Where a state statute has been held unconstitutional under the
state constitution by an inferior state court, and subsequently has
been upheld by the highest court of the state, this Court, when the
case is properly here under § 237, Judicial Code, must regard the
statute as valid under the state constitution and consider only the
question of its validity under the federal Constitution, although
intermediately this Court has followed the decision of the lower
state court.
The validity of a state statute under the commerce clause or the
Act to Regulate Commerce cannot be attacked in a suit which is not
based upon a claim arising out of interstate commerce.
A state may classify claims against persons or corporations
where there is no classification of debtors and where the claims
are not grouped together for the purpose of bearing against any
class of citizens or corporations.
Page 233 U. S. 643
A state police regulation designed to promote payment of small
claims of certain classes and discourage unnecessary litigation
respecting them should not be set aside by the federal courts on
the ground that claims of other kinds have not been included where
the legislature was presumably dealing with an actual mischief, and
made the act as broad in its scope as seemed necessary from the
practical standpoint.
The Fourteenth Amendment does not require that state laws shall
be. perfect.
In the absence of a construction by the state courts to that
effect, this Court will not concede that a state statute confers
its benefits only upon natural persons who are plaintiffs in
certain classes of actions, and not upon corporation
plaintiffs.
A defendant corporation is not in a position to assail a state
statute as denying equal protection of the law because its benefits
do not inure to corporations which are plaintiffs.
If the classification is otherwise reasonable, a state statute
does not deny equal protection of the law because attorney's fees
are allowed to successful plaintiffs only, and not to successful
defendants. The classification is reasonable.
A statute allowing an attorney's fee in cases involving small
amounts is not one imposing a penalty where it appears that the
effect is merely to require defendant to reimburse plaintiff for
part of his expenses.
This Court follows the construction of the highest court of the
state to the effect that a statute imposing an attorney's fee on
the defeated defendant is limited to claims of an amount specified
in the title.
The statute of Texas of 1909 imposing an attorney's fee on the
defeated defendant in certain classes of cases, as the same has
been construed by the highest court of that state, is not
unconstitutional under the equal protection provision of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe R. Co. v.
Ellis, 165 U. S. 150,
distinguished.
The facts, which involve the construction and constitutionality
under the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth Amendment of
a statute of Texas of 1909 imposing an attorney's fee on the
defeated defendant in certain classes of cases, are stated in the
opinion.
Page 233 U. S. 645
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action was brought in the justice court to recover the sum
of $10.75 alleged to be due as wages from the defendant (now
plaintiff in error) to the plaintiff below, with an attorney's fee
of $9. The fee was claimed only by virtue of an act of the
legislature, approved March 19, 1909, Laws, p. 93, now forming
Arts. 2178 and 2179, Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. 1911. Defendant specially
excepted to this part of plaintiff's claim on the ground that the
act was invalid as constituting a burden upon interstate commerce,
contrary to the commerce clause of the federal Constitution and the
Act to Regulate Commerce and amendments thereof, and as violating
the "equal protection" and "due process" clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Notwithstanding these contentions, judgment was rendered
in favor of plaintiff for the amount claimed, including the
attorney's fee. Under the local practice, no appeal lies from a
decision of the justice court to a higher state court in a case
involving less than twenty dollars, and so the judgment is brought
directly here by writ of error for a review of the federal
questions.
The statute in question (including its caption) is set
Page 233 U. S. 646
forth in the margin.
* This is the same
act that was held invalid under the state constitution by the court
of civil appeals in
Ft. Worth & D.C. Ry. Co. v. Loyd,
132 S.W. 899, because of which decision this Court, in
Gulf,
Colorado
Page 233 U. S. 647
& S.F. Railway v. Dennis, 224 U.
S. 503, reversed a judgment that included an attorney's
fee without passing upon the question whether the act contravened
the Fourteenth Amendment.
And see Gulf, Colorado & S.F.
