Only those whose rights are directly affected can properly
question the constitutionality of a state statute and invoke the
jurisdiction of this Court in respect thereto.
Where a state statute provides, as a prerequisite to the use of
the highways of a state without cost by residents of other states,
compliance with the highway laws of their respective states, one
who does not show such compliance cannot set up a claim for
discrimination in this particular.
Quaere, and not now decided, whether the Motor Vehicle
Law of Maryland so discriminates against residents of the District
of Columbia as to be an unconstitutional denial of equal protection
of the laws in that respect. This Court will assume, in the absence
of a definite and authoritative ruling of the courts of a state to
the contrary, that
Page 235 U. S. 611
when a statute shall be construed by the highest court,
discrimination against the residents of a particular state or
territory will be denied.
The movement of motor vehicles over highways, being attended by
constant and serious dangers to the public and also being
abnormally destructive to the highways, is a proper subject of
police regulation by the state.
In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a
state may prescribe uniform regulations necessary for safety and
order in respect to operation of motor vehicles on its highways,
including those moving in interstate commerce.
A reasonable graduated license fee on motor vehicles, when
imposed on those engaged in interstate commerce, does not
constitute a direct and material burden on such commerce and render
the act imposing such fee void under the commerce clause of the
federal Constitution.
A state may require registration of motor vehicles, and a
reasonable license fee is not unconstitutional as denial of equal
protection of the laws because graduated according to the
horsepower of the engine. Such a classification is reasonable.
The reasonableness of the state's action is always subject to
inquiry insofar as it affects interstate commerce, and in that
regard it is likewise subordinate to the will of Congress.
A state which, at its own expense, furnishes special facilities
for the use of those engaged in interstate and intrastate commerce
may exact compensation therefor, and if the charges are reasonable
and uniform, they constitute no burden on interstate commerce. The
action of the state in such respect must be treated as correct
unless the contrary is made to appear.
A state motor vehicle law imposing reasonable license fees on
motors, including those of nonresidents, does not interfere with
rights of citizens of the United States to pass through the state.
Crandall v.
Nevada, 6 Wall. 35, distinguished.
The facts, which involve the construction and constitutionality
of certain provisions of the Motor Vehicle Law of Maryland and
their application to citizens of the District of Columbia, are
stated in the opinion.
Page 235 U. S. 618
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff in error was tried before a justice of the peace,
Prince George's county, Maryland, upon a charge of violating the
motor vehicle law. A written motion to quash the warrant because of
conflict between the statute and the Constitution of the United
States was denied; he was found guilty and fined. Thereupon an
appeal was taken to the circuit court -- the highest in the state
having jurisdiction -- where the cause stood for trial
de
novo upon the original papers. It was there submitted for
determination by the court upon an agreed statement of facts
grievously verbose, but in substance as follows:
The cause was originally brought July 27, 1910, before a Justice
of the Peace for Prince George's County by the state against John
T. Hendrick for violating § 133 of the Motor Vehicle Law effective
July 1, 1910. He is and then was a citizen of the United States,
resident and commorant
Page 235 U. S. 619
in the District of Columbia. On that day, he left his office in
Washington in his own automobile and drove it into Prince George's
County, and while temporarily there was arrested on the charge of
operating it upon the highways without having procured the
certificate of registration required by § 133 of the Motor Vehicle
Law. He was brought before a justice of the peace and fined $15
after having been found guilty of the charge set out in a warrant
duly issued, a motion to quash having been denied. Whereupon he
filed his appeal. At the time and place aforesaid, he had not
procured the certificate of registration for his automobile
required by § 133. Upon the foregoing, the court shall determine
the questions and differences between the parties and render
judgment according as their rights in law may appear in the same
manner as if the facts aforesaid were proven upon the trial. Either
party may appeal.
The Maryland Legislature, by an act effective July 1, 1910 (c.
