Where the judgment of a state court rests upon an independent
ground not only adequate to sustain it, but in entire harmony with
an asserted federal right, there is no denial of that right in the
sense contemplated by § 237 of the Judicial Code, and the writ of
error will be dismissed.
Where the initial carrier sets up the Carmack Amendment and also
denies negligence, but the state court finds from conflicting
evidence that the loss was occasioned by the negligence of the
connecting carrier, the judgment rests on that finding as an
independent ground, and this Court has not jurisdiction.
A party is entitled to the benefit of all the testimony in the
case from whatever source it comes, and although having the burden
of proof, need not prove any fact otherwise established.
Writ of error to review 132 La. 615 dismissed.
The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this Court to
review the judgment of a state court within § 237, Judicial Code,
are stated in the opinion.
Page 234 U. S. 81
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action to recover the value of two cars of rice
destroyed by fire in August, 1908, while being transported over
connecting railroads from New Orleans, Louisiana, to Charleston,
South Carolina. The rice was shipped upon through bills of lading
issued by the initial carrier, and was destroyed while in the
second carrier's custody at Old Hamburg, South Carolina. The two
cars, with others
Page 234 U. S. 82
containing quicklime, were side-tracked in the yard at that
place awaiting further movement towards their destination. The
yards adjoined the Savannah River, which was then almost out of its
banks and steadily rising as a result of extraordinary rains and
cloudbursts extending up the river and its tributaries 100 miles.
The waters continued to rise, spread over the yard to a
considerable depth, and ultimately reached the quicklime, thereby
causing the cars to burn and destroying the rice. The cars had been
in the yard about sixteen hours when the fire started. The action
was against both carriers, and it was alleged in the petition,
which based the right of recovery upon the Carmack Amendment to the
Interstate Commerce Act (June 29, 1906, 34 Stat. 584, 595, c.
3591), that the loss of the rice was caused by the negligence of
the second carrier, and that the two carriers were jointly liable.
Issue was joined, and, after a trial, the district court of the
parish rendered a judgment against the carriers jointly and
in
solido, which the supreme court of the state at first reversed
and then, after a rehearing, affirmed. 132 La. 615. The carriers
sued out this writ of error, basing their right so to do upon a
claim that, by the judgment of affirmance they were denied a right
or immunity asserted under a law of the United States.
A motion to dismiss was presented along with the merits, and we
think it is well taken.
The bills of lading contained these stipulations:
"This company or other carriers over whose line the property may
pass shall not be held responsible for loss or damage (unless
through proved carelessness or negligence of their employees)
resulting . . . from heat, cold, fire, flood, storms, mobs, or
other causes not subject to the carrier's control."
"Neither this company nor any of its connecting carriers shall
be liable for any damage to or destruction of
Page 234 U. S. 83
said property by fire unless such damage or destruction shall
result directly and exclusively from their negligence or that of
their employees, and unless such negligence shall be affirmatively
established by the owner of said property."
In the supreme court of the state, the carriers contended that,
under the combined operation of the Carmack Amendment as
interpreted in
Adams Express Co. v. Croninger,
226 U. S. 491, the
stipulations in the bills of lading, and the common law rule
applied in
Railroad Co. v.
Reeves, 10 Wall. 176, and other cases,
* they were
entitled to exoneration upon showing that the rice was destroyed by
the extraordinary flood unless it also was shown that the second
carrier contributed to the loss by negligently failing to take
reasonable precautions to avoid it when the rising waters gave
warning of the danger, and it was particularly urged as a part of
this contention that the burden was upon the plaintiff to show such
negligence, and not upon the carriers to show the absence of it.
