When a federal court decides that a case removable from a state
court on independent grounds is not made otherwise by § 6 of the
Employers' Liability Act, the decision is a judicial act done in
the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by law, and, even if
erroneous, is not open to collateral attack, but only subject to
correction in an appropriate appellate proceeding.
The authorized mode of reviewing such a ruling in an action at
law is by writ of error from the final judgment. Judicial Code, §§
128, 238. The writ of mandamus lies to compel the exercise by a
judicial officer of existing jurisdiction, but not to control his
decision.
Page 234 U. S. 71
Mandamus may not be used to correct alleged error in a refusal
to remand, especially where the order may be reviewed after final
judgment on writ of error or appeal.
Ex Parte Harding,
219 U. S. 363.
The facts, which involve the Removal Acts and also the
construction of the provisions of § 6 of the Employers' Liability
Act of 1908 as amended in 1910 relating to removal of causes
arising under the latter act, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
By an action begun in a state court in Harrison County, Texas,
W. L. Roe sought to recover from the Texas & Pacific Railway
Company, a federal corporation, $30,000 as damages for personal
injuries sustained through its negligence while he was in its
employ as a brakeman, and while both were engaged in interstate
commerce. In due time and in the accustomed way, the case was
removed into the District Court of the United States for that
district upon the sole ground that it was one arising under a law
of the United States, in that the defendant was chartered by an act
of Congress. The plaintiff then moved that the case be remanded
upon the ground that it also arose under the Federal Employers'
Liability Act (April 22, 1908, 35 Stat. 65, c. 149; 36 Stat. 291,
c. 143), and therefore was not removable. After a hearing, the
motion was denied for reasons assigned in the second branch of the
opinion in
Van Brimmer v. Texas & Pacific Railway,190
F. 394, 397. The plaintiff then petitioned this Court for a writ of
mandamus commanding
Page 234 U. S. 72
the judge of the district court to remand the case. A rule to
show cause was granted, and the respondent answered that the motion
to remand had been denied because, upon consideration, he believed
the case was lawfully removed.
As the case arose under a law of the United States, namely, the
defendant's federal charter (
see Pacific Removal Cases,
115 U. S. 1;
Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Cody, 166 U.
S. 606), and the requisite amount was in controversy, it
is conceded that it was removable unless made otherwise by the fact
that it also arose under the Federal Employers' Liability Act. In
the sixth section, as amended in 1910, that act declares:
"The jurisdiction of the courts of the United States under this
act shall be concurrent with that of the courts of the several
states, and no case arising under this act, and brought in any
state court of competent jurisdiction, shall be removed to any
court of the United States."
A like restriction upon removals appears in § 28 of the Judicial
Code.
The question presented to the district court by the motion to
remand was whether these provisions were intended to forbid a
removal in every case falling within the Employers' Liability Act,
regardless of the presence of some independent ground of removal,
as in this instance, or only to declare that the fact that a case
arises under that act shall not be a ground of removal. Regarding
the latter of these alternatives as sustained by the better
reasoning, the court denied the motion, and upon this petition for
mandamus we are asked to review that ruling, pronounce it
erroneous, and direct the respondent to retract it and remand the
case.
Whether the ruling was right or wrong, it was a judicial act,
done in the exercise of a jurisdiction conferred by law, and, even
if erroneous, was not void or open to collateral attack, but only
subject to correction in an appropriate appellate proceeding.
Chesapeake & Ohio Railway
Co. v.
Page 234 U. S. 73
McCabe, 213 U. S. 207;
In re Metropolitan Trust Co., 218 U.
S. 312. Like any other ruling in the progress of the
case, it will be regularly subject to appellate review after final
judgment, and the authorized mode of obtaining such a review, the
action being at law, is by a writ of error. Judicial Code, §§ 128,
238;
Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Fitzgerald,
160 U. S. 556,
160 U. S.
582.
The accustomed office of a writ of mandamus, when directed to a
judicial officer, is to compel an exercise of existing
jurisdiction, but not to control his decision. It does not lie to
compel a reversal of a decision, either interlocutory of final,
made in the exercise of a lawful jurisdiction, especially where in
regular course the decision may be reviewed upon a writ of error or
an appeal.
Bank of Columbia v.
Sweeney, 1 Pet. 567;
Life &
Fire Insurance Co. v. Adams, 9 Pet. 571,
34 U. S. 602;
Ex Parte Taylor,
14 How. 3,
55 U. S. 13;
Ex Parte Many,
14 How. 24;
Ex Parte
Newman, 14 Wall. 152,
81 U. S. 169;
Ex Parte
Sawyer, 21 Wall. 235;
Ex Parte Flippin,
94 U. S. 348;
Ex Parte Loring, 94 U. S. 418;
Ex Parte Railway Co., 103 U. S. 794;
Ex Parte Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 108 U.
S. 566;
American Construction Co. v. Jacksonville
&c. Co., 148 U. S. 372,
148 U. S. 379;
In re Atlantic City Railroad, 164 U.
S. 633;
Ex Parte Oklahoma, 220 U.
S. 191,
220 U. S. 209;
Ex Parte First National Bank, 228 U.
S. 516. And this is true of a decision denying a motion
to remand.
Ex Parte Hoard, 105 U.
S. 578;
In re Pollitz, 206 U.
S. 323;
Ex Parte Nebraska, 209 U.
S. 436;
Ex Parte Gruetter, 217 U.
S. 586;
Ex Parte Harding, 219 U.
S. 363. In the last case, the subject was extensively
considered, and it was held that the writ of mandamus may not be
used to correct alleged error in a refusal to remand where, after
final judgment, the order may be reviewed upon a writ of error or
an appeal. To that view we adhere, and therefore we are not here at
liberty to consider the merits of the question involved in the
district court's ruling.
Rule discharged; petition dismissed.