Railway v. Thorn, 227 U.S. 675. Since that time, the Supreme
Court of Texas, overruling the decision in the
Loyd case,
has upheld the act under the Texas Constitution in
Missouri,
Kan. & Texas Ry. Co. of Texas v. Mahaffey, 105 Tex. 394.
We must therefore now consider the federal questions.
But first we should note the construction placed upon the act by
the state court of last resort. Section 35 of Article III of the
Constitution of 1876 declares that no bill except appropriation
bills shall contain more than one subject, which shall be expressed
in its title,
"but if any subject shall be embraced in an act which shall not
be expressed in the title, such act shall be void only as to so
much thereof as shall not be so expressed."
In the case last mentioned (105 Tex. 394, 398), the court
construed the act as limited in its operation to the purpose
expressed in the title -- that is, as relating only to the
collection of claims not exceeding $200 in amount, and as
conferring no right upon persons having claims exceeding that
amount which did not exist independently of the act. In reaching
this conclusion, the court said:
"Surely, the legislature did not intend to limit attorney's fees
to $20 in a case involving $1,000, and there is no apparent reason
for allowing additional attorney's fees of $20 in a case involving
so large an amount, but there is a sound reason for allowing and
limiting the amount of fee on small claims. If the claim be $200 or
less, and suit must be instituted, which makes an attorney
necessary, it is a heavy tax on the claimant; therefore, if he
present a just demand which is refused, the recovery of the full
amount claimed shows that the demand of payment should have
Page 233 U. S. 648
been granted, and this law compels one refusing payment of such
demand to pay the cost and attorney's fees, not to exceed $20. The
limitation of the amount of the fee to $20 and to cases in which an
attorney has been actually employed practically implies that such
action might be prosecuted without an attorney, which in effect
limits the amount of the claim to $200, because the only court in
which suits of that character could be instituted by
nonprofessional claimants, without the services of an attorney, is
that of justice of the peace, whose jurisdiction cannot exceed
$200; therefore, the limitation in the caption is in effect the
same as that of the body of the law, because the proviso in the law
can be harmonized with the title by no other construction."
So far as the present attack is founded upon the commerce clause
and the Act to Regulate Commerce, it is sufficient to say that the
judgment under review was not based upon a claim arising out of
interstate commerce, and hence plaintiff in error does not bring
itself within the class with regard to whom it claims the act to be
in this respect repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the
United States.
Seaboard Air Line v. Seegers, 207 U. S.
73,
207 U. S. 76;
Tyler v. Judges, 179 U. S. 405,
179 U. S. 409;
Hooker v. Burr, 194 U. S. 415,
194 U. S. 419;
Hatch v. Reardon, 204 U. S. 152,
204 U. S. 160;
Southern Railway Co. v. King, 217 U.
S. 524,
217 U. S. 534;
Standard Stock Food Co. v. Wright, 225 U.
S. 540,
225 U. S. 550;
Rosenthal v. New York, 226 U. S. 260,
226 U. S. 271;
Farmers' Bank v. Minnesota, 232 U.
S. 516,
232 U. S. 530;
Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.
S. 531.
Upon the other questions, plaintiff in error relies chiefly upon
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. v. Ellis, 165 U.
S. 150. In that case, a previous act of the Legislature
of Texas (Act of April 5, 1889, Laws p. 131; Supp. to Sayles'
Tex.Civ.Stat. Art. 4266
a, p. 768) was held repugnant to
the Fourteenth Amendment. That act
Page 233 U. S. 649
allowed the recovery of plaintiff's attorneys' fees in certain
classes of cases, but only where the defendant was a railroad
company, and it was adjudged to be invalid because it singled out a
particular class of debtors, and imposed this burden upon them,
without any reasonable ground existing for the discrimination. The
classification was held to be arbitrary because having no relation
to the special privileges granted to this class of corporations, or
to the peculiar features of their business, distinguishing
Missouri Pacific Railway Co v. Humes, 115 U.
