In a suit by an ecclesiastical society to recover from the
administrator of a deceased member assets of the estate as
community property under the provisions of the constitution and
membership, the question for the courts is not one of canon law or
ecclesiastical polity, but one solely of civil rights.
Where the state has chartered a society as one of "religious men
living in community," a provision in its constitution for community
ownership, with renunciation of individual rights in private
property during continuance of membership, with freedom of
withdrawal, is not invalid as opposed to the public policy of, but
is directly sanctioned by, the state creating the society.
An agreement to live in community and renounce individual rights
of property, but with a right to withdraw at any time, invades no
constitutional right; nor, in this case, does it transgress any
statute of the State of New Jersey, which chartered the society
with which the agreement is made.
Subject to the inhibitions of the Constitution of the United
States, the legislature of each state is the arbiter of its public
policy.
In this case,
held that an agreement made by a member
of a religious order, chartered as a society of religious men
living in community, that his individual earnings and acquisitions,
like those of other members, should go into the common fund,
included his earnings from copyrights of books, and also
held that as such agreement contained a right to withdraw
at any time there was no infringement of any right protected by the
Constitution of the United States, nor was it against the public
policy of the State of New Jersey, which granted the charter to the
society.
194 F. 289 reversed.
The facts, which involve the validity under the laws of New
Jersey and the public policy of that state of an agreement
Page 234 U. S. 641
between an ecclesiastical order and one of its members, are
stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HUGHES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was brought by the Order of St. Benedict of New
Jersey, a corporation of that state, to establish its title to
personal property left by Augustin Wirth, deceased, a member of the
Order, who died at Springfield, Minnesota, in December, 1901. The
defendant Albert Steinhauser, as administrator of the estate of the
decedent, holding letters from the probate court of Brown County,
Minnesota, filed a cross-bill asserting ownership in his
representative capacity and praying discovery and account with
respect to whatever part of the estate had come into the
complainant's possession. The circuit court entered a decree
dismissing the cross-bill and granting the relief sought by the
complainant's bill. 179 F. 137. The circuit court of appeals
reversed this decree, directing the dismissal of the original bill
and the granting of the prayer of the cross-bill. 194 F. 289.
Certiorari was allowed.
The monastic brotherhood known as the Order of St. Benedict was
established by St. Benedict in the early part of the sixth century
at Subiaco, Italy, whence it spread over western Europe. It was
brought to the United States in 1846. The members of the
brotherhood follow what is known as "the rule of St. Benedict," a
collection
Page 234 U. S. 642
of mandates essentially unchanged from the beginning. The vows
are those of obedience, stability, chastity, and poverty.
We are not concerned in the present case with any question of
ecclesiastical requirement or monastic discipline. The question is
solely one of civil rights. The claim in suit rests upon the
constitution of the complainant corporation, and the obligations
inherent in membership.
The Order of St. Benedict of New Jersey was incorporated in 1868
by special act of the legislature of that state. The incorporators
were described as "being a society of religious men, living in
community, and devoted to charitable works and the education of
youth." The corporation was empowered to hold property and to make
bylaws for the government of the Order, provided that these should
not be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States or of the
State of New Jersey, that the clear yearly income of the real
estate should not exceed a sum stated, and that no one should
remain an incorporator "except regular members of said religious
society, living in community, and governed by the laws thereof."
Under this charter, the Order adopted a constitution, among the
provisions of which are the following:
"Section XI. Membership is lost at once:"
"1. By being dismissed according to the disciplinary statutes of
the Order of St. Benedict of New Jersey, approved of by Pope Pius
IX for the American Cassinese Congregation of Benedictines."
"2. By voluntary leaving the Order for any purpose
whatsoever."
"3. By joining any other order or secret society, or any other
religious denominations."
"Section 12. Since the Order of St. Benedict of New Jersey is
solely a charitable institution, the real estate of said order and
the individual earnings of its members are and must be considered
as common property of the
Page 234 U. S. 643
Order of St. Benedict of New Jersey, from which the members of
said Order derive their support, and the balance of which income
and property should serve for the following up and carrying out of
the charitable objects of the Order."
"It is therefore agreed upon by all the members of the said
Order of St. Benedict of New Jersey that no member can or will
claim at any time or under any circumstances more than their decent
support for the time for which they are members of the Charter of
the Order of St. Benedict of New Jersey, and no further."
"And moreover, that each member individually pledges himself to
have all property which he now holds or hereafter may hold in his
own name conveyed as soon as possible to the legal title of the
Order of St. Benedict of New Jersey."
