Where the owner of demised premises makes a contract with an
adjoining owner for construction of a party wall, which contract
cannot be carried out according to its terms without entry upon the
demised premises and undermining the tenant's wall, and the
adjoining owner, or his servants, in performing the contract,
commit such a trespass upon the tenant's possession and undermine
the wall, the contract is evidential of a command or approval of
the trespass by the landlord such as to render him liable
severally, or jointly with the adjoining owner, in an action by the
tenant for the resulting damages.
Where a trespass results in the destruction of a building with
consequent interruption of a going business, the loss of future
profits --
Page 232 U. S. 572
reasonably certain and proved with reasonable exactitude -- is a
proper element for consideration in awarding compensatory
damages.
Where the contractor is required to follow instructions of the
owner, he is not such an independent contractor a to relieve the
owner of liability for his acts.
The "independent contractor" doctrine does not apply where the
work that the contractor does amounts, in itself, to a nuisance or
necessarily operates to destroy the property of another.
16 N.M. 302 affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
In November, 1901, Weinman, one of the plaintiffs in error,
being the owner of a building and lot of land in Albuquerque, New
Mexico, leased them to defendants in error for a term of two years,
to commence in December following. They entered into possession,
and occupied and used the building in their business of
prescription and retail druggists. Plaintiff in error Barnett was
the owner of an adjoining lot and building. Sometime in May or
June, 1902, while the Weinman building was occupied by defendants
in error, Barnett took down and removed his building, including the
wall adjacent to the Weinman building. The east wall of the latter
was an old adobe wall that stood close to, but perhaps a few inches
away from, the easterly boundary line of the lot. In May, 1902,
Weinman and Barnett entered into an agreement in writing, whereby
Barnett was to construct a party wall,
Page 232 U. S. 573
to stand one half of its full thickness upon each lot; the
footing course to be 40 inches wide; the foundation wall to be 18
inches thick from the top of the footing to its full height, where
it was to receive the first floor joints, the wall above that to be
of less thickness. It was stipulated that Barnett should be
permitted to take down any part of the east wall of the Weinman
building as might be necessary in order to locate the new wall
centrally over the property line, and if, through his fault, damage
should be done to the Weinman building, he was to make it good. In
the execution of this agreement, it was necessary to undermine the
east wall of the Weinman building. Barnett made an agreement with
one Grande, a general contractor, by which the latter was to do the
excavation and stone work according to plans and specifications,
and as directed by La Driere, a superintendent who was in Barnett's
employ. Grande proceeded under La Driere's direction to do the
work. It would seem that the purpose was to excavate for the party
wall in sections, so that support for the Weinman building should
not at any time be entirely lacking. On or about June 30th, the
contractor having excavated for a space about 5 feet in length
along the line between the two lots at the northeast corner of the
Weinman building, and extending under the east wall of that
building for approximately 12 inches, the wall fell, damaging the
stock-in-trade and fixtures of defendants in error, and rendering
the building untenantable. They removed what remained of their
stock and fixtures to another and less desirable location, and
carried on their business there, up to the time their lease of the
Weinman lot and building would have expired by its terms. After the
wall fell, Weinman made demand for the rent payable by the lease
for the month of July, 1902, and, defendants in error having
refused to pay it, Weinman took possession.
Defendants in error brought suit against both Weinman
Page 232 U. S. 574
and Barnett in the district court of one of the counties of the
then Territory of New Mexico. The action was in the nature of an
action of trespass, and damages were claimed for the destruction of
parts and injury to other parts of the stock-in-trade and fixtures,
for the being compelled to remove to a less favorable location at
considerable expense, and for the loss of profits in the business.
(There was also a claim of damages for eviction and the loss of the
leasehold, but this was afterwards abandoned.)
Answers were filed, and there were subsequent amendments to the
pleadings, but it is not necessary to recite them.
