The suppression clause in the declaration required to be made by
agent consignees of imported goods by sub-section 6 of § 28 of the
Tariff Act of August 5, 1909, c. 6, 36 Stat. 11, 95, relates to the
omission of matter proper to be included in the invoice and account
attached, and not to independent facts.
In construing a provision of the Tariff Act relating to entry of
merchandise, courts should consider the purpose of such provision
in the light of the customs regulations applicable to such entry,
and in this case, this Court will not say that one of a number of
acts required to be done related to undefined extraneous general
matter when all of the other acts related to particular defined
subjects connected with the importation.
The meaning of words is affected by their context, and words
used in a highly penal statute will be interpreted in a narrower
sense as referring to things of the same nature as those described
in an enumerated list, although, standing alone, they might have a
wider meaning.
This limited interpretation given to subsection 6 of § 28 of the
Tariff Act of 1909 does not mean that Congress has deprived the
Collector of means of obtaining extraneous information, as there
are other statutory provisions for examinations of the owner,
consignee. or agent for that purpose.
A statute such as the suppression clause -- subsection 6 of § 28
of the Tariff Act of 1909 -- will not be so interpreted as to
spread a net that might catch the unwary as well as the guilty, or
in a manner contrary to the fixed rules of interpretation, by
making it relate to unenumerated matters as well as those
enumerated, thus fixing no standard by which to draw the line
between innocent silence and felonious concealment.
Salen was indicted for making false statements in the sworn
declaration required if consignees by the Tariff Act of 1909.
August 5, 1909, 36 Stat. 93, c. 6. The first five counts charged
that, in entering laces in February,
Page 235 U. S. 238
1910, and January and February, 1913, he had falsely sworn that
the consular invoices attached were the only invoices covering the
shipments, when he well knew that there were others in existence.
The court overruled the demurrer to these counts, and they are not
involved in this case.
The sixth count related to a declaration made by Salen on March
17, 1913, in making an entry of foreign laces covered by consular
invoice No. 7893. Salen was therein charged with having
fraudulently concealed from the Collector the existence of certain
material facts, and thereby had falsified the required statement in
the sworn declaration
"that nothing has been on my part, nor, to my knowledge, on the
part of any other person concealed or suppressed whereby the United
States may be defrauded of any part of the duty due on said
goods."
This count sets out at great length and in narrative form
certain evidentiary facts which may be thus summarized:
Salen was the New York agent and primary consignee of Goetz, a
French exporter, who, for eight years, had been shipping laces to
Salen for sale and delivery to Robinson, the purchaser and ultimate
consignee.
When the last consignment arrived in New York, Salen presented
the declaration to the Collector, attaching thereto, as required by
law, the bill of lading; a list or entry account of the goods, and
the consular invoice No. 7893. He paid the duty assessed on the
basis of the foreign values as given in the invoice, and thereupon
removed the goods and delivered them to Robinson, the purchaser.
This count of the indictment further charged that Salen knew that
the foreign values had been falsely and fraudulently stated in the
previous invoices; that such foreign values named in those invoices
were uniformly greatly below the prices at which the laces were
sold in the United States; that, in making the declaration as to
the shipment represented by consular invoice No. 7893,
Page 235 U. S. 239
Salen concealed the fact that it was one of the series of
shipments in which Goetz and Robinson had fraudulently concealed
the great and uniform discrepancy between the foreign values named
in the invoices and the prices at which the lace was sold in the
United States.
It was charged that this concealment was the suppression of a
fact by which the United States may have been defrauded of its
lawful duty, for if Salen had communicated the facts, the Collector
would have called for a reappraisement of the laces, and their
undervaluation would have been disclosed.
The defendant demurred on the ground that there was no positive
averment that the goods were undervalued, but only an argumentative
statement of facts the existence of which did not raise the legal
conclusion that there was any undervaluation, and that the count
failed to charge facts sufficient to constitute an offense under
subsection 6 of § 28 of the act of August 5, 1909, or any other
statute of the United States. The demurrer was sustained on the
ground that the facts stated did not constitute an offense under
the statute, and the case was then brought here by the government
under the Criminal Appeals Act of March 2, 1907, c. 2564, 34 Stat.
1246.
Page 235 U. S. 244
MR. JUSTICE LAMAR, after making the foregoing statement of
facts, delivered the opinion of the Court.
This writ of error raises the question as to whether the
suppression clause in the declaration required to be made by agent
consignees of imported goods (36 Stat. 95) relates to the omission
of matter proper to be included in the invoice and account
attached, or to independent facts which, if brought to the
attention of the Collector,
Page 235 U. S. 245
would have excited his suspicion and induced him to institute a
special inquiry as to the value of the merchandise mentioned in the
account and invoice.