Augustin Wirth was born in Bavaria in 1828. He came to this
country in 1851, and, in the next year, he took the solemn vows of
the Order at St. Vincent's Abbey in Pennsylvania, and was ordained
to the priesthood. For a few years he had charge of a church at
Greenburgh, Pennsylvania, near St. Vincent's, and in 1857 he went
to Kansas, where he established a college and a church which
afterwards became an abbey. He continued his work in Kansas until
1868, and then was sent to Minnesota, where he remained until 1875.
He then resumed his pastorate at Greenburgh, Pennsylvania, and
later had charge of a parish at Elizabeth, New Jersey, until 1887.
It is evident that, while in Kansas, he had joined the monastery of
St. Benedict there established, and in 1887, with the permission of
both Abbots, he transferred his stability to St. Mary's Abbey in
Newark, New Jersey, the home of the complainant, the New Jersey
Order, of which he thus became a member. He remained continuously
at this Abbey for about two years, until 1889; he was in ill
health, and was taken care of by the Order. He was then sent to a
church in Wilmington, Delaware, and after a few
Page 234 U. S. 644
months he returned to his pastorate in Elizabeth, New Jersey, in
which he continued until 1897. After traveling for some time in
Europe for his health, visiting Rome and various monasteries, he
took a parish, in 1898 at Springfield, Minnesota, with the
requisite permission and tempus from the Abbot of St. Mary's, and
there he remained until his death. At the request of the New Jersey
Abbot, he was buried in the cemetery of the Benedictine Order in
Minnesota. The circuit court found that his membership in the
complainant Order continued to the last, and this finding was not
disturbed by the circuit court of appeals. We regard the fact as
satisfactorily established. His absence from the Abbey when engaged
in pastoral work was upon the consent of the Abbot, and he was
subject to recall at any time.
Father Wirth published many works on religious subjects. He
obtained copyrights for his books, and made his contract with the
publishers, in the name of "Augustine Wirth, O.S.B." The property
here in question consists chiefly of the proceeds received from
sales of these books (including notes and mortgages in which they
had been invested), credits on account of sales made before and
after his death, and the copyrights. He received the royalties
personally during his lifetime, and after his death, until October
17, 1906 (when suit was brought against the publishers by the
administrator), the accruing royalties were paid to the
complainant. The New Jersey Order also, through the Abbot of St.
John's Abbey in Minnesota, collected certain sums on outstanding
notes held by the decedent, and paid therefrom the decedent's
debts.
It is clear that, according to the principles of the
complainant's organization, Father Wirth was not entitled to retain
for his own benefit either the moneys which he received for his
services in the various churches with which he was connected or
those which he derived from
Page 234 U. S. 645
the sale of his books. By the explicit provision of the
constitution of the complainant (§ XII), it was a necessary
consequence of his continued membership that his gains -- from
whatever source -- belonged to it, and that, as against the
complainant, he could not assert title to the property which he
received. The claim of the Order, based upon this conception of its
rights, is resisted upon the grounds (1) that the decedent had the
permission of the Abbot to retain, as his own property, the
proceeds of the sales of his books, and (2) that the obligation
sought to be enforced by the complainant is void as being against
public policy.
1. While there was evidence that Father Wirth was required to
account to the Abbot for the salary and perquisites received in his
church work, it appeared that the income from his books was treated
in a different manner. This income he was allowed to retain and
use. When he joined the complainant, in 1887, he did not make a
transfer of any property to the Order, although already he had some
property as a result of his literary labors. The evidence showed
that he made loans and investments, and from the moneys in his
hands, he paid his personal expenses, including his outlays on his
visit to Europe. Because of his going to Rome without leave, and
his expenditures on this trip, he was admonished by the Abbot
Primate, O.S.B., who had already written to the Abbot of St. Mary's
that Father Wirth should be required to account. But no such
account was given, and it would seem that such disagreements as
arose between the decedent and his ecclesiastical superiors in this
country related to church moneys, and not to the proceeds of book
sales. The circuit court of appeals, disagreeing with the finding
of the circuit court, concluded that Father Wirth was permitted by
the Abbot of St. Vincent's, and by the complainant's Abbot, to
retain these proceeds as his own property.
Page 234 U. S. 646
It is undisputed that the decedent did have a special permission
with respect to the use of this income. Originally given by the
Abbot of St. Vincent's, it was continued by the Abbot of St.
