No authority beyond that already conferred on the Interstate
Commerce Commission by the Act to Regulate Commerce can be derived
by that Commission from a resolution passed by only one branch of
Congress, and so
held that the powers of the Commission in
making the investigation required by Senate Resolution No. 153, in
regard to inspection of accounts and other papers, are limited to
those conferred by the Act to Regulate Commerce and the amendments
thereto.
Section 12 of the Act to Regulate Commerce does not make
provision for inspection of accounts and correspondence of carriers
authorized by the Commission; that feature was added by the Hepburn
Act of June 29, 1906, amending § 20 of the Commerce Act.
The Hepburn Act, like other statutes, may be read in the light
of the purpose it was intended to subserve, and the history of its
origin and the report of the Interstate Commerce Commission
submitted to Congress recommending the passage of the Act may be
referred to.
As construed in the light of such report, and applying the rule
of
noscitur a sociis, § 20 of the Act to Regulate Commerce
does not provide for the compulsory inspection of the
correspondence of carriers, but is limited to accounts, including
records, documents and memoranda.
Congress is not likely to enact a sweeping provision subjecting
all correspondence of carriers to examination, attended with
serious consequences in cases of withholding it, without using
language adequate to that purpose.
The protection of confidential communications between attorney
and client is well known and recognized as a matter of public
policy.
The right of inspection of whatever accounts, records,
documents, and memoranda are included within § 20 of the Act to
Regulate Commerce, as amended by the Hepburn Act, is not limited to
those kept and made after the passage of the latter Act, but
includes those kept and made prior thereto.
Page 236 U. S. 319
Quaere whether compulsory inspection of correspondence
and other matters referred to in Senate Resolution No. 153 of Nov.
6, 1913, can be permitted within the constitutional rights of the
carrier. Where the Interstate Commerce Commission has applied for a
writ of mandamus broader than the law permits, and no amendment was
made narrowing the demand, but the petition was dismissed without
prejudice, the proper practice is to affirm the order, and not to
reverse so as to grant the relief within the limits which the law
allows; a new proceeding may be started for that purpose.
212 F. 486 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the power of the federal court to
require the production of testimony, books, and papers by a carrier
under the provisions of the Anti-Trust Act in a proceeding started
by the Interstate Commerce Commission pursuant to a resolution of
the Senate of the United States, are stated in the opinion.
Page 236 U. S. 323
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an appeal from and writ of error to the District Court
of the United States for the Western District of Kentucky refusing
a writ of mandamus which the United States undertook to obtain
under authority of § 20 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, as
amended, June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584, 594-595, c. 3591. In view of
the character of an action in mandamus, we are of opinion that the
review is by writ of error.
Columbian Ins. Co. v.
Wheelright, 7 Wheat. 534;
Kentucky v.
Dennison, 24 How. 66,
65 U. S. 97;
Page 236 U. S. 324
High on Extraordinary Legal Remedies §§ 6, 557. The appeal is
therefore dismissed.
The petition sets forth the authority conferred upon the
Commission by § 20 of the Act, and also § 12, and embodies a copy
of a resolution passed by the Senate of the United States, which is
given in the margin.* It further
Page 236 U. S. 325
states that, for the purpose of enabling the Commission to
perform its duties, it appointed two special agents and duly
authorized them to inspect and examine the accounts, records, and
memoranda of the defendant railway company; that, on February 4,
1914, one of said agents demanded of the vice-president of the
defendant, the officer
Page 236 U. S. 326
in charge and control of the accounts, records, and memoranda of
the company, and to and of other officers, access to and
opportunity to examine the accounts, records, and memoranda kept by
the defendant prior to August 28, 1906 [the Hepburn Act took effect
August 29, 1906], and that the same was refused by the officers of
the company; that, on February 4, 1914, a demand was made for an
opportunity to examine the accounts, records, and memoranda of the
defendant on and subsequent to August 28th, 1906, which was
refused, and a writ of mandamus was asked against the company
requiring it to give access to its accounts, records, and
memoranda, and its correspondence and copies of correspondence, and
indexes thereto, and to afford opportunity to examine the same to
the commission and its agents and examiners, and to give such
access to and opportunity to examine the said accounts, records,
and memoranda made and kept by and for said
Page 236 U. S. 327
defendant both before, on, and subsequent to August 28, 1906,
including correspondence, copies of correspondence, and indexes
thereto, and other indexes to said accounts, records, and
memoranda.
