Where the case is one of statutory construction, consideration
of the statute becomes necessary, and if the validity of
departmental regulations is involved, a construction of the statute
authorizing the head of the department to make them is also
necessary, and this Court has jurisdiction under the Criminal
Appeals Act of 1907 to review the judgment sustaining a demurrer to
the indictment.
The theory of the Act of March 3, 1883, is that every postmaster
shall receive a salary dependent upon and regulated by the amount
of business done at his office as represented by normal and natural
-- not unlawfully induced -- sales of stamps.
Page 233 U. S. 516
Under § 161, Rev.Stat., authorizing heads of the Executive
Departments to prescribe regulations not inconsistent with law, the
Postmaster General has power to prescribe regulations requiring
postmasters to make proper returns of sales of stamps at their
respective offices, and such regulations have the force of law.
An indictment charging a postmaster and others with conspiring
under § 37, Penal Code, to violate §§ 206 and 208, Penal Code, by
the sale and purchase of stamps in large quantities to be used at
other post offices so as to fraudulently increase his salary, and
also charging violation of regulations of the Department in that
respect, is sufficient.
The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this Court under
the Criminal Appeals Act of 1907 and the construction of statutes
regulating the pay of postmasters and the power of the Postmaster
General to make regulations in regard thereto, are stated in the
opinion.
Page 233 U. S. 518
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Indictment in two counts for conspiracy to defraud the United
States, and to violate certain provisions of the postal laws. The
object of the conspiracy and the manner of its execution are in
substance, as charged in the indictment in the first count, as
follows: Harold A. Foster was postmaster of the United States post
office at North Brookfield, Massachusetts, a second-class office.
The salary of the office was fixed by the Postmaster General,
pursuant to law and the regulations established by him, at $2,000 a
year, the salary being based and ascertained upon the gross
receipts of the office for the twelve months next preceding the
thirty-first of March, 1911. The law required the salary to be
adjusted annually, and the next adjustment was required to be made
by the Postmaster General in accordance with the gross receipts of
the office as shown by the quarterly returns of the postmaster to
the Auditor of the Post Office Department for the four quarters
next preceding the thirty-first of March, 1912, the readjustment to
take effect on the ensuing first of July, 1912. The Postmaster
General was required by law and the established regulations in
readjusting such salary not to include in the gross receipts of the
office the moneys received by the postmaster for the sale of stamps
to any person or persons in large quantities, to be used in
other
Page 233 U. S. 519
post offices than the North Brookfield office for mailing
purposes, or in that office if such matter in the ordinary course
would not be deposited for mailing in the latter office.
Frank E. Winchell, of North Brookfield, was the president and
general manager of the Oxford Linen Mills, a corporation having its
usual place of business at North Brookfield, and William S. Edwards
and Harry H. Platt, both of New York, were officers of the Sterling
Debenture Company, a corporation having its place of business in
New York, and they and Foster, well knowing the premises, conspired
to defraud the United States of its money and property by
Winchell's purchasing from the United States in behalf of the
Oxford Linen Mills, with the knowledge, consent, and connivance of
Foster, quantities of United States postage stamps to be sent to
the Sterling Debenture Corporation at New York, and Edwards and
Platt as its officers were to cause it to use them in the
prepayment of postage upon matter to be deposited in the post
office in New York or in some other office, with the view and
intent, by means of the purchase of stamps as stated, of
irregularly and improperly increasing the gross receipts of the
North Brookfield post office for the twelve months beginning on the
1st of April, 1911, and ending on the thirty-first of March, 1912,
and thereby enabling Foster, as such postmaster, to make returns to
the Auditor of the Post Office Department as a basis for the
adjustment of Foster's salary for the fiscal year beginning July 1,
1912, which returns should include the sale of stamps so made to
Winchell in addition to the sale of stamps made by Foster to other
persons in the regular business of the North Brookfield office,
with the intent and view of violating the regulations of the Post
Office Department, and for the purpose of fraudulently increasing
Foster's salary, and with the further intent that such sales
should, in violation of the post office regulations, be included
and
Page 233 U. S. 520
deemed a part of the gross receipts of the North Brookfield
office for the period above mentioned, and be made in part the
basis of the readjustment of Foster's salary. All the acts done by
Foster, Winchell, Edwards, and Platt were done knowingly,
willfully, and fraudulently for such purpose -- that is, for the
purpose of increasing the salary of Foster by a sum of money in
excess of that which he would be lawfully entitled to receive, and
to cause such excessive sum to be paid to him, and thereby cheat
and defraud the United States thereof.
