"It suffices to say that the law of
Page 232 U. S. 181
Pennsylvania in respect of the question we are now considering
is settled by a line of cases extending through nearly a century.
Starting with the policy of the statute of Elizabeth for the
circumvention of fraud and deceit in sales of personal property
(which nowhere in terms refers to retention of possession by a
vendor), it has wisely developed the spirit of that statute and
evolved the salutary rule that, where there is nothing in the case
but the retention of a physical possession by the vendor, which he
is capable of delivering to the vendee, such retention is fraud
per se, and not merely evidence of fraud, even though
there be nothing inconsistent with the most perfect honesty. But
this rule is not applied by the courts of Pennsylvania to cases
where the inherent nature of the transaction and the attendant
circumstances are such as to preclude the possibility of a delivery
by the vendor that would be consistent with the avowed and fair
purpose of the sale, or where the absence of a physical delivery is
excused by the usages of the trade or business in which the sale
was made."
444, 187 F. 689, 696.
We entertain no doubt as to the correctness of this statement
(
Clow v. Woods, 5 S. & R. 277;
Barr v. Reitz,
53 Pa. 256;
McKibbin v. Martin, 64 Pa. 352;
Crawford
v. Davis, 99 Pa. 576;
Stephens v. Gifford, 137 Pa.
219;
Pressel v. Bice, 142 Pa. 263;
Garretson v.
Hackenberg, 144 Pa. 107;
Barlow v. Fox, 203 Pa. 114;
White v. Gunn, 205 Pa. 229), and it was in the light of
these principles that the court below held that, considering the
situation of the property and the usages of the business, the
transaction in question was valid.
To insure collection of the heavy tax that is laid upon
distilled spirits, the production is carefully supervised and the
product is impounded. Rev.Stat. §§ 3247-3334, as amended; Act of
May 28, 1880, c. 108, 21 Stat. 145; Act of August 27, 1894, c. 349,
§§ 48-67, 28 Stat. 509, 563-568. Every distiller
Page 232 U. S. 182
is required to provide at his own expense
"a warehouse, to be situated on and to constitute a part of his
distillery premises, and to be used only for the storage of
distilled spirits of his own manufacture until the tax thereon
shall have been paid."
This warehouse, when approved, by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, is declared by the statute to be "a bonded warehouse of
the United States, to be known as a distillery warehouse," and
is
"under the direction and control of the collector of the
district, and in charge of an internal revenue storekeeper,
assigned thereto by the Commissioner"
(§ 3271). While the statute provides that "every distillery
warehouse shall be in the joint custody of the storekeeper and the
proprietor thereof," the control of the government's representative
is made dominant, as, in the nature of the case, it must be in
order to fulfill the purposes of the act. The warehouse, the
statute continues,
"shall be kept securely locked, and shall at no time be unlocked
or opened or remain open unless in the presence of such storekeeper
or other person who may be designated to act for him as provided by
law, and no articles shall be received in or delivered from such
warehouse except on an order or permit addressed to the storekeeper
and signed by the collector having control of the warehouse"
(§ 3274). Under the departmental regulations, "the only lock to
the warehouse door must be the government lock, the key of which
must at all times be in charge of the storekeeper." There must be
an immediate removal of the distilled spirits to the distillery
warehouse as soon as they are drawn into casks or packages and
gauged, proved, and marked, as required, and thereupon the internal
revenue gauger
"shall, in the presence of the storekeeper of the warehouse,
place upon the head of the cask or package an engraved stamp, which
shall be signed by the collector of the district and storekeeper
and gauger, and shall have written thereon the number of
proof-gallons contained
Page 232 U. S. 183
therein, the name of the distiller, the date of the receipt in
the warehouse, and the serial number of each cask or package, in
progressive order, as the same are received from the
distillery"
(§ 3287; act of May 28, 1880, 21 Stat. 147, c. 108, § 6). The
spirits must be entered for deposit in the warehouse under the
regulations prescribed by the commissioner, and bond must be given
for the payment of the tax. The statute gives the form of the entry
which, made in triplicate and duly verified, must set forth the
name of the person making it, the designation of the warehouse, the
specification of the spirits deposited, with the marks and serial
numbers of the packages, etc., and a statement of the amount of
tax. Withdrawal may be made on payment of the tax -- which is
payable within eight years -- by application to the collector in
charge of the warehouse, and the making of a withdrawal entry (§§
3293, 3294, Act of May 28, 1880, 21 Stat. 145, 146, c. 108, §§ 4,
5; Act of August 27, 1894, 28 Stat. 563, c. 349, § 49). Provision
is made for regauging and for an allowance for loss from leakage or
evaporation (
id., § 50; Act of March 3, 1899, c. 435, 30
Stat. 1349; Act of Jan. 13, 1903, c. 134, 32 Stat. 770), and, after
four years, the spirits may be bottled in bond, in a separate
portion of the warehouse set apart for that purpose, under the
supervision of the government official (Act of March 3, 1897, c.
