The Court of Claims has no general jurisdiction over claims
against the United States, and can take cognizance only of those
which are committed to it by some act of Congress.
Johnson v.
United States, 160 U. S. 546.
A claim embraced by § 1 of the Indian Depredation Act of March
3, 1891, but which accrued prior to July 1, 1865, is not within the
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims if it falls within the
restriction clause of § 2 because not allowed or pending prior to
the passage of the act. An appeal to the bounty or generosity of
Congress for damages sustained from depredations by other than
Indians cannot be considered as a claim for reparation for
depredations of Indian wards of the government within the meaning
of the Act of 1891.
Jurisdiction of a claim which accrued in 1857, was never
allowed, and was not pending as a claim for depredations by
Indians, was expressly withheld by the Act of 1891, and the fact
that the same claim was presented to Congress as a claim for
depredations by Mormons does not bring it within the
jurisdiction.
The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims
under the Indian Depredation Act of March 3, 1891, and what
constitutes a presentation of a claim against the United States for
depredations by Indians under the act, are stated in the
opinion.
Page 232 U. S. 475
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit was begun in the Court of Claims in 1892, under the
Indian Depredation Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 851, c. 538, to
recover from the United States and the Ute Indians the value of
certain personal property alleged to have belonged to appellant's
intestate, and to have been taken and destroyed by members of the
Ute tribe in 1857. It was also alleged that the claim had been
presented to, and was pending before, the House of Representatives
in 1877 and 1878. The allegations of the petition were traversed,
and a trial resulted in a judgment of dismissal for want of
jurisdiction upon the ground that the claim accrued before July 1,
1865, and had not been presented to Congress, or any officer
authorized to inquire into such claims, prior to the Act of 1891,
and so was not cognizable under that act.
The facts disclosed in the findings, and material to be noticed,
are these: the depredation occurred at Mountain Meadows, Utah,
September 11, 1857, while the appellant's intestate was en route,
with an emigrant train, from Arkansas to California, his life being
taken at the time. In 1877 and again in 1878, one of his daughters,
on behalf of his heirs, presented to Congress a petition praying
that they be reimbursed for the property from the public treasury.
The petitions, as also the accompanying affidavits, represented
that the depredation was committed by Mormons acting under the
direction of Brigham Young, and contained no suggestion that it was
in anywise chargeable to the Ute Indians or to any Indians. In
response to each of the petitions, a bill was introduced in the
House of Representatives, reciting that the depredation was
committed
Page 232 U. S. 476
by Mormons at the instance of Brigham Young, and making an
appropriation to reimburse the heirs as prayed in the petition, but
neither bill was passed, and the claim was not otherwise recognized
by Congress. In no other way or form was the claim presented to or
pending before any department of the government, or any of its
officers or agents, prior to the passage of the Act of 1891.
Preliminarily, it is well to observe that the Court of Claims
has no general jurisdiction over claims against the United States,
and can take cognizance only of those which, by the terms of some
act of Congress, are committed to it.
Johnson v. United
States, 160 U. S. 546,
160 U. S.
549.
Turning to the Act of 1891, we find that it is not couched in
general terms, but, on the contrary, carefully specifies what
claims may be considered, and as carefully points out some which it
is intended shall not be considered. It is entitled, "An act to
Provide for the Adjudication and Payment of Claims Arising from
Indian Depredations." Its first section empowers the court to
inquire into and adjudicate, among others not material here,
"all claims for property of citizens of the United States taken
or destroyed by Indians belonging to any band, tribe, or nation in
amity with the United States without just cause or provocation on
the part of the owner or agent in charge, and not returned or paid
for."
And the second section declares:
"That all questions of limitations as to time and manner of
presenting claims are hereby waived, and no claim shall be excluded
from the jurisdiction of the court because not heretofore presented
to the Secretary of the Interior or other officer or department of
the government:
Provided, That no claim accruing prior to
July first, eighteen hundred and sixty-five, shall be considered by
the court unless the claim shall be allowed or has been or is
pending, prior to the passage of this act, before the Secretary of
the Interior or the Congress of the United
Page 232 U. S. 477
States, or before any superintendent, agent, subagent, or
commissioner, authorized under any act of Congress to inquire into
such claims; but no case shall be considered pending unless
evidence has been presented therein. . . ."
Assuming, without so deciding, that the clause quoted from the
first section, if not otherwise restrained, is broad enough to
embrace the present claim notwithstanding some of its particulars
not here noticed, we come to consider whether it is within the
restrictive clause in the second section declaring that no claim
accruing prior to July 1, 1865, shall be considered unless it was
allowed or was pending prior to the passage of the act. To a better
understanding of this clause and the preceding one in the same
section, it is well to recall that there was an existing limitation
of time upon the prosecution of claims against the government
(Rev.Stat. § 1069), and that there had been and were then various
statutory and treaty provisions regulating the manner of presenting
claims for Indian depredations, by whom they were to be examined,
and the evidence required to sustain them. 4 Stat. 731, c. 161, §
17; 11 Stat. 401, c. 66, § 8; 12 Stat. 120, Res. No. 26; 16 Stat.
360, c. 296, § 4; 17 Stat.190, c. 233, § 7; Rev.Stat. §§ 466, 2098,
2156, 2157; 23 Stat. 376, c. 341; 13 Stat. 674, Art. 6; 15 Stat.
620, Arts. 5 and 6. Both clauses must be read in the light of those
limitations and provisions, and when this is done, it is apparent
that Congress, while disposed to be very liberal in waiving prior
restrictions upon the time and mode of presenting such claims,
deemed it unwise to open the door so wide in respect of claims
accruing prior to July 1, 1865, and therefore declared that the
court should not consider them save where they had been allowed or
had been pending prior to the passage of the act.
The present claim accrued in 1857, was never allowed, and was
not a pending claim before the date of the act;
Page 232 U. S. 478
unless it can be said that it was pending before Congress in
1877 and 1878. We think this cannot properly be said. The claim to
which the attention of Congress was invited in those years was not
for an act of depredation by Indians, but, as was stated in the
petitions and accompanying affidavits and in the bills introduced
in response thereto, was for a depredation by Mormons. No one could
understand from the petitions and affidavits or from the bills that
there was any purpose to claim indemnity from the government on the
ground that the depredation was committed by its Indian wards, or
to obtain reparation from the latter through the exertion of the
government's control over them. Rightly speaking, it was merely an
appeal to the bounty or generosity of Congress, and probably was so
regarded by the latter. At all events, it was not an assertion or
presentation of the claim which is the subject of this suit, for
the latter is for an act of depredation by Indians, not by Mormons.
We are accordingly of opinion that the claim is one jurisdiction of
which is expressly withheld from the Court of Claims by the Act of
1891.
Judgment affirmed.