In pursuance of the unlawful conspiracy, and to effect its
object, on the first of July, 1911, Foster, as such postmaster,
made a false return to the Post Office Department of the gross
receipts of the North Brookfield office for the quarter ending June
30, 1911.
In further pursuance of the conspiracy, and to effect its
object, Winchell, on June 2, 1911 at North Brookfield, sent by
registered mail to the Sterling Debenture Corporation at New York a
certain package, and also in pursuance of the conspiracy, and to
effect its object, Winchell bought from Foster postage stamps to
the value of $200.
In a second count, the indictment charges that the defendants
unlawfully conspired to commit an offense against the United
States, specified to be an offense denounced by § 206 of the Act of
March 4, 1909, entitled, "An Act to Codify, Revise, and Amend the
Penal Laws of the United States," 35 Stat. 1128, c. 321, in that
Foster, as such postmaster, should, in violation of the section,
knowingly and fraudulently increase Foster's salary and
compensation by knowingly and fraudulently failing to report, in
the report or the gross receipts of his office required by law and
the regulations of the Post Office Department, large and irregular
sales of stamps to be made by Foster to Winchell as president and
general manager of the Oxford Linen Mills, not to be used by that
corporation or by Winchell or by any other person for
Page 233 U. S. 521
the mailing of matter at the North Brookfield office, but to be
used for mailing matter at New York or in some other office other
than the North Brookfield office, with the intent and for the
purpose for increasing the compensation of Foster as such
postmaster. That, in pursuance of such conspiracy, Winchell, on
June 2, 1911, purchased stamps of the value of $200.
In pursuance of the conspiracy and to effect its object, Foster,
on the first of July, 1911, made a false return to the Auditor of
the Post Office Department of the gross receipts of his office. An
overt act by Winchell is charged.
The defendants were duly arraigned and pleaded not guilty, but
subsequently withdrew their pleas of not guilty and filed demurrers
to the indictment.
The grounds of demurrer were the same as to both counts, and
were: (1) he facts alleged did not constitute a crime; (2) nor an
offense at common law; (3) nor a violation of the statutes or penal
laws of the United States; (4) nor a violation of any valid
regulation of the Postmaster General; (5) each and every one of his
regulations is invalid.
The demurrers to the first count were sustained on the ground
expressed by the court in its opinion, that the Act of March 3,
1883 (22 Stat. 600, c. 142), provides that the salaries of
postmasters of the second class shall be determined by the gross
receipts of the office, and that the Postmaster General had no
power to qualify the requirement of the law by providing that
unusual sales of stamps should not be included in estimating the
gross receipts.
In passing upon the demurrers to the second count, the court
said that the count charged the defendants with a conspiracy to
commit "the offense denounced by § 206 of the Criminal Code," that
section providing,
inter alia, that whoever, being a
postmaster, shall, for the purpose of fraudulently increasing his
compensation, make a false return, statement, or account to any
officer of the
Page 233 U. S. 522
United States, shall be punished. The crime denounced, the court
said, included
"two essential elements: (1) that a return shall be made, which
was known to be false, and (2) that such false return shall have
been made 'for the purpose of fraudulently increasing
compensation'"
And the court observed that there could be no criminality unless
a false return was made for the purpose stated, and that, it
appearing from the indictment that the alleged return made by
Foster was to secure for him only what he was legally entitled to
receive, he committed no crime under § 206, "and the alleged
conspiracy to do so was not a conspiracy to commit the offense
denounced thereby."
It will be observed, therefore, that the court held that the
indictment charged neither a conspiracy to defraud the United
States nor to make a false return, because the object of each
conspiracy was to obtain only what Foster was legally entitled to
-- namely, an increase of salary based upon the gross receipts of
his office -- and that it was immaterial how they were increased or
for what purpose increased.
The case was brought here under the criminal appeals act, its
provision being that this Court has jurisdiction on writ of error
taken by the United States in criminal cases
"from a decision sustaining a demurrer to any indictment where
such decision is based upon the invalidity or construction of the
statute upon which the indictment is founded."