207, Laws 1910, p. 177), prescribed a comprehensive scheme for
licensing and regulating motor vehicles. The following summary
sufficiently indicates its provisions:
The governor shall appoint a commissioner of motor vehicles,
with power to designate assistants, who shall secure enforcement of
the statute. Before any motor vehicle is operated upon the
highways, the owner shall make a statement to the commissioner and
procure a certificate of registration; thereafter it shall bear a
numbered plate. This certificate and plate shall be evidence of
authority for operating the machine during the current year (§
133). Registration fees are fixed according to horsepower -- $6
when 20 or less, $12 when from 20 to 40, and $18 when in excess of
40 (§ 136). No person shall drive a motor vehicle upon the highway
until he has obtained at a cost of $2 an operator's license,
subject to revocation for cause
Page 235 U. S. 620
(§ 137). Any owner or operator of an automobile, nonresident of
Maryland, who has complied with the laws of the state in which he
resides requiring the registration of motor vehicles, or licensing
of operators thereof, etc., may, under specified conditions, obtain
a distinguishing tag and permission to operate such machine over
the highways for not exceeding two periods of seven consecutive
days in a calendar year without paying the ordinary fees for
registration and operator's license (§ 140a), but residents of the
District of Columbia are not included amongst those to whom this
privilege is granted (§ 132). Other sections relate to speed, rules
of the road, accidents, signals, penalties, arrests, trials, fines,
etc. All money collected under the provisions of the act go to the
commissioner, and, except so much as is necessary for salaries and
expenses, must be paid into the state treasury to be used in
construction, maintaining, and repairing the streets of Baltimore
and roads built or aided by a county or the state itself. Section
140
a is copied in the margin.
*
Page 235 U. S. 621
Plaintiff in error maintains that the act is void because it
discriminates against residents of the District of Columbia,
attempts to regulate interstate commerce, violates the rights of
citizens of the United States to pass into and through the state,
exacts a tax for revenue -- not mere compensation for the use of
facilities -- according to arbitrary classifications, and thereby
deprives citizens of the United States of the equal protection of
the laws.
If the statute is otherwise valid, the alleged discrimination
against residents of the District of Columbia is not adequate
ground for us now to declare it altogether bad. At most, they are
entitled to equality of treatment, and, in the absence of some
definite and authoritative ruling by the courts of the state, we
will not assume that, upon a proper showing, this will be denied.
The record fails to disclose that Hendrick had complied with the
laws in force within the District of Columbia in respect of
registering motor vehicles and licensing operators, or that he
applied to the Maryland commissioner for an identifying tag or
marker -- prerequisites to a limited use of the highways without
cost by residents of other states under the plain terms of §
140
a, He cannot therefore set up a claim of discrimination
in this particular. Only those whose rights are directly affected
can properly question the constitutionality of a state statute and
invoke our jurisdiction in respect thereto.
Hatch v.
Reardon, 204 U. S. 152,
204 U. S. 161;
Williams v. Walsh, 222 U. S. 415,
222 U. S. 423;
Collins v. Texas, 223 U. S. 288,
223 U. S.
295-296;
Missouri,
Page 235 U. S. 622
Kansas & Texas Ry. v. Cade, 233 U.
S. 642,
233 U. S. 648,
and cases cited.
The movement of motor vehicles over the highways is attended by
constant and serious dangers to the public, and is also abnormally
destructive to the ways themselves. Their success depends on good
roads, the construction and maintenance of which are exceedingly
expensive, and in recent years insistent demands have been made
upon the states for better facilities, especially by the
ever-increasing number of those who own such vehicles. As is well
known, in order to meet this demand and accommodate the growing
traffic the State of Maryland has built and is maintaining a system
of improved roadways. Primarily for the enforcement of good order
and the protection of those within its own jurisdiction, the state
put into effect the above-described general regulations, including
requirements for registration and licenses. A further evident
purpose was to secure some compensation for the use of facilities
provided at great cost from the class for whose needs they are
essential, and whose operations over them are peculiarly
injurious.
In the absence of national legislation covering the subject, a
state may rightfully prescribe uniform regulations necessary for
public safety and order in respect to the operation upon its
highways of all motor vehicles -- those moving in interstate
commerce as well as others. And, to this end, it may require the
registration of such vehicles and the licensing of their drivers,
charging therefor reasonable fees graduated according to the
horsepower of the engines -- a practical measure of size, speed,
and difficulty of control. This is but an exercise of the police
power uniformly recognized as belonging to the states and essential
to the preservation of the health, safety, and comfort of their
citizens, and it does not constitute a direct and material burden
on interstate commerce. The reasonableness of the state's action is
always subject to
Page 235 U. S. 623
inquiry insofar as it affects interstate commerce, and in that
regard it is likewise subordinate to the will of Congress.
Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27,
113 U. S. 30-31;
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465,
124 U. S. 480;
Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133,
152 U. S. 136;
N.Y., N.H. & H. R. Co. v. New York, 165 U.
S. 628,
165 U. S. 631;
Holden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366,
169 U. S. 392;
Lake Shore & Michigan Southern Railway v. Ohio,
173 U. S. 285,
173 U. S. 298;
Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. McGuire, 219 U.