No case directly in point has been cited, but counsel have
traced the history of the clause from the Act of 1799, which
required only one form of declaration from all importers, through
the subsequent statutes, which, like the tariff Act of 1909,
provide for slightly different forms, according as the entry is
made by owner, manufacturer, consignee, or agent. (1 Stat. 627,
656; 3 Stat. 729. 730; 22 Stat. 488, 524; 26 Stat. 131, 132; 36
Stat. 11, 93.) Under the Act of 1799, every importer had to attach
the consular invoice and entry account and swear that he "had not
in the said entry or invoice concealed or suppressed anything"
whereby the government might be defrauded of its duty. This clause
is still retained in the form required to be signed by owner and
manufacturer. Where the goods are entered by an agent consignee he
makes declaration that
"nothing has been on my part, nor, to my knowledge, on the part
of any other person, concealed or suppressed whereby the United
States may be defrauded of any part of the duty lawfully due on the
said goods, wares, and merchandise."
Much of the argument was addressed to the effect of this
difference in the language in the respective forms of the several
declarations. 36 Stat. 93-95.
Counsel for Salen insist that this difference is due to the fact
that the suppression clause in the consignee's declaration was
included in a sentence all the terms of which related to invoice
and entry. The declaration to be signed by owner and manufacturer
(36 Stat. 94, 95) was in two sentences, and as the last of the two
contained the suppression clause, it was necessary, from a
grammatical point of view, to mention invoice and account as
antecedents. It is argued that the owner's statement conveyed the
same meaning as was otherwise expressed in
Page 235 U. S. 246
the suppression clause of the consignee's declaration. On the
other hand, the government contends that the difference in
phraseology indicated an intent to require the consignee to
disclose matters as to which no requirement was made where the
goods were entered by owner or manufacturer.
Congress, of course, could have legislated in the same statute
so as to make a distinction between consignor and consignee. But no
satisfactory reason is given why Congress should have imposed no
penalty upon an owner for concealing a great and uniform difference
between invoice values and selling prices, while at the same time
making the agent guilty of a felony for suppressing exactly the
same fact. The moral quality of the act was the same whether the
concealment was by owner or agent; the result to the government was
the same, and all doubtful or ambiguous language in a statute
covering the same subject should be construed on the natural
supposition that Congress required identity of disclosures and
provided identity of punishment for identity of concealment.
In arriving at the meaning of the clause on which this
indictment is founded, it may be helpful to consider the purpose of
the statute, in the light of the customs regulations applicable to
the entry of foreign merchandise at a domestic port.
Foreign value is the basis on which
ad valorem duties
are imposed (36 Stat. 101, § 18), and Congress has made various
provisions to enable collectors and appraisers to obtain
information as to such foreign values. To that end, it authorizes
them to examine all importers or consignees under oath, so as to
secure from them a statement of any facts which might shed light on
the amount of duty to be paid. Any false statement made on such
examination subjects them to indictment and punishment as for a
felony (, 1890, 26 Stat. 139, §§ 16, 17, c. 407).
Page 235 U. S. 247
But the documents attached to the declaration are the primary
source of information as to value. They consist of a consular
invoice (prepared by the consignor, showing a list of the goods and
their foreign value at the date of exportation), an entry or
account (prepared by the consignee, showing marks, numbers,
contents, quantity, invoice value, dutiable value, and the rate of
duty of the goods. Customs Regulations 217), and also the bill of
landing (prepared by the master of the vessel). If these three
papers, prepared by three different persons, have been truly and
correctly made, they contain all the information needed to assess
the duties. In view, therefore, of the importance of these
documents, the statute makes specific provisions by which they are
to be verified, and, as will appear from an analysis of the
declaration (36 Stat. 93), the consignee states in the first
sentence
* of the
declaration:
Page 235 U. S. 248
"(1) That he is the consignee of the merchandise described in
the annexed
entry and invoice;"
"(2) that the
invoice and
bill of lading are
the true and only
invoice and
bill of
lading;"
"(3) that they are in the state in which they were actually
received by him;"
"(4) that he does not know or believe in the existence of any
other
invoice or bill of lading;"
"(5) that the
entry delivered to the Collector contains
a just and true account of the merchandise according to the
invoices;"
"(6) that nothing has been suppressed by him, or, to his
knowledge, on the part of any other person, whereby the United
States may be defrauded of any part of the duty lawfully due on the
merchandise;"
"(7) that the
said invoice and the declaration therein
are in all respects true, and were made by the person by whom they
purport to have been made;"
"(8) that, if at any time he discovers any error in the
Page 235 U. S. 249
said invoice or in the account
now rendered, he will
immediately make the same known to the Collector . . ."