Mary's. It was given in recognition of the fact that his literary
work was in addition to the duties which he was normally required
to perform. But, as we think, the conclusion of the court below
does not give proper weight to the testimony as to the nature and
scope of the privilege thus accorded. It was explicitly testified
by the Abbot that Father Wirth was permitted to keep the moneys in
question, not as his own, but to have their use for charitable
purposes with the permission of his superiors. It was this
permission which was originally given and which the complainant's
Abbot renewed. This testimony was not controverted, and, in view of
the constitution of the Order, we find no ground for treating the
permission as being of a different character. It is said that it
does not appear how the decedent, while in Minnesota, for example,
could have expended the money for the charitable purposes of the
Order in New Jersey. But the purposes of this Order were broadly
charitable and religious; the decedent prosecuted his educational
and religious work with the Abbot's consent, and the use of these
moneys for charitable purposes, wherever he was located for the
time, might well be in furtherance of the objects of the Order. It
may have been the concession of a special privilege to permit the
decedent to act directly in the distribution of the moneys which he
had earned by his additional labors, instead of turning them over
to the head of the Order, but we cannot say that it was a
permission without restriction, or one which essentially altered
his relation to the Order and his fundamental duty while he
remained a member of it.
On the contrary, we agree with the circuit court not only in its
finding of fact that the permission was limited as stated, but also
in its holding that, in view of the basic
Page 234 U. S. 647
law of the organization, there is no warrant for the conclusion
that the Abbot had any authority to allow Father Wirth to assert an
independent title, or to hold the property as absolutely his own.
It is said that the "Rule of St. Benedict" recognizes the right of
the member of the Order to keep whatever the Abbot permits him to
have. But this plainly refers to the necessities of life, and not
to accumulations in direct antagonism to the principles of the
society. Whatever indulgence may have been shown to the decedent
with respect to the submission of appropriate accounts, it cannot
be said that, while his membership continued, he had or could have
the privilege of accumulating an individual estate for his own
benefit and free from his obligations to the Order. This could not
but be regarded as violative of the constitution of the
complainant, and beyond the competency of its official head to
grant.
2. We are thus brought to the question whether the requirement,
which lies at the foundation of this suit, is void as against
public policy -- that is, whether, by reason of repugnance to the
essential principles of our institutions, the obligation, though
voluntarily assumed, and the trust arising from it, cannot be
enforced. In support of this view, it seems to be premised that a
member of the Order can be absolved from his vows only by the
action of the Head of the Church, and that, unless the requisite
dispensation is thus obtained the member is bound for life in
temporal, as well as in spiritual, affairs. This, it is said, is
the necessary import of testimony given by the Abbot. It is thus
assumed that the vows in connection with the "Rule" bind the member
in complete servitude to the Order for life, or until the Head of
the Church absolves him from his obligations, and it is concluded
that an agreement for such a surrender, being opposed to individual
liberty and to the inherent right of every person to acquire and
hold property, is unenforceable in the civil
Page 234 U. S. 648
courts, and cannot form the basis for an equitable title in the
complainant.
This argument, we think, disregards the explicit provision of
the complainant's constitution as to voluntary withdrawal. It
overlooks the distinction between civil and ecclesiastical rights
and duties; between the Order of St. Benedict of New Jersey, a
corporation of that state, and the monastic brotherhood subject to
church authority; between the obligation imposed by the corporate
organization and religious vows. As we have said, the question here
is not one of canon law or ecclesiastical polity. The requirement
of complainant's constitution must be read according to its terms,
and its validity must be thus determined. Granted that it is to be
examined in the light of that to which it refers, still,
obligations which are inconsistent with its express provisions
cannot be imported into it. This constitution, as already stated,
definitely provides: "Membership is lost at once: -- 2. By
voluntary leaving the Order for any purpose whatsoever" (§ XI).
This language cannot be taken to mean other than what it distinctly
says. So far as the corporation, and the civil rights and
obligations incident to membership therein are concerned, it leaves
no doubt that the member may voluntarily leave the Order at any
time. His membership in the corporation, and the obligation he
assumes, are subject to that condition. If he severs his connection
with the corporation, it cannot be heard to claim any property he
may subsequently acquire. His obligation runs with his membership,
and the latter may be terminated at will.
With this privilege of withdrawal expressly recognized, we are
unable to say that the agreement expressed in § XII of the
complainant's constitution, that the gains and acquisitions of
members shall belong to the corporation, must be condemned. These
go to the corporation in exchange for the privileges of membership,
and
Page 234 U. S. 649
to further the common purpose to which the members are devoted.
No constitutional right is invaded, and no statutory restriction is
transgressed. The Legislature of New Jersey, which, subject to
constitutional inhibition, is the arbiter of the public policy of
that state, granted the charter by special act to the Benedictine
Society of "religious men living in community," and it cannot be
said that the constitution adopted by the Order was repugnant to
the charter provisions, or exceeded the authority plainly intended
to be conferred. It would seem to be clear that the obligation
assumed, instead of being opposed to the public policy of the state
where it was created, was directly sanctioned.
The validity of agreements providing for community ownership
with renunciation of individual rights of property during the
continuance of membership in the community, where there is freedom
to withdraw, has repeatedly been affirmed. The case of
Goesele v.