S. 512.
The present statute, however, differs in essential features. It
applies to claims
"against any person or corporation doing business in this state
for personal services rendered or for labor done, or for material
furnished, or for overcharges on freight or express, or for any
claim for lost or damaged freight, or for stock killed or injured
by such person or corporation, its agents or employees."
There is here no classification of debtors; the act bears
equally against individuals and against corporations of any class
doing business in the state. It applies only to certain kinds of
claims, but these cover a wide range, and do not appear to have
been grouped together for the purpose of bearing against any class
or classes of citizens or corporations. Unless something of this
sort did appear, we should not be justified in holding the act to
be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment. It is a police regulation
designed to promote the prompt payment of small claims and to
discourage unnecessary litigation in respect to them. The claims
included appear to be such as are susceptible of being readily
adjusted by the party responsible within the thirty days that must
intervene between the presentation of the claim and the institution
of suit. We may imagine that some other kinds of claims might as
well have been included, but it is to be presumed that the
legislature was dealing with an actual mischief, and made the act
as broad in its scope as seemed
Page 233 U. S. 650
necessary from the practical standpoint. As has been said
before, the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that state laws
shall be perfect, and we cannot judicially denounce this act as
based upon arbitrary distinctions, in view of the wide discretion
that must necessarily reside in a state legislature about resorting
to classification when establishing regulations for the welfare of
those for whom they legislate.
Magoun v. Illinois Trust &
Savings Bank, 170 U. S. 283,
170 U. S. 293;
Orient Insurance Co. v. Daggs, 172 U.
S. 557,
172 U. S. 562;
Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Melton, 218 U. S.
36,
218 U. S. 52;
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S.
61,
220 U. S.
78.
It is insisted that the benefits of the act are conferred upon
natural persons only; but this we cannot concede in the absence of
a decision by the courts of the state giving to it a construction
thus limited.
Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania,
232 U. S. 531,
232 U. S. 546.
And besides, plaintiff in error is not in a position to assail the
legislation on the ground that corporation plaintiffs are not
included within its benefits.
Rosenthal v. New York,
226 U. S. 260,
226 U. S.
271.
If the classification is otherwise reasonable, the mere fact
that attorney's fees are allowed to successful plaintiffs only, and
not to successful defendants, does not render the statute repugnant
to the "equal protection" clause. This is not a discrimination
between different citizens or classes of citizens, since members of
any and every class may either sue or be sued.
Actor and
reus differ in their respective attitudes towards a
litigation; the former has the burden of seeking the proper
jurisdiction and bringing the proper parties before it, as well as
the burden of proof upon the main issues, and these differences may
be made the basis of distinctive treatment respecting the allowance
of an attorneys' fee as a part of the costs.
Atchison, Topeka
&c. Railroad v. Matthews, 174 U. S.
96;
Farmers' &c. Ins. Co. v. Dobney,
189 U. S. 301,
189 U. S. 304;
McMullin v. Doughty, 68 N.J.Eq. 776, 781.
Page 233 U. S. 651
Even were the statute to be considered as imposing a penalty
upon unsuccessful defendants in cases within its sweep, such
penalty is obviously imposed as an incentive to prompt settlement
of small but well founded claims, and as a deterrent of groundless
defenses, which are the more oppressive where the amount involved
is small. In
Seaboard Air Line v. Seegers, 207 U. S.
73,
207 U. S. 77,
the Court sustained a state enactment that imposed a fixed penalty
of $50 upon common carriers, to be recovered by the party
aggrieved, for failure to promptly adjust and pay claims for loss
or damage to property while in the carrier's possession. In
Yazoo & Miss. R. Co. v. Jackson Vinegar Co.,
226 U. S. 217,
226 U. S. 219,
we upheld a state enactment that imposed a penalty of $25 in
addition to actual damages for failure to settle claims for lost or
damaged freight within a limited time after written notice of the
loss. And in
Kansas City Southern Ry. v. Anderson, decided
this term,
ante, p.