It is, however, contended by defendants in error that this Court
has no jurisdiction because, it is further contended, the district
court gave the same meaning to the statutes upon which the
indictment was based as the government asserted was the correct
one, and only decided that the regulation of the Postmaster General
was beyond his power to enact under Revised Statutes, § 161, upon
which section alone he claimed the power. Nor, it is further
contended, were the words "gross receipts" interpreted.
Page 233 U. S. 523
"The only question was," counsel says, "whether there was power
in an administrative officer to make the regulation limiting its
scope." It is further urged that, if those words were interpreted,
the indictment was not founded upon the Act of 1883, where they
occur.
A lack of jurisdiction is also urged to review the ruling upon
the second count, it being based on § 206 of the Criminal Code, the
construction or interpretation of which was never in dispute.
"Whether it applied or not," it is said, "had to be determined by
the validity of the regulation."
We think the contentions are untenable. The court distinctly
ruled that the indictment was in technical or formal details
sufficient, and the contention of the parties not only submitted
for decision the validity of the regulations of the Postmaster
General, but also the sufficiency and legality of the returns made
by Foster under the provisions of the statutes. The court, it is
true, gave especial prominence to the regulations, but the effect
of the statutes independently of the regulations was necessarily
considered. In other words, the court must have considered and
decided that a conspiracy to establish a basis for a false return
for the purpose of increasing Foster's salary was not prohibited by
law; and, besides, a construction of the statutes was necessary to
determine the validity of the regulation.
The case being one of statutory construction, a consideration of
the statutes becomes necessary.
It is provided by the Act of March 3, 1883, that the
"compensation of postmasters of the first, second and third
classes shall be annual salaries, assigned in even hundreds, of
dollars, and payable in quarterly payments, to be ascertained and
fixed by the Postmaster General from their respective quarterly
returns to the Auditor of the Treasury for the Post Office
Department . . . to be forwarded to the First Assistant
Page 233 U. S. 524
Postmaster General, for four quarters immediately preceding the
adjustment,"
according to the gross receipts, the amount of which not only
determines the classes, but the compensation of the offices within
classes.
By § 4 of the act (22 Stat. 602), the Postmaster General is
required to readjust the salaries of the first, second, and third
class at the beginning of each fiscal year. The same section fixed
the salary of the postmaster at the Washington Post Office, and
provided that
"in no case shall the salary of any postmaster exceed the sum of
six thousand dollars, except in the City of New York, where the
salary of the postmaster shall remain as now fixed by law at eight
thousand dollars."
Section 37 of the Criminal Code makes it an offense to conspire
to defraud the United States in any manner or for any purpose.
Section 206 of the same Code makes it a crime for a postmaster
to make a false return, for the purpose of fraudulently increasing
his compensation, or to induce or attempt to induce, for such
purpose, any person to deposit mail matter in or forward in any
manner for mailing at the office where such postmaster is employed,
knowing such matter to be properly mailable at some other
office.
Section 208 makes it a crime for a postmaster to dispose of
stamps outside of the delivery of his office, or to induce or
attempt to induce, for the purpose of increasing his compensation,
the purchase of stamps, stamped envelops or postal cards otherwise
than as provided by law or the regulations of the Post Office
Department.
By § 161 of the Revised Statutes, it is provided that
"the head of each department is authorized to prescribe
regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the government of his
Department, the conduct of its officers and clerks, [and] the
distribution and performance of its business. . . ."
In pursuance of the authority so given, the Postmaster General
made the following regulation:
Page 233 U. S. 525
"2. In determining the 'gross receipts' upon which the salary of
a postmaster shall be based, stamps, stamped envelops, and postal
cards, sold in large or unusual quantities to any person to be used
in mailing matter at other post offices will not be included,
whether the sale be made with or without solicitation by the
postmaster. When postage stamps or stamped paper are sold in large
or unusual quantities, it shall be the duty of the postmaster to
inquire into and ascertain whether or not the purchaser intends to
use such postage stamps or stamped paper for mailing matter in his
office, or other offices, and the fact shall be clearly indicated
in his monthly stock report on Form 3240 to the Third Assistant
Postmaster General. Upon evidence of neglect of the postmaster to
ascertain and report such facts, he will be required to refund the
amount of the excess salary and allowances be may have received on
account of such sales."