To this petition the defendant answered, setting out that it
did, prior to the beginning of the suit, give the examiners access
to the correspondence other than privileged communications, and
that, after this suit, it did refuse and does now refuse to give to
said commission or to said agent access to or opportunity to
examine correspondence received by it before, on, or subsequent to
August 28, 1906, or copies of correspondence sent out by defendant
before, on, or subsequent to that date, or the indexes kept with
respect to said outgoing and incoming correspondence by defendant
(except correspondence as to passes issued since January 1, 1911),
and the defendant set up that its correspondence contains private
communications between its various officers and agents regarding
various matters which did not in any way pertain to the provisions
of the Act to Regulate Commerce, nor to any act of Congress, the
provisions of which it is made the duty of the Interstate Commerce
Commission to enforce, and avers that said correspondence contains
communications of a private and confidential nature between the
president of the railway company and the heads of the various
departments, relative to its internal affairs, to its proposed
constructions and extensions in the future, to its policies with
competing and rival roads, to its relations with labor
organizations represented in its operating department, and to a
variety of other subjects of a private and confidential nature, and
that do not relate to the provisions of the Act to Regulate
Commerce and acts amendatory thereto, or to any other act of
Congress as to the enforcement of which any duty has been imposed
upon the Interstate Commerce Commission, and that said
correspondence also contains confidential, private, and privileged
communications between
Page 236 U. S. 328
defendant and its attorneys. The answer further sets up that,
under the provisions of § 20 of the Commerce Act, a uniform system
of accounting has been prescribed by the Commission, and that
defendant has fully complied with all such requirements, and that
the Commission's examiners have full and complete access to the
same; that, if the Act to Regulate Commerce can be construed as to
give the said Commission or its examiners a right of access to, and
the right to examine or inspect at will, any or all accounts,
records, and memoranda, and all correspondence received, and all
copies of correspondence sent out by the defendant or its officials
in the manner and as set out and claimed in the petition, then the
exercise of such alleged right in this respect will amount to and
operate as an unreasonable search and seizure of the private papers
of the defendant, in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States.
The answer further sets out a copy of the Senate resolution, and
the order of the Interstate Commerce Commission ordering the
investigation and inquiry concerning the matters and things set
forth in the resolution, and providing that the proceeding be set
for hearing at such times and places, and that such persons be
required to appear and testify, or to produce books, documents, and
papers, as the Commission may direct, and that a copy be served
upon certain railways, including the defendant. The answer also
sets up that the subject matter of the first twelve paragraphs of
the Senate resolution was not within the authority of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, and avers that as to the subject
matter of the thirteenth paragraph, which relates to free passes,
since January 1, 1911, defendant permitted the Commission and its
examiners and agents, on their request, to have access to and to
examine and inspect all accounts, records, and memoranda relating
to such passes, whether interstate or intrastate, and also all
correspondence relating to such passes (although
Page 236 U. S. 329
defendant claims that the Commission had no legal right to
examine any of said correspondence nor to examine any intrastate
passes or any accounts, records, and memoranda pertaining
thereto).
Motion was made for the writ of mandamus to issue as prayed for
in the petition, certain testimony was taken, showing the demand of
the agent and the refusal of the company. Upon hearing, the motion
was denied.
The testimony shows that the refusal withheld from the
inspection of the agents making the demand all accounts, records,
and memoranda kept prior to the 28th of August, 1906; all accounts,
records, and memoranda subsequent to that date, except such as to
which the form had been subsequently prescribed by the Commission;
all correspondence and the indexes thereto upon any subject other
than the issue of passes subsequent to January 1, 1911, and all
certificates of destruction, if any, relating to papers antedating
August 28, 1906.
The discussion in this case has taken a wide range, and much has
been said of the constitutional rights of the defendant and the
authority of the Commission to carry out the purpose of the
interstate Commerce Act, and to make investigations which shall be
the basis of the discharge of duties imposed upon it by the law.
But, as we view the case, the real questions may be determined by a
consideration of certain provisions of the Act to Regulate
Commerce. We may at the beginning put aside any question of
authority derivable from the resolution passed by the Senate. The
resolution was passed by only one branch of the legislative body,
and it is not contended by the government or the Commission that
any authority is derivable from it.
