Where the jurisdiction of a federal court is invoked because of
questions raised under the federal Constitution, it extends to the
determination of all questions presented, irrespective of the
disposition that may be made of the federal questions or whether it
is necessary to decide them at all.
Ohio Tax Cases,
232 U. S. 576.
While the rule applicable to the Interstate Commerce Commission
that an order made indisputably contrary to the evidence, or
without any evidence, is arbitrary and subject to be set aside, may
also be applicable to orders of the Kentucky Railroad Commission,
in this case
held that there was substantial evidence to
support the order establishing rates, and the Commission had
jurisdiction under the McChord Act to make the order reestablishing
a former rate.
Where the evidence shows that special rates on a particular
commodity were voluntarily established and were maintained for many
years after the avowed reason for introducing them had ceased to
exist, and the carrier's reason for an advance was not because they
were inadequate, but because they gave rise to discrimination,
there is a reasonable inference that the advanced rates are
unreasonably high which is sufficient to give jurisdiction to the
Kentucky Railroad Commission under the McChord Act to make an order
reestablishing the original rates and to support the conclusion
that such rates were remunerative, and should be reestablished.
Where, in a proceeding before a state Railroad Commission,
complaining shippers specified the amount of extortionate charges
for which
Page 235 U. S. 602
reparation was prayed, and the carrier admitted the rates had
been charged and denied liability for reparation solely on the
round that the rates were reasonable, and there was evidence to
support the charges that the rates were extortionate, and the
record does not show that the carriers were denied an opportunity
to introduce evidence, this Court will not declare that an order of
reparation was contrary to the due process provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment either because of lack of evidence on which to
base the amounts ordered to be paid or because, under the statutory
procedure, there was no formal issue, or because the statute does
not provide for compulsory production of evidence either before the
Commission or in any subsequent trial before the court.
This Court does not pass upon moot questions, and one seeking to
strike down a state statute as unconstitutional must show that he
is within the class with respect to whom it is unconstitutional,
and that he has been injured by the unconstitutional feature.
Where the record does not show that the party complaining
suffered for lack of compulsory process or that he will be
prevented in a subsequent trial from producing evidence, he cannot
be heard to object to a statute as unconstitutional because it does
not provide for compulsory process or contains restrictions on
admission of evidence.
214 F. 465, affirmed.
The facts, which involve the validity of orders of the Kentucky
Railroad Commission establishing rates and awarding reparation and
the constitutionality of the statute under which the orders were
made, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This case was here on a former occasion (
Louisville &
Nashville R. Co. v. Garrett, 231 U. S. 298),
when an order
Page 235 U. S. 603
denying a motion for an interlocutory injunction was affirmed.
The suit was brought by the railroad company to enjoin the
enforcement of two orders made August 10, 1910, by the Railroad
Commission of Kentucky, one of which prescribed maximum rates of
freight upon certain intrastate traffic and the other awarded
specified amounts in reparation for payments previously exacted by
the carrier for freight transportation in excess of the rates thus
established by the Commission as reasonable. One of the grounds of
attack upon the rate order was that the Commission had acted
arbitrarily in that there was no evidence before it tending to
establish that the rates which the company had maintained were
unreasonable. Upon the former appeal, we held that, since it
appeared that there had been a hearing before the Commission, with
evidence adduced on each side, and since this was not produced
before the court, the general allegations of the bill respecting
the effect of the evidence, and the statements contained in the
affidavits submitted upon the application for injunction, were
insufficient to justify the court in enjoining the rates upon the
ground that the Commission either had denied the hearing which the
statute contemplated or, by its arbitrary action, had been guilty
of an abuse of power. With respect to the reparation order, we
sustained the action of the court below in declining to determine
its validity, upon the ground that the persons in whose favor the
award was made had not been brought in as parties.
After our decision, appellant filed an amended and supplemental
bill bringing in as defendants the parties in whose favor
reparation was awarded, stating with more particularity the grounds
upon which that order was attacked, and, with respect to the rate
order, setting out as an exhibit a transcript of the evidence
introduced before the Commission. Upon this amended and
supplemental bill, appellant again moved for an interlocutory
injunction.
Page 235 U. S. 604
The motion was heard before three judges, under § 266, Judicial
Code (36 Stat. 1162, c. 231), the application for injunction was
denied (214 F. 465), and the case comes here by direct appeal taken
pursuant to the provisions of the same section.
The jurisdiction of the federal court was invoked because of
questions raised under the Constitution of the United States, and
not because of diversity of citizenship, but it extends, of course,
to the determination of all questions presented, irrespective of
the disposition that may be made of the federal questions, or
whether it is necessary to decide them at all.
Ohio Tax
Cases, 232 U. S. 576,
232 U. S. 587,
and cases cited.