But the court, although disapproving the latter phase of the
contention and thinking the carriers were charged by the law of
Louisiana with the burden of showing that there was no negligence,
did not rest its judgment upon that ground. On the contrary, it
examined the evidence, which comprehensively covered the subject,
to ascertain whether, upon the hypothesis that the contention of
the carriers was sound, they were liable, and from that examination
it found as matter of fact that the second carrier had negligently
permitted the cars of rice to remain within the influence of the
rising flood and in immediate proximity to the quicklime when
ordinary prudence required that they be moved to a place of safety,
and that this was
Page 234 U. S. 84
made an independent ground of the judgment is shown by the
court's extended discussion of the evidence and by the following
excerpts from its opinion:
"A close reading of the evidence compels the conclusion that
there was not sufficient forethought on the part of the officers in
charge of the railroad yards. We have seen that the river was
rising rapidly on the morning of the 26th of August. Some of the
witness testified that, by 7 o'clock, it had covered the switch
tracks, and yet nothing was done to protect property. Leisurely
enough, the employees went about their business and gave very
little concern to the rising waters. Those who did attempt to save
property (if what they did can be considered in that light)
displayed very little activity, beginning at 8 o'clock, taking out
a few cars and leaving others in the old Hamburg yards. That is all
they did. These yards were submerged by water to a height above the
floor of the cars. The question arises: was it possible, before the
waters reached their greatest height, to move the cars to a safer
place than where they were hauled to on the morning of the 26th of
August -- that is, to the old Hamburg yards? We have noted, before
8 o'clock or 8:30 o'clock A.M., not the least attempt was made to
move the cars out of the yard where they had been placed. Mr.
Benson, inspector of the Southern Railway Company, testified that,
on the morning of the 26th of August, he reported at the Hamburg
yard at 7 o'clock to go to work, and at that time the water had
just reached the rail in front of the block office. There were a
crew and an engine in the yard. Why were they not put at work at
that time to save the freight?"
"Another witness, the night operator, renders it still more
evident that it was possible to move the train in the morning, for
he says that when he went to work, the yard was entirely free from
water on the 26th of August in the morning. An attempt was made to
rescue the cars between 8 and half past 8 o'clock A.M. It failed.
They
Page 234 U. S. 85
went too late to rescue these cars. There had been ample time to
save them. (132 La., p. 643.)"
"
* * * *"
"These floods were frequent, and yet defendant remained
indifferent, and even sent its cars to the lowest places on the
yard, where they were permitted to remain without making a serious
and timely attempt to take them away."
"From all this evidence, we are led to the inference, which we
think is positive, that there was negligence. A little timely
activity would have brought about a different result, and would
have saved plaintiff's property, or would have placed defendant in
a position to successfully defend itself."
"Unquestionably the river was rising rapidly on the morning of
the 26th at 7 o'clock; in thirty-five minutes, it covered the
switch tracks. It does not seem that anything was done to prevent
the destruction of the cars. Leisurely enough, the employees went
about their respective occupations, and now, when they give an
account of themselves, it does seem as if they wish to lay all the
trouble on the rising waters, although they remained indifferent
when they should have exerted themselves(p. 645)."
"
* * * *"
"Admitting for a moment all that is claimed under the Carmack
Amendment, under any of the laws of this country, indifferent
railroad people, who receive freight to be transported some
distance, and who, just before the waters of a storm have flowed
down, stop the cars on the way, and run them to the lowest part of
their yards, and place them next to cars loaded with quicklime,
easily ignited by water, and leave them at that place while other
cars are taken out, and who make no attempt to haul them out
although the waters are rising slowly enough for such work after
warning given, are not protected from the charge of negligence
under the law (p. 649). "
Page 234 U. S. 86
True, the testimony upon which the court rested its conclusion
that negligence was proved did not come from the plaintiff's
witnesses, but from those for the carriers, and was largely
elicited by cross-examination, but that is quite immaterial. The
plaintiff was entitled to the benefit of all the testimony in the
case, from whatever source it came, and was not required, even
though having the burden of proof, to go through the ceremony of
proving any fact otherwise established.
As it clearly appears that the judgment rested upon a ground
which was not only adequate to sustain it, but in entire harmony
with the carrier's asserted federal right, it cannot be said that
there was a denial of that right in the sense contemplated by § 237
of the Judicial Code. Whether the right was well founded we
therefore need not consider.
Writ of error dismissed.
*
Clark v.
Barnwell, 12 How. 272,
53 U. S.
280-283;
Western Transp. Co. v.
Downer, 11 Wall. 129,
78 U. S. 133;
Cau v. Texas & Pacific Railway Co., 194 U.
S. 427,
194 U. S. 432.