The guardianship of the United States over allottee Indians does
not cease upon the making of the allotment and the allottee's
becoming a citizen of the United States.
Tiger v. Western
Investment Company, 221 U. S. 286.
The United States has capacity to sue for the purpose of setting
aside conveyances of lands allotted to Indians under its care where
restrictions upon alienation have been transgressed.
Heckman v.
United States, 224 U. S. 413.
A transfer of allotted lands contrary to the inhibition of
Congress is a violation of governmental rights of the United States
arising from its obligation to a dependent people, and no
stipulations, contracts, or judgments in suits to which the United
States is a stranger can affect its interest.
The authority of the United States to enforce a restraint
lawfully created by it cannot be impaired by any action without its
consent.
Restrictions on alienation imposed by acts of Congress imposed
by the Act of March 2, 1889, regarding the allotments to the
confederated tribes specified therein, are not mere personal
restrictions operative upon the allottee alone, but run with the
land and are binding upon his heirs as well for the specified
term.
The intent of Congress in regard to its enactments -- such as
those relating to restrictions on alienation of Indian allotted
lands -- may be indicated by subsequent enactments relating to the
same subject matter.
191 F. 19 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the construction of statutes affecting
the alienation of Indian allotments, are stated in the opinion.
Page 233 U. S. 532
MR. JUSTICE Hughes delivered the opinion of the Court.
Pursuant to the Act of March 2, 1889, c. 422, 25 Stat. 1013, a
tract of land in the Indian Territory was allotted to
Pe-te-lon-o-zah, or William Wea, a member of the confederated Wea,
Peoria, Kaskaskia, and Piankeshaw Tribes of Indians. The patent
conveying the land to Wea and his heirs was issued on April 8,
1890, and imposed a restraint upon alienation for a period of
twenty-five years from its date. Upon the death of Wea, his heirs
entered into a contract to sell the land, and in a suit brought by
them in the United States court for the Northern District of the
Indian Territory, for the purpose of enforcing the contract,
judgment was entered sustaining its validity. The property was
thereupon conveyed by the heirs and passed by various mesne
conveyances to the appellants.
The United States, by virtue of its interest in the enforcement
of the restriction against alienation, instituted this suit to
cancel these conveyances and also to set aside the above-mentioned
judgment. The case was heard upon bill and answer, and a decree was
rendered in favor of the United States, which was affirmed by the
circuit court of appeals. 191 Fed.19.
The relations of the government to these Indians, and the
legislation with respect to the lands occupied by them, may be
briefly stated. In 1832, the Piankeshaw and Wea tribes of Indians
ceded to the United States their interest in lands within the
States of Missouri and Illinois, and lands were set apart for them
in what is now the State of Kansas (7 Stat. 410), adjoining the
lands assigned to the Peorias and Kaskaskias (7 Stat. 403). In
1854, the Piankeshaws and Weas were united into a single tribe with
the Peorias and Kaskaskias, and the consolidated tribes ceded to
the United States all their interest in the tracts theretofore
assigned to them, reserving, in addition to
Page 233 U. S. 533
certain sections which were to be held as common property, a
specified quantity of land for each individual, the patents for
which were to be issued "subject to such restrictions respecting
leases and alienation as the President or Congress" might prescribe
(10 Stat. 1082;
See The Kansas
Indians, 5 Wall. 737,
72 U. S.
757-758). By the Treaty of February 23, 1867 (15 Stat.
513, 518, 519), provision was made for the sale of the common tract
in Kansas, and for the purchase with the proceeds of lands in the
northeast portion of what is at present the State of Oklahoma, and
to enable the Indians to dispose of their allotments in Kansas, the
Secretary of the Interior was authorized to remove the restrictions
upon sale. In 1873 (17 Stat. 631), members of the tribe of Miamis,
so electing, were united with these confederated tribes under the
name of the United Peorias and Miamis. The territory which they
occupied was expressly excepted from the operation of the General
Allotment Act of February 8, 1887, c. 119, § 8, 24 Stat. 388, 391,
but the provisions of that statute, with certain exceptions, were
extended to these Indians by the Act of March 2, 1889, 25 Stat.
1013, c. 422.