The action of the Commission was based upon Kentucky Statutes: §
816, defining what shall be deemed extortion by a railroad
corporation in charging toll or compensation for intrastate
transportation; § 820a (the "McChord Act"), authorizing the
Commission, upon complaint made against a railroad company for
charging extortionate freight or passenger rates, to hear the
matter, and, if it determines that the company has been guilty of
extortion, then to establish a just and reasonable rate for
services thereafter to be rendered, and § 829, authorizing the
Commission to hear and determine complaints under § 816, and to
render such award as may be proper.
It appears that, for many years prior to March 25, 1910, the
railroad company had voluntarily maintained special rates for the
transportation of corn, rye, barley, and malt, and empty barrels,
boxes, etc., from three points of origin upon the Ohio River --
Louisville, Covington, and Newport -- to points of destination in
the interior of the state, these rates being allowed only to owners
of distilleries, when the commodities in question were used as raw
materials or supplies. On the date mentioned, the carrier withdrew
these special rates and substituted what are
Page 235 U. S. 605
described as the "standard rates," being the same that had been
theretofore charged to others than distillers. Thereupon numerous
distillery companies complained to the Commission, insisting that
the new rates were exorbitant, and that the former rates were just
and reasonable. After a hearing, the Commission sustained the
contention of the petitioners and established the maximum rates now
in question, these being the same as the special rates, which,
prior to March 25, 1910, the carrier had given to the distillery
companies; but, by the Commission's order, they were made to apply
to the commodities mentioned, without regard to the use that was to
be made of them.
The McChord Act, under which the rate order was made, is set
forth in
Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,
213 U. S. 178.
It provides for notice to the carrier, stating the nature of the
complaint or matter to be investigated, and the time and place of
hearing it, and requires the Commission to hear such statements,
argument, or evidence offered by the parties as the Commission may
deem relevant. Section 829 likewise requires notice of the hearing
to be given to the company; the evidence is to be reduced to
writing, together with the award, and they are to be filed in the
office of the clerk of a designated court, and a summons is to be
issued requiring the company to appear and show cause why the award
should not be satisfied. If the parties fail to appear, judgment is
rendered by default; but if trial is demanded, the case is to be
tried as ordinary cases are, except that no evidence shall be
introduced by either party other than that heard by the Commission,
or such as the court shall be satisfied could not have been
produced before the Commission by the exercise of reasonable
diligence. The judgment and proceedings thereon are to be the same
as in ordinary cases. Since the case was here before, the Court of
Appeals of Kentucky, in
Illinois Central R. Co. v.
Paducah
Page 235 U. S. 606
Brewery Co., 157 Ky. 357, has passed upon § 829,
upholding its validity under the state and federal Constitutions
and construing it as authorizing the Commission to award reparation
in money.
The contentions now made by appellants are reducible to two:
first, that the rate order is invalid because not supported by
substantial evidence, and second that the reparation order is
invalid for the same reason, and also because the statute pursuant
to which it was made violates the "due process" clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
To deal first with the rate order. In cases arising under the
Interstate Commerce Act, the provisions of which contemplate an
investigation or inquiry conducted with some formality, followed by
a written report and decision as the basis of the orders, it has
been repeatedly held by this Court that an administrative order
made indisputably contrary to the evidence, or without any
evidence, must be deemed to be arbitrary, and therefore subject to
be set aside.
Int. Com. Com. v. Union Pacific R. Co.,
222 U. S. 541,
222 U. S. 547;
Int. Com. Com. v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co.,
227 U. S. 88,
227 U. S. 91-92.
It is contended that the "due process" provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes a like rule of procedure upon the states with
respect to their exercise of the legislative power of
ratemaking.
We find it unnecessary to pass upon this question. The McChord
Act, like the Interstate Commerce Act, contemplates that the
Commission bases its determination upon the evidence adduced before
it, and it may at least be assumed that the rate order must be held
invalid unless it was founded upon substantial evidence. But we
agree with the court below that there was substantial evidence to
support the order. At the hearing, a Mr. Goodwyn was produced by
the company, and made a statement of the facts in its behalf -- not
under oath, but it was received as evidence in behalf of the
company -- in substance
Page 235 U. S. 607
that the special rates maintained prior to March 25, 1910, had
been introduced more than thirty years before in order to encourage
the distillery business along the line of the railroad; that the
rates were not raised when the business of the distilleries became
prosperous, but were continued as long as the railroad company
could continue them with justice to itself -- that is to say, to
the point where prosecution was threatened by the Interstate
Commerce Commission for alleged discrimination -- and that, in
order to remove the discrimination, the company had raised the
rates charged on grain for distillery purposes in order to make
them correspond with those charged on grain used for other
purposes. These grain rates were the chief bone of contention.