Bimeler, 14 How. 589, related to a religious
society called Separatists. By an agreement made in 1819, the
members of the society agreed to unite in a "communion of
property." They renounced "all individual ownership of property,
present or future, real or personal." Amendatory articles of like
import were signed in 1824. As to these agreements, the Court
said:
"The articles of 1819 and 1824 are objected to as not
constituting a contract which a court of equity would enforce. . .
. What is there in either of these articles that is contrary to
good morals, or that is opposed to the policy of the laws? An
association of individuals is formed under a religious influence,
who are in a destitute condition, having little to rely on for
their support but their industry, and they agree to labor in common
for the good of the society, and a comfortable maintenance for each
individual, and whatever shall be acquired beyond this shall go to
the common stock. This contract provides for every member of
the
Page 234 U. S. 650
community, in sickness and in health, and under whatsoever
misfortune may occur. . . . By disclaiming all individual ownership
of the property acquired by their labor, for the benefits secured
by the articles, the members give durability to the fund
accumulated, and to the benevolent purposes to which it is applied.
No legal objection is perceived to such a partnership."
Id., pp.
55 U. S.
606-607. In
Schwartz v. Duss, 187 U. S.
8, the controversy related to the property of the
Harmony Society, a community in Pennsylvania. It was said that the
cardinal principle of the society was "self-abnegation," which was
manifested
"not only by submission to a religious head, but by a community
instead of individual ownership of property, and the dedication of
their labor to the society."
It had been held by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania that the
agreements constituting the community were not offensive to the
public policy of that state (
Schriber v. Rapp, 5 Watts
351), and, as to this, it was said by this Court:
"The Supreme Court observed that the point made against the
articles as being against public policy was attended with no
difficulty, and Chief Justice Gibson said for the Court: 'An
association for the purposes expressed is prohibited neither by
statute nor the common law.'"
Id., p.
187 U. S. 26. In
Burt v. Oneida Community, 137 N.Y. 346, in describing the
character of that society, the Court of Appeals of New York said
that its main purpose was the "propagandism of certain communistic
views as to the acquisition and enjoyment of property" and "the
endeavor to put into practical operation an economic and industrial
scheme which should embody and illustrate the doctrines which they
held and inculcated." "Necessarily" said the court,
"the basic proposition of such a community was the absolute and
complete surrender of the separate and individual rights of
property of the persons entering it; the abandonment of all purely
selfish pursuits, and the investiture of the title to their
Page 234 U. S. 651
property and the fruits of their industry in the common body,
from which they could not afterwards be severed or withdrawn except
by unanimous consent. It was fashioned according to the pentecostal
ideal that all who believed should be together and have all things
common. It was intended to be in fact as they frequently styled
themselves, but a single family upon a large scale, with only one
purse, where self was to be abjured and the general good alone
considered."
The court, viewing it solely as a business undertaking, held
that the organization "was not prohibited by any statute, or in
contravention of any law regulating the possession, ownership, or
tenure of property."
See also Speidel v. Henrici,
120 U. S. 377;
Casely v. Separatists, 13 Ohio St. 144;
Waite v.
Merrill, 4 Me. 102;
Gass v. Wilhite, 2 Dana 170;
State v. Amana Society, 132 Ia. 304.
It is said that, in these cases, the contracts had been fully
performed, and that the effort was made either to partition or
distribute the property of the society, or to recover the value of
property which had been actually conveyed or services which had
been rendered to it. But the validity of the agreements there in
question, against the objection based upon public policy, was
distinctly recognized.
In the present case, there was no infringement of Father Wirth's
liberty or right to property. He did not withdraw from the Order.
He had agreed, by accepting membership under the complainant's
constitution, that his individual earnings and acquisitions, like
those of other members, should go into the common fund, and, except
as required for the maintenance of the members, should be used in
carrying out the charitable objects of the Order. It is not
unlikely that the copyrights upon his books derived their
commercial value largely, if not altogether, from his membership.
Certainly, the equitable ownership of these copyrights, by virtue
of his obligation, vested in the complainant,
Page 234 U. S. 652
and the moneys in question when received became in equity its
property and were subject to its disposition. As to both, Father
Wirth stood in the position of a trustee.
The further objection that the claim is barred by the statute of
limitations was held by the circuit court to be untenable, and we
agree with that view. The applicable limitation is six years
(Minn.Rev.Laws 1905, § 4076), and the bill was filed within six
years after Father Wirth's death. There is no such clear evidence
of repudiation of the trust as would warrant the conclusion that
the statute began to run at an earlier date.
The decree of the circuit court of appeals is reversed, and that
of the Circuit Court is affirmed.
It is so ordered.