A mere error of law not involving a federal question and
committed in the exercise of jurisdiction by giving conclusive
effect to a judgment rendered in another state afford no
opportunity for a review in this Court.
If the court rendering the judgment had jurisdiction of the
subject matter and the parties, the merits of the controversy are
not open for reinvestigation in the courts of another state; but,
under the full faith and credit clause of the federal Constitution
and § 905, Rev.Stat., the latter must give the judgment such credit
as it has in the state where it was rendered.
The proper method of obtaining a review of the federal question
adversely decided by the state court is by writ of error to this
Court under § 237, Judicial Code, and not by collaterally attacking
the judgment on the ground that it denies due process of law when
it is invoked in the courts of another state.
Page 234 U. S. 739
Where the effect of the judgment of another state dissolving an
injunction as
res judicata is denied on the ground that it
is not a final decree, if the contention that a final decree was
subsequently rendered which concluded the merits was not presented
to the court, there is no basis for review in this Court under §
237, Judicial Code on the ground that full faith and credit was not
given to the original judgment.
Writ of error to review 71 W.Va. 161 dismissed.
The facts, which involve the application of the full faith and
credit clause of the federal Constitution and the jurisdiction of
this Court to review a judgment of the state court under § 237,
Judicial Code, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This writ of error was sued out under § 237, Judicial Code (Act
of March 3, 1911, 36 Stat. 1156, c. 231), in order to bring under
review a judgment of the Supreme Court of appeals of the State of
West Virginia (71 W.Va. 161), which affirmed a decree of the
circuit court of Pendleton County, in that state, in an equitable
action brought by plaintiff in error against defendants in error.
His original bill was filed May 10, 1901, and an amended bill was
filed in December, 1907. Complainant therein averred that, in the
year 1872, he was employed by the late Emily Hollingsworth, of the
City of Philadelphia, as attorney, to recover for her a tract of
52,000 acres of land situate in the Counties of Rockingham and
Augusta, in the State of Virginia, and the County of Pendleton, in
the State of West Virginia, and immediately undertook
Page 234 U. S. 740
the necessary work and labor, and diligently and faithfully
endeavored to discharge the duties imposed upon him by the
employment; that from time to time various parcels of land were
recovered from adverse claimants, some by compromise settlements
and others by actions of ejectment, until the entire tract of
52,000 acres was recovered, the actual litigation not being
completed until some time in the year 1893; that portions of the
property had been sold, so that, in the year 1889 there remained of
the lands recovered about 44,000 acres undisposed of, from the
proceeds of the sale of which complainant was to receive payments
on account of his services; that, on or about April 1, 1889, the
said Emily Hollingsworth made a deed of gift of the unsold lands,
amounting to about 44,000 acres, to Mary H. Murray, one of the
defendants, upon condition that she should pay to complainant one
fifth of the proceeds thereafter to be realized on the sale of the
lands, and that she should hold the same as trustee for
complainant, and complainant avers that the said Mary H. Murray
accepted said deed upon that condition, and became liable to
complainant for the said proportion of said proceeds of sale and
for the reasonable value of his services rendered by him to Miss
Hollingsworth, and to be thereafter rendered to the said Mary H.
Murray; that the latter, having accepted the conveyance, continued
to act under it and in conformity with it until May 25, 1901, when
for the first time she repudiated it. The object of the bill was to
enforce a trust as to the undivided one-fifth of the land and of
the purchase money upon sales made of the same, as against Mary H.
Murray and her grantees with notice. Mrs. Murray pleaded that, in a
chancery cause brought by the same complainant against her, with
others, in the Circuit Court for the County of Rockingham, in the
State of Virginia, a court of competent jurisdiction, complainant
asserted and claimed that there was due to him from her the same
sum of money and the same
Page 234 U. S. 741
debt, as compensation for the same services alleged in his
present bill, and that the cause of action was the same as now set
up and asserted; that, on June 24, 1907, a final decree was made
and entered in said cause by the said circuit court, and this, on
appeal, was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia in
accordance with opinions found in 107 Va. 527, in which it was held
that defendant Mary H. Murray was a privy in estate to Miss
Hollingsworth, her grantor, and a privy also to the contract with
complainant, and that the said Supreme Court of Appeals of
Virginia, affirming the circuit court, determined that complainant
had no right to recover on said cause of action, wherefore
defendant pleaded the final adjudication of the Virginia court as
res judicata. There was filed with the plea a certified
copy of the record of the proceedings had in the Circuit Court of
Rockingham County, Virginia, and in the Supreme Court of Appeals of
that state. Subsequently, complainant filed in the Pendleton County
Court written objections to the plea of
res judicata upon
the following grounds: first, that the Circuit Court of Rockingham
County, Virginia, after the rendition of the judgment pleaded by
defendant, in another cause pending in that court between the
Chesapeake-Western Company and the complainant, John E. Roller, and
others, in which latter cause the said Mary H. Murray was impleaded
as a party, decreed that the matters involved in the cause pending
in the Circuit Court of Pendleton County, West Virginia, were not
concluded by the judgment and decree of the Circuit Court of
Rockingham County, Virginia, and did therefore vacate and dissolve
certain injunctions previously awarded in that cause, restraining
complainant from further prosecution in the West Virginia court of
his present suit against said Mary H. Murray. Secondly, that the
cause of action and grounds of jurisdiction and relief in the
present cause are
Page 234 U. S. 742
not the same as those set out in the record filed in the plea of
res judicata. And thirdly, that the record and judgment of
the Virginia court should not be enforced as
res judicata
for the following reasons: (a) that the courts of West Virginia do
not enforce foreign judgments that are contrary to the laws and
public policy of that state; (b) that the decree rests not upon
rights arising
ex contractu, or upon torts based on
natural rights, but upon a penalty denounced by the policy of the
law of Virginia which is not so denounced by the policy of the law
of the State of West Virginia, and that it is not one of such
nature as the courts of West Virginia will enforce, and (c) that
the
lex loci rei sitae determines the jurisdiction and
relief to be given by this Court as to the land in the bill
referred to, regardless of the judgment of any sister state as to
land therein situate.