It will be seen that the declaration was not only intended to
secure an affirmative statement as to the genuineness of the
documents and of the correctness of what was actually therein set
out, but the consignee was also required to make a negative
averment that nothing had been suppressed or concealed by himself
or, so far as he knew, by anyone else -- that is, nothing had been
suppressed or concealed in the account (prepared by the consignee);
in the consular invoice (prepared by the exporter); or in the bill
of lading (prepared by the master of the vessel). Seven of the
eight clauses distinctly related to documents. To say that the
sixth clause in this enumeration was intended to embrace undefined
extraneous matter would be to suddenly depart from the particular
to the general, and back again from the general to the particular
-- from the particular subject of documents, to which the attention
of the affiant had been specially directed by the first five
clauses, into a general field of wide and indefinite scope; and, in
the seventh clause, again to return to the particular subject of
documents. Such an interpretation would give an exceedingly liberal
construction to a statute defining a felony. It would ignore the
fact that the meaning of words is affected by their context, and
violate the settled rule that words which, standing alone, might
have a wide and comprehensive import will, when joined with those
defining specific acts, be interpreted in their narrower sense, and
understood to refer to things of the same nature as those described
in the associated list, enumeration, or class.
Cf. Virginia v.
Tennessee, 148 U. S. 519;
United States v. Chase, 135 U. S. 258;
Neal v. Clark, 95 U. S.
708.
The fact that, under this rule, the general language of the
suppression clause is to be restricted to the documents to which
all the other clauses in the sentence refer
Page 235 U. S. 250
does not, of course, mean that Congress has deprived the
Collector of the means of obtaining information as to extraneous
facts that might assist him in passing upon questions of value, or
in determining whether there had been any violation of the tariff
law.
But the method by which that information is to be obtained is
the examination of the owner, consignee, or agent under oath. 26
Stat. 139; 36 Stat. 100, §§ 15, 16; Customs Regulations, 1908, §
865. The very fact that provision is made for such examination is
itself a clear indication that there may be material matter, not
proper for inclusion in the declaration, but which might still be
important in the assessment of the duty. But to say that, in
signing the statutory form of declaration, consignee should in
effect answer specific questions and at the same time be required,
on peril of committing a felony, to disclose extraneous evidentiary
facts as to which no direct question was asked, and to which his
attention was not directed, is to make the declaration serve a
purpose for which it was not intended, and spread a net that might
catch the unwary as well as the fraudulent consignee.
United
States v. Reese, 92 U. S. 221.
For, under the contention of the plaintiff in error, it is not
necessary that Salen should have intended to defraud, or that the
government should have been actually defrauded. The crime was
committed if the United States "may have been defrauded." So that,
even if the foreign value on which the duty was assessed had been
truly stated in the declaration, the consignee would yet be guilty
of a felony if he failed to call attention to facts which would
have excited the Collector's suspicion and induced him to demand a
reappraisement. Such an interpretation of the statute is not only
contrary to the rule which restricts the operation of the
suppression clause to the particular matters enumerated in all
other parts of the printed declaration, but would fix no standard
by which to draw
Page 235 U. S. 251
the line between innocent silence and felonious concealment.
Judgment affirmed.
MR. JUSTICE McREYNOLDS took no part in the consideration and
decision of this case.
*
"
DECLARATION OF CONSIGNEE, IMPORTER, OR AGENT
WHERE"
"
MERCHANDISE HAS BEEN ACTUALLY PURCHASED"
"I, _____ _____, do solemnly and truly declare that I am the
consignee, importer, or agent of the merchandise described in the
annexed entry and invoice; that the invoice and bill of lading now
presented by me to the Collector of __________ are the true and
only invoice and bill of lading by me received of all the goods,
wares, and merchandise imported in the _____, whereof _____ is
master, from _____, for account of any person whomsoever for whom I
am authorized to enter the same; that the said invoice and bill of
lading are in the state in which they were actually received by me,
and that I do not know or believe in the existence of any other
invoice or bill of lading of the said goods, wares, and
merchandise; that the entry now delivered to the Collector contains
a just and true account of the said goods, wares, and merchandise,
according to the said invoice and bill of lading; that nothing has
been on my part, nor, to my knowledge, on the part of any other
person, concealed or suppressed whereby the United States may be
defrauded of any part of the duty lawfully due on the said goods,
wares, and merchandise; that the said invoice and the declaration
therein are in all respects true, and were made by the person by
whom the same purport to have been made, and that, if at any time
hereafter I discover any error in the said invoice, or in the
account now rendered of the said goods, wares, and merchandise, or
receive any other invoice of the same, I will immediately make the
same known to the collector of this district. And I do further
solemnly and truly declare that, to the best of my knowledge and
belief, (insert the name and residence of the owner or owners) is
(or are) the owner (or owners) of the goods, wares, and merchandise
mentioned in the annexed entry; that the invoice now produced by me
exhibits the actual cost at the time of exportation to the United
States in the principal markets of the country from whence imported
of the said goods, wares, and merchandise, and includes and
specifies the value of all cartons, cases, crates, boxes, sacks,
casks, barrels, hogsheads, bottles, jars, demijohns, carboys, and
other containers or coverings, whether holding liquids or solids,
which are not otherwise specially subject to duty under any
paragraph of the tariff act, and all other costs, charges, and
expenses incident to placing said goods, wares, and merchandise in
condition, packed ready for shipment to the United States, and no
other or discount, bounty, or drawback but such as has been
actually allowed on the same."