It is manifest from the quoted provisions that their purpose is
to fix the salary of postmasters by the normal receipts of their
respective offices, and thereby keep the officers in relation, and
to secure such end, quarterly returns are required to be made by
each postmaster, and each is prohibited under criminal penalty from
selling or disposing of stamps, stamped envelops or postal cards
outside of the delivery of his office, or selling or disposing of
stamps, etc., otherwise than as provided by law or the regulations
of the Post Office Department. In other words, the false returns
and designated disposition of stamps are made crimes, and made
crimes to secure the purpose of the law to keep the legal measure
of the salaries unimpaired and the relation of the offices intact.
It may, indeed, be that, in one sense, the United States would
suffer no loss by the derangement of their relation; in another
sense, the United States would be defrauded. One of the postmasters
would fraudulently obtain a greater salary than he was entitled to.
But distinctly would the United
Page 233 U. S. 526
states be defrauded under the facts charged in the indictment,
the postmaster at New York having a fixed salary of eight thousand
dollars.
See in this connection
Haas v. Henkel,
216 U. S. 462,
216 U. S.
479.
The sole theory of the Act of 1883 is that every postmaster
shall receive a salary dependent upon and regulated by the amount
of business done at his office (
United States v. Wilson,
144 U. S. 24,
144 U. S. 28) under
normal and natural sales of stamps, not unlawfully induced sales.
This being the law, what does the indictment charge?
(1) The salary of the postmaster was to be adjusted in
accordance with the returns of the gross receipts. (2) By the law
and regulation of the Postmaster General, the postmaster was not to
include in the gross receipts moneys received from the sale of
stamps in large or unusual quantities which were (a) to be used
upon matter in some other post office, or (b) used upon matter
deposited at North Brookfield if, in the ordinary and usual course
of business, such matter would be deposited at some other office.
(3) The defendants conspired with Winchell, who purchased from
Foster with Foster's connivance large quantities of stamps to be
used by the Sterling Debenture Corporation for mailing matter at
New York or some other office than North Brookfield, and by such
purchase to irregularly and improperly increase the gross receipts
of the North Brookfield office, and thereby enable Foster to make
returns as a basis for the readjustment of his salary in violation
of the regulations of the Post Office Department, and for the
purpose of increasing his salary, and thereby cheat and defraud the
United States.
The second count charges a violation of § 206 of the Criminal
Code by conspiring in the manner we have already set out, and which
need not be repeated.
It is clear from these provisions that it is the gross receipts
from lawful sales which are to be the measure of the salary of the
postmaster, and that unlawfully induced
Page 233 U. S. 527
sales (§ 208), sales made "outside of the delivery of the
office" (
id.), and sales "otherwise than as provided by
law or the regulations of the Post Office Department"
(
id.), are unlawful sales and regarded as criminal.
It would indeed be strange if unlawful and criminal sales were
intended to constitute a part of the gross receipts upon which the
postmaster's salary should be adjusted, and it would seem clear
that to prevent such result the Postmaster General could legally
exercise by the regulation under review the power given him by §
161, Rev.Stat. The regulation is purely administrative of the law.
(1) It notifies the postmaster that, in the gross receipts of his
office, stamps in large or unusual quantities sold to be used in
mailing matter at other post offices will not be included. This but
executes the purpose of the law; adds nothing to it.
United
States v. Antikamnia Chemical Co., 231 U.
S. 654;
Lewis Publishing Co. v. Wyman, 182 F.
13. (2) It requires the postmaster to ascertain and report the
intention of the purchaser of stamps or stamped paper in large or
unusual quantities. This is properly supplemental to the first
requirement, and a reasonable supervision of the office, and a
means of discovering unlawful and fraudulent sales. (3) It provides
that for a neglect to so ascertain and so report, the postmaster
will be required to refund the amount of the excess salary he may
have received on account of such sales. This provision is of
doubtful validity, but it is not of material consequence to the
questions now involved.
But if the regulation be regarded as invalid, the indictment yet
states an offense. It counts not only upon the regulation, but upon
the law, and the facts it alleges show a violation of the law.
Judgment reversed.