S. 549,
219 U. S. 568;
Atlantic Coast Line v. Georgia, 234 U.
S. 280,
234 U. S.
291.
In
Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465,
124 U. S. 480,
consideration was given to the validity of an Alabama statute
forbidding any engineer to operate a railroad train without first
undergoing an examination touching his fitness and obtaining a
license, for which a fee was charged. The language of the Court,
speaking through Mr. Justice Matthews, in reply to the suggestion
that the statute unduly burdened interstate commerce and was
therefore void, aptly declares the doctrine which is applicable
here. He said:
"But the provisions on the subject contained in the statute of
Alabama under consideration are not regulations of interstate
commerce. It is a misnomer to call them such. Considered in
themselves, they are parts of that body of the local law which, as
we have already seen, properly governs the relation between
carriers of passengers and merchandise and the public who employ
them, which are not displaced until they come in conflict with
express enactments of Congress in the exercise of its power over
commerce, and which, until so displaced, according to the evident
intention of Congress, remain as the law governing carriers in the
discharge of their obligations, whether engaged in the purely
internal commerce of the state or in commerce among the
states."
The prescribed regulations, upon their face, do not appear to be
either unnecessary or unreasonable.
In view of the many decisions of this Court, there can be
Page 235 U. S. 624
no serious doubt that, where a state, at its own expense,
furnishes special facilities for the use of those engaged in
commerce, interstate as well as domestic, it may exact compensation
therefor. The amount of the charges and the method of collection
are primarily for determination by the state itself, and so long as
they are reasonable and are fixed according to some uniform, fair,
and practical standard, they constitute no burden on interstate
commerce.
Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.
S. 691,
107 U. S. 699;
Huse v. Glover, 119 U. S. 543,
119 U. S.
548-549;
Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United
States, 148 U. S. 312,
148 U. S.
329-330;
Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.
S. 352,
230 U. S. 405,
and authorities cited. The action of the state must be treated as
correct unless the contrary is made to appear. In the instant case,
there is no evidence concerning the value of the facilities
supplied by the state, the cost of maintaining them, or the
fairness of the methods adopted for collecting the charges imposed,
and we cannot say from a mere inspection of the statute that its
provisions are arbitrary or unreasonable.
There is no solid foundation for the claim that the statute
directly interferes with the rights of citizens of the United
States to pass through the state, and is consequently bad according
to the doctrine announced in
Crandall v.
Nevada, 6 Wall. 35. In that case, a direct tax was
laid upon the passenger for the privilege of leaving the state,
while here, the statute, at most, attempts to regulate the
operation of dangerous machines on the highways, and to charge for
the use of valuable facilities.
As the capacity of the machine owned by plaintiff in error does
not appear, he cannot complain of discrimination because fees are
imposed according to engine power. Distinctions amongst motor
machines and between them and other vehicles may be proper --
essential, indeed -- and those now challenged are not obviously
arbitrary or oppressive. The statute is not a mere revenue
measure,
Page 235 U. S. 625
and a discussion of the classifications permissible under such
an act would not be pertinent.
There is no error in the judgment complained of, and it is
accordingly affirmed.
*
"140
a. Any owner or operator, not a resident of this
state, who shall have complied with the laws of the state in which
he resides requiring the registration of motor vehicles or
licensing of operators thereof and the display of identification or
registration numbers on such vehicles, and who shall cause the
identification numbers of such state, in accordance with the laws
thereof, and none other, together with the initial letter of said
state, to be displayed on his motor vehicle, as in this subtitle
provided, while used or operated upon the public highways of this
state, may use such highways not exceeding two periods of seven
consecutive days in each calendar year without complying with the
provisions of §§ 133 and 137 of this subtitle if he obtains from
the commissioner of motor vehicles and displays on the rear of such
vehicle a tag or marker which the said commissioner of motor
vehicles shall issue in such form and contain such distinguishing
marks as he may deem best, provided that, if any nonresident be
convicted of violating any provisions of §§ 140
b,
140
c, 140
d, 140
e, and 1401 of this
subtitle, he shall thereafter be subject to and required to comply
with all the provisions of said §§ 133 and 137 relating to the
registration of motor vehicles and the licensing of operators
thereof, and the governor of this state is hereby authorized and
empowered to confer and advise with proper officers and legislative
bodies of other states of the Union, and enter into reciprocal
agreements under which the registration of motor vehicles owned by
residents of this state will be recognized by such other states,
and he is further authorized and empowered, from time to time, to
grant to residents of other states the privilege of using the roads
of this state as in this section provided in return for similar
privileges granted residents of this state by such other
states."