The Circuit Court of Pendleton County, West Virginia, sustained
the plea of
res judicata and dismissed the bill, and it is
the judgment of the court of last resort of West Virginia,
affirming this decree, that is now under review.
There are three assignments of error, the substance of which is
as follows:
First, that the court erred in holding that the plea of
res
judicata filed by the defendant Mary H. Murray was a good and
sufficient plea, for the reason that the decree therein relied upon
in terms provided that it should be without prejudice to
complainant's right to institute other proceedings upon a
quantum meruit if so advised, and that the record shows
the cause of action and ground of jurisdiction were not the same in
the present West Virginia action as those set out and contained in
the record in the Virginia action; the present action being based
upon a
quantum meruit, for just and reasonable
compensation for services rendered by complainant in and about the
recovery of the tract of land in controversy.
Page 234 U. S. 743
Second, that the court erred in sustaining the action of the
court below upholding the plea of
res judicata, because
the decrees in the Virginia courts presented in that plea were void
and of no effect, since they had denied to complainant due process
of law, in that they had denied to him the right to file the third
amended bill of complaint tendered by him, and denied him a hearing
upon the case thereby presented.
Third, that the court erred in sustaining the action of the
court below in overruling the objections made by complainant to the
plea of
res judicata, because, in the suit of
Chesapeake-Western Co. v. Roller, it was necessarily
decided that the matters involved in the case in the West Virginia
courts were not concluded by the decrees rendered in the first
cause of
Roller v. Murray in the Virginia courts.
There is a motion to dismiss or affirm, based upon the ground
that no federal question is raised by the record, or that, if any
such question is raised, it is so frivolous as not to need further
argument.
It appears that the Virginia court (107 Va. 527) denied relief
to complainant with respect to the lands in that state upon the
ground that the contract upon which the action was based was
champertous, and therefore illegal under the laws of the
commonwealth. The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia (71
W.Va. 161), finding that this decision was rendered not in a mere
proceeding
in rem or
quasi in rem, but in an
action
in personam (defendants having appeared, and the
validity of the contract constituting the basis of the plaintiff's
claim to the fund or to the land having been actually litigated by
the parties and decided by the courts), that decision necessarily
settled and determined the question of the validity of the contract
in the State of Virginia, and that, under the "full faith and
credit" clause of the Constitution of the United States the
decision was entitled to the same credit
Page 234 U. S. 744
in West Virginia that it had in the Commonwealth of Virginia.
Upon this ground, although assuming that the contract was valid
under the law of West Virginia, viewed independently of the
Virginia decision, the court held itself bound by the Virginia
decision to deny relief to complainant.
It is argued under the first assignment of error that the
contract in controversy must be held to be a Pennsylvania contract,
and that its validity and enforcement in the courts of West
Virginia did not depend upon the decision of the Virginia courts,
but required an independent consideration upon its merits by the
courts of West Virginia, and that their failure to give such
consideration was a denial of due process of law. We are unable to
find that it was contended in the courts of West Virginia that the
contract in question was made in Pennsylvania, or ought for other
reasons to be regarded as a Pennsylvania contract; nor are we able
to find that the "due process of law" clause was invoked in the
West Virginia courts upon the ground that to follow the Virginia
decision would be a denial of the right of plaintiff in error to
such process. Assuming the contention to have been made, we are
unable to see that any federal question was thereby raised.
Supposing the courts of West Virginia erred in giving conclusive
effect to the Virginia decision, this was no more than an error of
law, committed in the exercise of jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties, and such an error, not involving a federal
question, affords no opportunity for a review of this Court.