To authorize the government to demand the writ of mandamus in
this case, two sections of the interstate Commerce Act are invoked
-- 12 and 20. It is enough to say of § 12 that the record discloses
that the proceedings
Page 236 U. S. 330
and the demands for inspection in this case were not conducted
under its authority.
See Harriman case,
211 U.
S. 407.
Section 12 deals with the production of evidence in certain
cases; it does not make provision for inspection by examiners duly
authorized by the Commission. That feature of the law was added by
the amendment to § 20, of June 29, 1906.
The substantial question in the case is: was the right of
inspection of the accounts, records, and memoranda of the defendant
in the manner attempted by the agents who represented the
Commission in this respect authorized by § 20 of the Act, as the
same is amended by the Hepburn Act of June, 1906?
That section, as amended, provides in part:
"The Commission may, in its discretion, prescribe the forms of
any and all accounts, records, and memoranda to be kept by carriers
subject to the provisions of this Act, including the accounts,
records, and memoranda of the movement of traffic as well as the
receipts and expenditures of moneys. The Commission shall at all
times have access to all accounts, records, and memoranda kept by
carriers subject to this Act, and it shall be unlawful for such
carriers to keep any other accounts, records, or memoranda than
those prescribed or approved by the Commission, and it may employ
special agents or examiners, who shall have authority under the
order of the Commission to inspect and examine any and all
accounts, records, and memoranda kept by such carriers. This
provision shall apply to receivers of carriers and operating
trustees."
"In case of failure or refusal on the part of any such carrier,
receiver, or trustee to keep such accounts, records, and memoranda
on the books and in the manner prescribed by the Commission, or to
submit such accounts, records, and memoranda as are kept to the
inspection of the Commission or any of its authorized agents or
examiners, such
Page 236 U. S. 331
carrier, receiver, or trustee shall forfeit to the United States
the sum of five hundred dollars for each such offense and for each
and every day of the continuance of such offense, such forfeitures
to be recoverable in the same manner as other forfeitures provided
for in this Act."
"Any person who shall willfully make any false entry in the
accounts of any book of accounts, or in any record or memoranda
kept by a carrier, or who shall willfully destroy, mutilate, alter,
or by any other means or device falsify the record of any such
account, record, or memoranda, or who shall willfully neglect or
fail to make full, true, and correct entries in such accounts,
records, or memoranda of all facts and transactions appertaining to
the carrier's business, or shall keep any other accounts, records,
or memoranda than those prescribed or approved by the Commission,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be subject, upon
conviction in any court of the United States of competent
jurisdiction, to a fine of not less than one thousand dollars nor
more than five thousand dollars, or imprisonment for a term not
less than one year nor more than three years, or both such fine and
imprisonment."
"Any examiner who divulges any fact or information which may
come to his knowledge during the course of such examination, except
insofar as he may be directed by the Commission or by a court or
judge thereof shall be subject, upon conviction in any court of the
United states of competent jurisdiction, to a fine of not more than
five thousand dollars or imprisonment for a term not exceeding two
years, or both."
This section, it will be observed, gives authority to the
Commission to employ special agents or examiners, who shall have
authority under the order of the Commission to inspect and examine
any and all accounts, records, and memoranda kept by such carriers.
The copy of the authority issued by the Commission to the special
agent or
Page 236 U. S. 332
examiner who made the demand for inspection in this case shows
that he was clothed with authority to examine any and all
"accounts, records, and memoranda" kept by carriers subject to the
Act to Regulate Commerce. The language here used, taken from § 20,
shows that the Commission acted under authority of that section,
and the examiner was thereby authorized to make the demand, the
refusal to comply with which was the basis for the petition for the
writ of mandamus in this case.
This part of the amended section, as the report of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, 1905, page 11, shows, was framed by
the Commission and became a part of the law upon its
recommendation. The appendix to the report (p. 182) shows the
amendment in the form in which it became a law. In commending the
passage of such an act, the Commission, in its report to Congress,
said:
"
Examination of Books of Account"
"An efficient means of discovering illegal practices would be
found, as we believe, in authority to prescribe a form in which
books of account shall be kept by railways, with the right on the
part of the Commission to examine such books at any and all times
through expert accountants. This recommendation has been urged upon
the attention of the Congress in previous reports, and we earnestly
renew it at this time. Probably no one thing would go further than
this toward the detection and punishment of rebates and kindred
wrongdoing."