The action has been at least three times tried by jury, and
three times reviewed by the Supreme Court of New Mexico. Upon the
first trial, a verdict was directed in favor of defendants, and the
supreme court reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for a
new trial. 13 N.M. 226. The second trial resulted in a verdict and
judgment for plaintiffs, which was reversed because compensation
for loss of profits and for goods injured was included without
sufficient evidence to sustain this part of the recovery. 15 N.M.
68. At the last trial, the proof was to some extent supplemented,
and there was a judgment in favor of plaintiffs for $7,738, based
upon the verdict of a jury for that amount. On appeal, the supreme
court found error only with respect to the proof as to damaged
goods, and required plaintiffs to elect whether they would file a
remittitur of $770 on this account, or submit to a new trial. 16
N.M. 302. They chose the former alternative, and the judgment was
affirmed for the reduced amount. The present writ of error was then
sued out.
The record is voluminous. In the territorial supreme court, 105
assignments of error were filed in behalf of Barnett and 68 in
behalf of Weinman. In this Court, the assignments of error are 110
in number. We shall make no
Page 232 U. S. 575
effort to deal with them in detail. The points that seem to
require mention are the following:
We agree with the Supreme Court of New Mexico that, where the
owner of demised premises makes a contract with an adjoining owner
for the construction of a party wall, which contract cannot be
carried out according to its terms without entry upon the demised
premises and an undermining of the tenant's wall, and the adjoining
owner or his servants, in the performance of the contract, do
commit such a trespass upon the tenant's possession and undermine
the wall, the contract is evidential of a command or approval of
the trespass by the landlord such as to render him liable
severally, or jointly with the adjoining owner, in an action by the
tenant for the resulting damages.
Lovejoy v.
Murray, 3 Wall. 1,
70 U. S. 9;
Northern Trust Co. v. Palmer, 171 Ill. 383, 388;
Collins v. Lewis, 53 Minn. 78, 83;
Snow v.
Pulitizer, 142 N.Y. 263, 268.
In our opinion, the court correctly held that, where a trespass
results in the destruction of a building, with consequent
interruption of a going business, the loss of future profits (these
being reasonably certain and proved with reasonable exactitude)
forms a proper element for consideration in awarding compensatory
damages.
Allison v. Chandler, 11 Mich. 543, 550;
Schile v. Brokhahus, 80 N.Y. 614, 620;
Snow v.
Pulitizer, 142 N.Y. 263, 270;
Chapman v. Kirby, 49
Ill. 211, 219;
Terre Haute v. Hudnut, 112 Ind. 542, 552;
Fibre Co. v. Electric Co., 95 Me. 318, 327.
And see
Anvil Mining Co. v. Humble, 153 U. S. 540,
153 U. S. 549;
Brown v. Honiss, 74 N.J.L. 501, 514.
We agree also with the court below that, upon the last trial,
there was legitimate evidence upon which to base an allowance of
damages for loss of profits, and no substantial error in the
rulings on evidence or in the instructions to the jury upon the
subject.
It is contended that plaintiffs in error are not responsible
Page 232 U. S. 576
for what was done by Grande in building the party wall because
he was an independent contractor.
But the evidence showed that he was required to follow the
instructions of La Driere, who was Barnett's agent, and that La
Driere was in fact in charge of the work. For this reason, it was
properly held that Grande was not an independent contractor.
Railroad Co. v.
Hanning, 15 Wall. 649,
82 U. S. 657;
Singer Mfg. Co. v. Rahn, 132 U. S. 518,
132 U. S.
523.
Nor does the "independent contractor" doctrine apply where the
work that the contractor is to do of itself amounts to a nuisance
or necessarily operates to injure or destroy the property of
plaintiff.
Chicago v.
Robbins, 2 Black 418,
67 U. S. 426;
Robbins v.
Chicago, 4 Wall. 657,
71 U. S.
678.
The other points that are raised have been examined, and we find
no material error. They have been sufficiently discussed in the
court below, and require no particular mention here.
Judgment affirmed.