Findings of fact concurred in by two lower federal courts will
not be disturbed by this Court unless shown to be clearly
erroneous.
A purchaser from a patentee is bound to take notice that the
land was acquired under the homestead law when that appears in the
patent, and if the other circumstances show that the purchase was
made with knowledge that the land was known to be coal land when it
was entered by the patentee, the purchaser must be deemed to
have
Page 234 U. S. 77
taken with notice of the fraudulent obtaining of coal lands
under the homestead law.
Where the application and proof of an entryman is strictly
ex parte, the proceedings are not adversary, and while the
finding of the land officer may not be open to collateral attack,
they are not conclusive, but only presumptively right, against the
government in a suit to cancel the patent on the ground that it was
obtained by fraud.
194 F. 59.
The facts, which involve the validity of patents for lands
issued under the homestead law and claimed by the government to
have been fraudulently obtained because the lands were known to be
valuable for coal at the time, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was a suit to cancel four patents issued under the
commutation provision of the homestead law, and embracing a full
section of land in King County, Washington. The bill charged that
the patents were fraudulently procured by falsely representing to
the land officers that the lands were agricultural in character,
and therefore subject to homestead entry, when in truth they were
at the time known to be valuable coal lands, and therefore excepted
from the operation of the homestead law. After the patents were
issued, the lands were conveyed to the appellant, and there was a
further charge that it took the title with notice and knowledge of
the fraud. The circuit court found that these charges were true,
and entered
Page 234 U. S. 78
a decree for the government, and the circuit court of appeals,
taking a like view of the evidence, affirmed the decree. 194 F.
59.
The rule is well settled that findings of fact concurred in by
two lower courts will not be disturbed by this Court unless shown
to be clearly erroneous.
Stuart v. Haydon, 169 U. S.
1,
169 U. S. 14;
Towson v. Moore, 173 U. S. 17,
173 U. S. 24;
Dun v. Lumbermen's Credit Association, 209 U. S.
20;
Texas & Pacific Railway Co. v. Railroad
Commission, 232 U. S. 338.
Applying the rule to the evidence in this case, we think the
findings below should not be disturbed.
Only two of appellant's contentions merit special notice.
Without any uncertainty, the evidence demonstrated that the
lands were known to be valuable coal lands when the homestead
entries were made and commuted, and that the affidavits and proofs
to the contrary, upon which the patents were procured, were false.
Not only were the lands in a well known coal region and generally
reputed to be coal lands, but a tunnel, slope, and other openings
upon them, costing about $8,000, had disclosed that they contained
coal of such quality and quantity as to render them valuable for
coal mining. The entrymen so understood, and resorted to severe
measures to keep coal prospectors off the lands.
The appellant's chief contention is that there was no evidence,
or at least no substantial evidence, that it took the title with
notice or knowledge of the fraud perpetrated by the entrymen. But
the record shows otherwise. The appellant's vice-president, who
represented it in the negotiations, had theretofore, as agent of
another company, learned that the latter was interested in the coal
development work before mentioned, and was, with others, bearing
the expense of that work with a view to acquiring the lands as coal
lands. This was recalled to his mind at the time of the
negotiations. He caused the section to be
Page 234 U. S. 79
examined by an engineer, who found and reported the tunnel and
other openings disclosing the coal, and, following that report, the
transaction was consummated on the theory that the lands were
valuable for their coal contents. There was no claim that there was
any development work or coal discovery after the entries were made,
and it is quite apparent from what was said of the engineer's
report that the tunnel and openings gave visible evidence that they
were not recently made. Of course, the appellant was bound to take
notice that the patentees with whom it was dealing had obtained the
lands under the homestead law, for it was so recited in the
patents.
Simmons Creek Coal Co. v. Doran, 142 U.
S. 417,
142 U. S. 437.
In these facts there was, as we think, persuasive evidence that the
appellant took the title with notice or knowledge of the fraud.
It is contended also that the proceedings resulting in the
patents were not
ex parte, but adversary, that the land
officers found the lands to be agricultural in character, and that
this finding was conclusive upon the government. No doubt those
officers found from the proofs submitted to them that the lands
were agricultural, and not coal lands, for that was a prerequisite
to issuing the patents, but the proceedings were not adversary in
any true sense of the term. The applications and proofs of the
entrymen were strictly
ex parte. The government was not
called upon to make any adverse showing, no issue was framed, no
hearing was had, and no one represented the government save in the
sense that the land officers did so. As this Court has often held,
the finding of the land officers in such a proceeding, although not
open to collateral attack, is not conclusive against the government
when it sues to cancel the resulting patent upon the ground that it
was obtained by means of false and fraudulent proofs.
United
States v. Minor, 114 U. S. 233;
McCaskill Co. v. United States, 216 U.
S. 504,
216 U. S. 509,
and cases cited. In such
Page 234 U. S. 80
a suit, the action of the land officers is given appropriate
effect by treating it as presumptively right, and as requiring the
government to carry the burden of proving the fraud by the class of
evidence which commands respect, and that amount of it which
produces conviction.
Diamond Coal & Coke Co. v. United
States, 233 U. S. 236,
233 U. S.
239.
Decree affirmed.