"We have also called attention to the fact that certain carriers
now refuse to make the statistical returns required by the
Commission. For example, railways are required, among other things,
to indicate what permanent improvements have been charged to
operating expenses. Without an answer to this question, it is
impossible to determine to what extent gross earnings have been
used in improving the property and the actual cost of operation
proper.
Page 236 U. S. 333
Admitting the right of a railroad company to use its money as it
sees fit, it is certainly proper that the government should know
what use is made of it for the purpose of determining whether its
rates and charges imposed are legitimate. Certain important
railways decline to furnish this information at all, and others
furnish it in a very imperfect and unsatisfactory manner."
"We have also recently required carriers to furnish statistics
showing the rate per ton-mile actually received for the movement of
certain kinds of carload traffic, but this requirement has not been
generally complied with."
Responding to this recommendation, and acting upon the bill in
the form proposed by the Commission, it was adopted as an amendment
and became amended § 20 of the Act to Regulate Commerce.
Of course, this act, like other acts, may be read in the light
of the purpose it was intended to subserve and the history of its
origin. We find, then, that in this section, Congress has
authorized the Commission to prescribe the forms of accounts,
records, and memoranda, which shall include accounts, records, and
memoranda of the movements of traffic, as well as the receipts and
expenditures of money, to which accounts, records, and memoranda
the Commission is given access at all times. The railroads are not
allowed to keep any other than those prescribed by the Commission.
The Commission is empowered to appoint agents or examiners with
authority to inspect and examine such accounts, records, and
memoranda, and provision is made penalizing the failure to comply
with the orders of the Commission concerning such accounts,
records, and memoranda or the falsification thereof, or the willful
destruction or mutilation thereof, or the failure to make full,
true, and correct entries in such accounts, records, and memoranda
of all facts and transactions pertaining to the carrier's business,
or keeping any other accounts, records, and memoranda.
Page 236 U. S. 334
Reading these provisions of the Act, there is nothing to suggest
that they were intended to include correspondence relative to the
railroad's business. In recommending the passage of the Act, the
Commission did not suggest that it was essential to its purpose to
have an inspection of the correspondence of the railroad. And, with
its expert consideration of the questions involved, and having
clearly in mind the authority it was intended to secure, it can
scarcely be supposed that the Commission would have confined its
proposed amendment to the carefully chosen words "accounts,
records, or memoranda," and would have omitted the word
"correspondence," if it had intended to include the latter. If we
apply the rule of construction
noscitur a sociis, we find
that all the provisions of the Act as to the inspection of accounts
have relation to such as are kept in the system of bookkeeping to
be prescribed by the Commission. It would be a great stretch of the
meaning of the term as here used, to make "memoranda" include
correspondence. The "records" of a corporation import the
transcript of its charter and bylaws, the minutes of its meetings
-- the books containing the accounts of its official doings and the
written evidence of its contracts and business transactions.
Certainly it was not intended that the Commission should prescribe
the forms of correspondence, although it was given the power to
prescribe the forms of all accounts, records, and memoranda subject
to the provisions of the Act.
It is urged that the amendment to § 20 of February 25, 1909,
adding a proviso to paragraph 7, shows the intention of Congress to
provide for accounts, records, and memoranda, including more than
those as to which the form may be prescribed by the Commission, and
in the word "document" making this section broad enough to include
correspondence. The language of this proviso is as follows:
"Any person who shall willfully make any false entry
Page 236 U. S. 335
in the accounts of any book of accounts, or in any record or
memoranda kept by a carrier, or who shall willfully destroy,
mutilate, alter, or by any other means or device falsify the record
of any such account, record, or memoranda, or who shall willfully
neglect or fail to make full, true, and correct entries in such
accounts, records, or memoranda of all facts and transactions
appertaining to the carrier's business, or shall keep any other
accounts, records, or memoranda than those prescribed or approved
by the Commission, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and
shall be subject, upon conviction in any court of the United States
of competent jurisdiction, to a fine of not less than one thousand
dollars nor more than five thousand dollars, or imprisonment for a
term not less than one year nor more than three years, or both such
fine and imprisonment: Provided, that the Commission may, in its
discretion, issue orders specifying such operating, accounting, or
financial papers, records, books, blanks, tickets, stubs, or
documents of carriers which may, after a reasonable time, be
destroyed, and prescribing the length of time such books, papers,
or documents shall be preserved."
