makes provision
for the prompt hearing of all such actions in preference
Page 236 U. S. 349
to other civil cases, with some exceptions. It would seem that
this system of law, with a right to review in the manner we have
stated in the Supreme Court of Ohio, has provided a system ample
for the protection of the rights of the employers (
see Plymouth
Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 531).
And, of course, in this, as in other cases, only alleged
infractions of constitutional rights of those complaining can be
considered in determining the constitutionality of the law.
Southern Ry. v. King, 217 U. S. 524,
217 U. S. 534;
Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260,
226 U. S. 271;
Jeffrey Mfg. Co. v. Blagg, 235 U.
S. 571,
235 U. S.
576.
The objection that the law is unconstitutional as unduly
abridging the freedom of contract in prescribing the particular
method of compensation to be paid by employers to miners for the
production of coal was made in the case of
McLean v.
Arkansas, 211 U. S. 539, in
which this Court sustained a law of the State of Arkansas,
requiring coal mined to be paid for according to the run-of-mine
system according to its weight when brought out of the mine in
cars. In that case, the constitutional objections founded upon the
right of contract which are made here were considered and disposed
of. This Court has so often affirmed the right of the state, in the
exercise of its police power, to place reasonable restraints like
that here involved upon the freedom of contract that we need only
refer to some of the cases in passing.
Schmidinger v.
Chicago, 226 U. S. 578;
Chicago &c. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.
S. 549, and cases therein cited and reviewed.
The contention that this law has no reasonable or legal relation
to the object to be attained seems to us to be equally without
foundation in view of the recognized right of the legislature to
regulate a business of this character, and to determine for itself,
in the absence of arbitrary action, the measure of relief necessary
to effect the desired purposes. That the law is within the
authority
Page 236 U. S. 350
of the Ohio Legislature, acting under the Constitution of Ohio,
there can be no question, in view of the authority conferred by
that instrument in § 36, which provides that
"laws may be passed . . . to provide for the regulation of
methods of mining, weighing, measuring, and marketing, coal, oil,
gas, and other minerals."
As to the alleged impracticability of the law because of the
impossibility of the Industrial Commission's determining the
quantity of dirt and other impurities in any coal mined, we can
find no force in that objection. Agreements as to the amount of
docking for dirt and impurities in the mining of coal have been
constantly made, and it is not the province of a court to revise
conclusions which men versed in the business have found
practicable, certainly not in advance of an attempt to put the law
into operation. The consideration of the law already given shows
the means enacted to do away with these impurities and to insure as
far as possible the production of clean coal.
As to the objection because of the penalties, this is not a suit
to enforce penalties, nor, in view of the provisions of the
statute, can we say that the penalties are so great as to prevent a
resort to the courts to ascertain the constitutionality of the law.
Willcox v. Consolidated Gas Co., 212 U. S.
19;
Grand Trunk Ry. v. Michigan Railroad
Commission, 231 U. S. 457;
Ohio Tax Cases, 232 U. S. 576.
We are unable to discover in the statute any infraction of the
constitutional rights of the appellant, and the order denying the
temporary injunction is accordingly
Affirmed.
*
"BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE STATE OF
OHIO:"
"SECTION 1. Every miner and every loader of coal in any mine in
this state, who, under the terms of his employment, is to be paid
for mining or loading such coal on the basis of the ton or other
weight, shall be paid for such mining or loading according to the
total weight of all such coal contained within the car (hereinafter
referred to as mine car) in which the same shall have been removed
out of the mine; provided, the contents of such car when so removed
shall contain no greater percentage of slate, sulphur, rock, dirt,
or other impurity than that ascertained and determined by the
Industrial Commission of Ohio as hereinafter enacted."
"SECTION 2. Said Industrial Commission shall ascertain and
determine the percentage of slate, sulphur, rock, dirt, or other
impurity unavoidable in the proper mining or loading of the
contents of mine cars of coal in the several operating mines within
this state."
"SECTION 3. It shall be the duty of such miner or loader of coal
and his employer to agree upon and fix, for stipulated periods, the
percentage of fine coal commonly known as nut, pea, dust, and slack
allowable in the output of the mine wherein such miner or loader is
employed. At any time when there shall not be in effect such agreed
and fixed percentage of fine coal allowable in the output of any
mine said Industrial Commission shall forthwith, upon request of
such miner or loader, or his employer, fix such allowable
percentage of fine coal, which percentage so fixed by said
Industrial Commission shall continue in force until otherwise
agreed and fixed by such miner or loader and his employer. Whenever
said Industrial Commission shall find that the total output of such
fine coal at any mine for a period of one month during which such
mine shall have been operating while the percentage of fine coal so
fixed by said Industrial Commission has been in force exceeds the
percentage so fixed by it, said Industrial Commission shall at once
make, enter, and cause to be enforced such order or orders relative
to the production of coal at such mine as will result in reducing
the percentage of such fine coal to the amount so fixed by said
Industrial Commission."
"SECTION 4. Said Industrial Commission shall, as to all coal
mines in this state which have not been in operation heretofore,
perform the duties imposed upon it by the provisions hereof."
"SECTION 5. Said Industrial Commission shall have full power
from time to time to change, upon investigation, any percentage by
it ascertained and determined, or fixed, as provided in the
preceding sections hereof."
"SECTION 6. It shall be unlawful for the employer of a miner or
loader of the contents of any car of coal to pass any part of such
contents over a screen or other device, for the purpose of
ascertaining or calculating the amount to be paid such miner or
loader for mining or loading such contents, whereby the total
weight of such contents shall be reduced or diminished. Any person,
firm, or corporation violating the provisions of this section shall
be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and, upon conviction, shall be
fined for each separate offense not less than $300 nor more than
$600."
"SECTION 7. A miner or loader of the contents of a mine car
containing a greater percentage of slate, sulphur, rock, dirt, or
other impurity than that ascertained and determined by said
Industrial Commission as hereinabove provided shall be guilty of a
misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished as follows: for
the first offense within a period of three days he shall be fined
50 cents; for a second offense within such period of three days, he
shall be fined $1, and for the third offense within such period of
three days, he shall be fined not less than $2 nor more than $4.
Provided, that nothing contained in this section shall affect the
right of a miner or loader and his employer to agree upon
deductions by the system known as docking, on account of such
slate, sulphur, rock, dirt, or other impurity."