There was some other evidence, but not very much, that bore
directly upon the question of the reasonableness of the rates, but
it should be said that full opportunity was afforded to the
railroad company to adduce such evidence as it desired. And since
it appeared that the company, long prior to March 25, 1910, had
voluntarily established the comparatively low rates upon a
substantial part of their traffic, had maintained them for many
years after the reason assigned for originally introducing them had
ceased to exist, and had then withdrawn them not upon the ground
that they were inadequate, but because they gave rise to
discrimination, and in so doing had introduced rates very much
greater, it seems to us that the conduct of the carrier, in the
absence of some explanation more conclusive than any that was made,
was sufficient basis for a reasonable inference that the special
rates in force prior to March 25 upon the distillery supplies were
reasonable and adequate compensation for that and other similar
traffic, and that the rates thereafter charged were unreasonably
high to the extent of being extortionate.
Interstate Com. Com.
v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 227 U. S.
88,
227 U. S. 99.
This was sufficient to give jurisdiction to the Commission under
the
Page 235 U. S. 608
McChord Act, and to support the conclusion that it reached.
As to the reparation order, it is further insisted (a) that
there was no evidence before the Commission to show that the
several parties to whom reparation was awarded had paid freights
based upon the rates complained of, or to show the amounts of their
payments, or to show that the difference in the freight payments
represented damages to which they were entitled, and (b) that so
much of the statute (§ 829) as undertakes to provide the procedure
for recovering reparation is contrary to the "due process"
provision of the Fourteenth Amendment because, in the proceeding
before the Commission, there is no formal issue and no method of
requiring the production of evidence, while in the subsequent trial
before the court, based upon the Commission's award, there is no
right to adduce evidence other than such as was presented to the
Commission unless the court shall first be satisfied that the
evidence is such as could not have been produced before the
Commission with the exercise of reasonable diligence.
From the record, however, it appears that, in the petition filed
by the distillers and distillery companies before the Commission,
it was alleged that, since March 25, 1910, each of the petitioners
had been subjected to extortionate charges collected from them by
the railroad company, and for which an award of reparation was
prayed, the respective amounts thus claimed being particularly
specified. The answers of the company admitted that the rates
mentioned had been charged, collected, and received by it, but
denied that they were extortionate, unjust, or unreasonable, and
upon this ground, and no other, denied liability to make
reparation. The transcript of the testimony taken before the
Commission shows that the several reparation claims were presented,
and the following colloquy occurred respecting them:
"Mr. McChord (counsel for petitioners): Is there any question
made as to
Page 235 U. S. 609
the amount of those claims?"
"Mr. Goodwyn: We never checked them."
"Mr. Dearing (counsel for the railroad company): My idea is that
the Commission can easily check them, and you and I can check them
if we come to the position that they are entitled to the
reparation."
"Mr. McChord: You deny it all?"
"Mr. Dearing: Yes."
"Mr. McChord: I will put all these claims in as exhibits. Some
of these have not been made up by the complainants, and we will
want to fill them in later."
"Mr. Dearing: That will be all right."
"Mr. McChord: Shall I put them in now?"
"Mr. Siler: Yes, or at any time."
In short, the record shows that the only question made
respecting the reparation claims was the general contention that
the rates charged by the company were in fact nor unreasonable or
extortionate, and that it was in effect conceded that the
particular amounts claimed were proper to be awarded as reparation
if the rates charged were determined to be unreasonable and
extortionate.
We have already seen that there was evidence to support the
Commission's affirmative finding upon the latter point. And this
leaves no basis, as we think, for appellant's present attack upon §
829 as repugnant to the due process provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment. In the proceeding before the Commission, there were
pleadings sufficiently formal, and appellant was permitted to raise
such issues and introduce such evidence as it desired. There is
nothing to show that it suffered for lack of compulsory process
against witnesses. As to its right to adduce evidence before the
court in the action to enforce payment of the award, its complaint
in this regard seems to us at least premature. There is nothing to
show that it has or could have any defense to the payment of the
reparation that it has not already either interposed or waived in
the proceeding before the Commission, or to show that it has any
evidence to be adduced before the court that it would be prevented
from introducing by the
Page 235 U. S. 610
effect of the restriction contained in § 829. This Court does
not sit to pass upon moot questions, and, as has been often pointed
out, it is incumbent upon one who seeks an adjudication that a
state statute is repugnant to the federal Constitution to show that
he is within the class with respect to whom it is unconstitutional,
and that the alleged unconstitutional feature injures him, and so
operates as to deprive him of rights protected by the Constitution.
Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152,
204 U. S. 161;
Southern Railway v. King, 217 U.
S. 524,
217 U. S. 534;
Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U.
S. 540,
225 U. S. 550;
Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.
S. 531,
232 U. S.
544.
The order of the district court should be, and it is
Affirmed.