It may be that the section is broad enough, particularly when
read in the light of this proviso, to authorize an inspection of
accounts, records, and memoranda for which no form has been
prescribed by the Commission, but we do not find in this proviso
anything to indicate that Congress in the original act or the
amendment intended to provide for the compulsory inspection of
correspondence.
There is nothing from the beginning to the end of the section to
indicate that Congress had in mind that it was making any
provisions concerning the correspondence received or sent by the
railroad companies. The primary object to be accomplished was to
establish a uniform system of accounting and bookkeeping, and to
have an inspection thereof. If it intended to permit the
Commission
Page 236 U. S. 336
to authorize examiners to seize and examine all correspondence
of every nature, Congress would have used language adequate to that
purpose. A sweeping provision of that nature, attended with such
consequences, would not be likely to have been enacted without
probable exceptions as to some lines of correspondence required to
be kept open and subject to inspection upon demand of the agents of
the government.
In the brief filed on behalf of the United States, it is frankly
admitted that there is much force in the objection that Congress
did not intend in this grant of authority to include the
confidential correspondence of the railroad companies between
itself and its counsel, and it is admitted that, in this respect,
the demand of the agent of the Commission may be too broad. The
desirability of protecting confidential communications between
attorney and client as a matter of public policy is too well known
and has been too often recognized by textbooks and courts to need
extended comment now. If such communications were required to be
made the subject of examination and publication, such enactment
would be a practical prohibition upon professional advice and
assistance.
Connecticut Mutual Life Insurance Co. v.
Schaefer, 94 U. S. 457,
94 U. S. 458.
And see the comments of this Court in
Blackburn
v. Crawford, 3 Wall. 175,
70 U. S.
192.
How far such a demand as embodied in this petition can be
permitted within the constitutional rights set up by the defendant,
we do not need to consider, as we do not think that the section of
the act of Congress under which the demand was made authorizes the
compulsory submission of the correspondence of the company to
inspection. It is true that correspondence may contain a record,
and it may be the only record of business transactions, but that
fact does not authorize a judicial interpretation of this statute
which shall include a right to inspection which Congress did not
intend to authorize.
Page 236 U. S. 337
The court below held that the right to demand inspection of
documents before August 29, 1906, the date when the Hepburn Act
went into effect, was of such a doubtful character that the writ
ought not to issue. We think the right of inspection and
examination given by the interstate Commerce Act by the amendment
to § 20 was not intended to be limited to such accounts, records,
and memoranda only as were made after the passage of the Act, but
is intended to permit an examination of all such accounts, records,
and memoranda, for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of
the Act. It is not contended that Congress might not do this within
its constitutional authority, and the argument is that it had no
such right in contemplation, and did not intend to authorize it;
but we think it is clear from the terms of the Act, read in the
light of its purpose, that Congress did not intend to draw the line
of inspection at preexisting accounts, records, and memoranda.
The government argues that, if it be held that the prayer for
the writ of mandamus and the accompanying motion were too broad in
requiring the production of confidential communications between
attorney and client which were contained in this correspondence,
nevertheless the court should have issued its writ of mandamus
insofar as the relator showed it was entitled thereto, and the case
of
West Virginia Northern R. Co. v. United States, 134
Fed.198, 203, is cited to the effect such practice is permissible.
The case shows, however, an amendment was permitted so as to make
the writ conform to the rights which could be properly granted. And
that course might have been pursued in this case.
Whether the Commission would desire an inspection of the
accounts, records, and memoranda as we have construed the terms of
the Act without the right to examine the correspondence, we are not
advised. As the petition in this case was dismissed by the court
below
Page 236 U. S. 338
without prejudice, and a new proceeding may be started, asking
for such inspection as the law allows, we think the order of the
court refusing to grant the writ of mandamus in the broad terms
prayed for in the petition and the motion for the writ should not
be reversed to permit a grant of relief within the limits which the
law allows as we interpret it.