By the latter act, the Secretary of the Interior was authorized
to make an allotment of land to each member, subject to the
following restriction:
"The land so allotted shall not be subject to alienation for
twenty-five years from the date of the issuance of patent therefor,
and said lands so allotted and patented shall be exempt from levy,
sale, taxation, or forfeiture for a like period of years. As soon
as all the allotments or selections shall have been made as herein
provided, the Secretary of the Interior shall cause a patent to
issue to each and every person so entitled, for his or her
allotment, and such patent shall recite in the body thereof that
the land therein described and conveyed shall not be alienated for
twenty-five years from the date of said patent, and
Page 233 U. S. 534
shall also recite that such land so allotted and patented is not
subject to levy, sale, taxation, or forfeiture for a like period of
years, and that any contract or agreement to sell or convey such
land or allotments so patented, entered into before the expiration
of said term of years, shall be absolutely null and void."
It was under this provision that the land here in question was
patented to William Wea, the allottee.
The confederated Peoria Indians who received allotments were
made citizens of the United States by the Act of May 2, 1890, c.
182, § 43, 26 Stat. 81, 99, and in 1897, it was provided that adult
allottees, who had received allotments of 200 acres or more might
sell 100 acres under such regulations as the Secretary of the
Interior might prescribe. Act of June 7, 1897, c. 3, 30 Stat. 62,
72. Subsequent provisions permitted sales by heirs of allottees,
but only upon the approval of the Secretary of the Interior. Acts
of May 31, 1900, c. 598, § 7, 31 Stat. 221, 248; May 27, 1902, c.
888, § 7, 32 Stat. 245, 275.
It is contended by the appellants that, when the allotment was
made, and the allottee became a citizen of the United States, the
guardianship of the government ceased. But this contention is
plainly untenable.
Tiger v. Western Investment Company,
221 U. S. 286. And
it is no longer open to question that the United States has
capacity to sue for the purpose of setting aside conveyances of
lands allotted to Indians under its care, where restrictions upon
alienation have been transgressed. Since the decision below, the
precise question has been determined by this Court in
Heckman
v. United States, 224 U. S. 413, and
it was there held that the authority to enforce restrictions of
this character is the necessary complement of the power to impose
them. It necessarily follows that, as a transfer of the allotted
lands contrary to the inhibition of Congress would be a violation
of the governmental rights of the
Page 233 U. S. 535
United States arising from its obligation to a dependent people,
no stipulations, contracts, or judgments rendered in suits to which
the government is a stranger can affect its interest. The authority
of the United States to enforce the restraint lawfully created
cannot be impaired by any action without its consent.
Heckman
v. United States, supra, p.
224 U. S. 445.
If therefore the conveyance by the allottee's heirs in the present
case would otherwise have been subject to cancellation, it was not
saved by reason of the judgment entered in their suit against the
purchaser.
The question, then, is whether the restriction imposed by the
Act of 1889 was a merely personal one, operative only upon the
allottee, or ran with the land, binding his heirs as well. This
must be answered by ascertaining the intent of Congress as
expressed in the statute. The restriction was not limited to "the
lifetime of the allottee," as in
Mullen v. United States,
224 U. S. 448,
224 U. S. 453,
nor was the prohibition directed against conveyances made by the
allottee personally. Congress explicitly provided that "the land so
allotted" should not be subject to alienation for twenty-five years
from the date of patent. "Said lands so allotted and patented" were
to be exempt "from levy, sale, taxation, or forfeiture for a like
period of years." The patent was expressly to set forth that "the
land therein described and conveyed" should not be alienated during
this period, and all contracts "to sell or convey such land" which
should be entered into "before the expiration of said term of
years" were to be absolutely void. These reiterated statements of
the restriction clearly define its scope and effect. It bound the
land for the time stated, whether in the hands of the allottee or
of his heirs. Moreover, the subsequent legislation, relating to the
same subject matter, which expressly provided for conveyances by
heirs of allottees, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the
Interior, leaves no room
Page 233 U. S. 536
for doubt as to the intention of Congress.
United
States v. Freeman, 3 How. 556,
44 U. S. 564;
Cope v. Cope, 137 U. S. 682,
137 U. S. 688;
Tiger v. Western Investment Company, 221
U. S. 309.
The conveyance by Wea's heirs came directly within the statutory
prohibition, and the later conveyances under which the appellants
claim must fall with it.
Affirmed.