The same response must be made to the second argument presented
under the first assignment of error, which is that the contract in
controversy shows that its terms, so far as they related to the
property within the jurisdiction of West Virginia, were different
from those which related to the property in Virginia, and that the
West Virginia court, in holding them to be the same and
refusing
Page 234 U. S. 745
to recognize the contract as a West Virginia contract, deprived
plaintiff in error of his property without due process of law.
It is not contended that the West Virginia court, in holding the
Virginia judgment to be conclusive upon the present controversy,
violated the "full faith and credit" clause of the federal
Constitution. By that clause, and by the act of Congress (§ 905,
Rev.Stat.) passed to carry it into effect, it was incumbent upon
the West Virginia court to give to the judgment the same faith and
credit that it had by law or usage in the courts of Virginia. The
effect of this was that, provided the Virginia court had
jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties (which was
not questioned), the merits of the controversy there concluded were
not open to reinvestigation in the courts of West Virginia. It is
not here questioned that the West Virginia courts gave such credit
to the Virginia judgment as was thus required.
Under the second assignment of error, the argument is that
plaintiff in error was denied due process in the Virginia courts in
that the Circuit Court of Rockingham County arbitrarily and
unlawfully rejected his third amended bill, and its action in so
doing was affirmed by the court of last resort of that state. Upon
this point, the West Virginia court (71 W.Va. 170) said:
"The said amendment was offered at a very late stage of the
proceedings. The court based its rejection thereof upon two grounds
-- the delay in tendering it without excuse or explanation and its
failure to show a contract materially different from that set up in
the original and first and second amended bills. In disposing of
the amendment, the court said:"
"The bill had been amended twice already, and after these
amendments, and after a thorough argument of the case on its
merits, the court announced its decision. A due regard for the
orderly procedure of the court and the rights of the opposing party
required
Page 234 U. S. 746
that some limit be set to the privilege of amendments. The
amendments now presented are offered without explanation or excuse,
and in the main are unsubstantial, and would not change the opinion
of the court on the merits of the case."
"Having said this, the court proceeded to analyze the amendments
and show their lack of merit and insufficiency to bring about a
different conclusion if they had been filed. The decision relied
upon to sustain this contention is
Hovey v. Elliott,
167 U. S.
409, asserting lack of due process in the entry of a
decree for the plaintiff, after having stricken out the defendant's
answer, because he was guilty of contempt in neglecting to pay into
court a certain sum of money. This was a total denial of the right
of defense, upon an insufficient ground. In that case, the action
of the court was arbitrary and oppressive. Here, the plaintiff has
been allowed a hearing. He had filed an original and two amended
bills, and had no doubt had opportunity to tender the third amended
bill long before the submission of the cause. It is certainly
competent for a court to say, within reasonable limits, what
amounts to a compliance with its rules and the principles of law,
respecting the order and limitations of proceedings in a case.
Besides, in the opinion of the court, the proposed amendment would
not have changed the character of the plaintiff's claim, nor
relieved the contract of its infirmity. An erroneous decision in
respect to either of these matters would not amount to a denial of
due process of law. As to them, it is not a case in which the
plaintiff has had no day in court."
For present purposes, it is sufficient to say that there is
nothing upon the face of the record to indicate that the refusal of
the Virginia court to entertain complainant's third amended bill
was arbitrary or unlawful, or otherwise inconsistent with the "due
process of law" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment; that there is
nothing to show that in the Virginia court complainant based his
right to
Page 234 U. S. 747
file a third amended bill upon the Fourteenth Amendment, and
that, if he had in fact set up such a right in the Virginia court
and it had been there denied, his proper mode of obtaining a review
of the federal question would have been by prosecuting a writ of
error under § 709, Rev.Stat. (§ 237, Judicial Code) to review the
judgment of the court of last resort of Virginia, and not by
attacking the judgment collaterally upon that ground when it was
invoked against him in the courts of West Virginia.
With respect to the third assignment of error, it is contended
that the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia refused to give
full faith and credit to the objection interposed by plaintiff in
error to the plea of
res judicata based upon the decrees
rendered in the Virginia case of
Roller v. Murray, the
objection being based upon the record in the case of
Chesapeake-Western Co. v. Roller, a subsequent decision in
the Virginia courts which, it is contended, overruled the decision
in the first Virginia suit so far as it tended to debar plaintiff
in error from suing upon a
quantum meruit. It appears that
the decision in the
Chesapeake-Western Co. case was to
dissolve an injunction that had been issued against the prosecution
of the West Virginia suit. Its effect as
res judicata was
denied by the West Virginia court (71 W.Va. 172) upon the ground
that it was not a final decree. It is now contended that,
subsequent to the decree dissolving the injunction, a final decree
was rendered in the same cause which in effect concluded the
merits. We find nothing in the record, however, to show that any
such contention was presented to the West Virginia courts.
Since we are unable to find that any substantial question of
federal right was raised by plaintiff in error in the courts of
West Virginia and there decided against him, it follows that the
writ of error must be
Dismissed.