It follows that the judgment of the district court refusing the
writ and dismissing the petition should be affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS took no part in the consideration and
decision of this case.
|236 U.S. 318ast|
*
"
RESOLUTION"
"Resolved, That the Interstate Commerce Commission be, and the
same is hereby, directed to investigate, taking proof and employing
counsel if necessary, and report to the Senate as soon as
practicable --"
"First. What amount of stock, bonds, and other securities of the
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway is owned or
controlled by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad;"
"Second. What other railroad or railroads in the territory
served by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad and the Nashville
Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway have been purchased, leased,
controlled, or arrangements entered into with for the purpose of
controlling by either the Louisville & Nashville Railroad or
the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway;"
"Third. Whether the Louisville & Nashville Railroad and the
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway serve the same
territory in whole or in part, and whether, under separate
ownership, they would be competitive to the various points in their
territories;"
"Fourth. Any other fact or facts showing or tending to show the
further relations between the Louisville & Nashville Railroad
and the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway, and any
fact or facts showing or tending to show whether these relations
restrict competition and maintain fixed rates;"
"Fifth. The terms of the lease of the Nashville & Decatur
Railroad by the Louis & Nashville Railroad, and what amount, if
any, of stock, bonds, and other securities of the Nashville &
Decatur Railroad, and of the Lewisburg & Northern Railroad are
owned by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, or any of its
subsidiaries or holding companies;"
"Sixth. Whether the Nashville & Decatur Railroad, the
Lewisburg & Northern Railroad, and the Louisville &
Nashville Railroad serve the same territory, in whole or in part,
and whether, under separate ownership, these railroads would be
competitive between various points in their territories;"
"Seventh. Any other fact or facts showing or tending to show the
further relations between the Louisville & Nashville Railroad,
the Nashville & Decatur Railroad, and the Lewisburg &
Northern Railroad, and any fact or facts showing, or tending to
show, whether these relations restrict competition and maintain and
fix rates;"
"Eighth. Any fact or facts showing or tending to show (a) the
relations between the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, the
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway, the Tennessee
Midland Railroad, the Tennessee, Paducah & Alabama Railroad,
and any other railroads that have been purchased or leased by
either or both of said railroad companies, and whether such
relations restrict competition and maintain and fix rates, and (b)
whether the lease of the Western & Atlantic Railroad by the
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway from the State of
Georgia, and the arrangement made between the Louisville &
Nashville and the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway by
which the former uses the tracks of the said Western & Atlantic
Railway restrict competition, restrain trade, and determine and fix
rates:"
"Ninth. Any fact or facts showing or tending to show whether the
ownership of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad and the
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway of any railroad
terminals or terminal companies, steamboats and steamboat lines
upon the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers, and any dock or dock
yards at Pensacola, New Orleans, Mobile, or other seaport
establishes a monopoly and restricts competition and determines and
fixes rates;"
"Tenth. Any fact or facts showing or tending to show whether an
agreement or arrangement has been entered into between the
Louisville & Nashville and other railroad companies for the
purpose of preventing competition from entering into any of the
territory served by the Louisville & Nashville Railroad, in
consideration of the Louisville & Nashville Railroad agreeing
not to enter into certain other territory, or in consideration of
any other agreement or arrangement;"
"Eleventh. What amount of stock, if any, the Atlantic Coast Line
Company or Atlantic Coast Holding Company owns in the Louisville
& Nashville Railroad, and in the Atlantic Coast Line, and
whether the ownership by such holding company of a majority of
stock in both of the aforesaid railroads tends to restrict
competition and maintain and fix rates;"
"Twelfth. What amount, if any, the Louisville & Nashville
Railroad, the Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Railway, the
Nashville & Decatur Railroad, and the Lewisburg & Northern
Railroad, all or any of them, have subscribed, expended or
contributed for the purpose of preventing other railroads from
entering any of the territory served by any of these railroads for
maintaining political or legislative agents, for contributing to
political campaigns, for creating sentiment in favor of any of the
plans of any of said railroads; and,"
"Thirteenth. (a) The number of free annual passes; (b) the
number of free-trip passes; (c) the number of every kind of free
passes issued by each of said railroads each year since January
first, nineteen hundred and eleven, to members of legislative
bodies and other public officials, or at the request of members of
legislative bodies and other public officials; (d) the total
mileage traveled upon free passes issued under each of the above
classifications, and (e) the amount in money the free passes issued
under each of the above-mentioned classifications would equal at
the regular rates for such service of each of the above-named
railroads."