233 U. S. 325, we
upheld the imposition of double damages in cases admitting of
special treatment.
But we think it is not correct to consider this statute as
imposing a penalty. The allowance is confined to a reasonable
attorney's fee not exceeding $20 where an attorney is actually
employed; the amount to be determined by the court or jury trying
the case. Manifestly, the purpose is merely to require the
defendant to reimburse the plaintiff for a part of his expenses not
otherwise recoverable as "costs of suit." So far as it goes, it
imposes only compensatory damages upon a defendant who, in the
judgment of the legislature, unreasonably delays and resists
payment of a just demand. The outlay for an attorney's fee is a
necessary consequence of the litigation, and since it must fall
upon one party or the other, it is reasonable to impose it upon the
party whose refusal to pay a just claim renders the litigation
necessary. The allowance of ordinary costs of suit to the
Page 233 U. S. 652
prevailing party rests upon the same principle. 2 Bac.Abr. title
Costs. Numerous cases in the state courts have sustained similar
legislation.
Vogel v. Pekoc, 157 Ill. 339, 344, 346;
Burlington &c. Ry. Co. v. Dey, 82 Ia. 312, 340;
Cameron v. Chicago &c. Ry. Co., 63 Minn. 384, 388;
Wortman v. Kleinschmidt, 12 Mont. 316, 330. If a
reasonable penalty may be imposed for failure to satisfy a demand
found to be just, it follows
a fortiori that costs and an
attorney's fee may be.
See Atchison, Topeka &c. Railroad v.
Matthews, 174 U. S. 96,
174 U. S. 105;
Farmers' &c. Ins. Co. v. Dobney, 189 U.
S. 301,
189 U. S.
304.
For these reasons, it seems to us that the statute in question
is not repugnant to either the "equal protection" or the "due
process" clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Judgment affirmed.
*
"An Act to Regulate the Presentation and Collection of Claims
for Personal Services or for Labor Rendered or for Material
Furnished, or for Overcharges in Freight or Express, or for Any
Claim for Lost or Damaged Freight, or for Stock Killed or Injured
by Any Person or Corporation, against Any Person or Corporation
Doing Business in This state, and Providing a Reasonable Amount of
Attorney's Fees to be Recovered, in cases Where the Amount of Such
Claims Shall Not Exceed Two Hundred ($200) Dollars, and Declaring
an Emergency."
"SECTION 1. That hereafter, any person in this state having a
valid,
bona fide claim against any person or corporation
doing business in this state for personal services rendered, or for
labor done, or for material furnished, or for overcharges on
freight or express, or for any claim for lost or damaged freight,
or for stock killed or injured by such person or corporation, its
agents or employees, may present the same to such person or
corporation, or to any duly authorized agent thereof in any county
where suit may be instituted for the same, and if, at the
expiration of thirty days after the presentation of such claim, the
same has not been paid or satisfied, he may immediately institute
suit thereon in the proper court, and if he shall finally establish
his claim and obtain judgment for the full amount thereof, as
presented for payment to such person or corporation in such court,
he shall be entitled to recover the amount of such claim and all
costs of suit, and in addition thereto a reasonable amount as
attorney's fees, provided he has an attorney employed in the case,
not to exceed twenty ($20.00) dollars, to be determined by the
court or jury trying the case; provided, however, that nothing in
this act shall be construed to repeal or in any manner affect any
provision of the law now in force giving a remedy to persons having
claims of the character mentioned in this Act, but the same shall
be considered as cumulative of all other remedies given to such a
person or persons."
"SEC. 2. The fact that there is no law now in force in this
state providing an effectual remedy for persons having such claims
as are mentioned in this act creates an emergency and an imperative
public necessity requiring the suspension of the constitutional
rule requiring bills to be read on three several days, and this Act
shall take effect from and after its passage, and it is so
enacted."
"Approved March 13, 1909."