379, 29 Stat. 626). The storekeeper is to keep "a warehouse book"
in which all deposits and deliveries are to be entered with
appropriate description, including marks and serial numbers (§
3301). And the removal "of and distilled spirits from a distillery
warehouse . . . in any manner other than is provided by law" is
punishable by fine and imprisonment (§ 3296).
The minute regulations of the statute, and the provision for
prolonged governmental control, proceed upon a recognition of the
exigencies of the business. It is a
Page 232 U. S. 184
matter of common knowledge that the product is not ready to be
marketed for consumption when it is drawn from the still. It must
undergo an aging process, and for this purpose it is kept in store
for several years. In laying the tax, Congress has taken this
necessity into consideration, permitting a long postponement of the
required payment, the spirits meanwhile being held in charge of the
government's representative. It is, however, a matter of obvious
business importance that the distiller should be able to release
the capital represented in the cost of production of the spirits in
store, and to make it available for further production, and hence
the practice is well established to deal with the product in the
bonded warehouse by sale or pledge, storage certificate suitably
identifying the property being delivered in lieu of the actual
transfer of possession. The district court found as a fact that it
is
"the unbroken custom of the trade to treat storage receipts for
spirits as completely equivalent to the spirits themselves, and to
sell or pledge them freely without question."
This finding is approved by the circuit court of appeals, and
the fact that this custom exists we understand to be
undisputed.
It is argued for the appellant that one cannot make himself a
warehouseman of his own goods, and issue so-called receipts to take
the place of the delivery which the law requires to give effect to
his sale or pledge (
Security Warehousing Co. v. Hand,
206 U. S. 415,
206 U. S. 422;
Bank v. Jagode, 186 Pa. 556). The argument ignores the
special circumstances of the case and the restrictions imposed by
law upon the distiller. The building is his, but the government is
in complete control. The spirits are his, but he is subject to fine
and imprisonment if he attempts to remove them. It is undoubtedly
true that the government is not strictly a bailee. It assumes no
responsibility to the distiller for the safekeeping of the goods
(
United States v. Witten, 143 U. S.
76,
143 U. S. 78).
But the immunity
Page 232 U. S. 185
which is incident to the exercise of governmental power in no
way limits its effect upon the distiller's relation to the goods.
They are effectually taken out of his power, so that he is
absolutely unable to make a physical delivery of them until the tax
is paid. On the other hand, to pay the tax and remove the property
before the aging process is completed would defeat the object of
the deposit for which the statute provides, and would frustrate the
purpose of a transfer of spirits in bond, which is an entirely
lawful transaction. In these circumstances, the certificates --
such as were here used -- appropriately represent the property.
It is said that the distiller need not use his own warehouse,
but may place the goods in one of he general bonded warehouses
established under the Act of 1894 (28 Stat. 564, 565). The appellee
asserts that this would be impracticable; that no general bonded
warehouse had been established in the collection district in
question; that there are only twelve in the entire country, with a
capacity that is extremely small in comparison with the output of
the distilleries. But, aside from this, the distillery warehouse is
equally recognized by law; it is "a bonded warehouse of the United
States." If it is a fit place for storage, the distiller is not
obliged to remove the spirits elsewhere. And while they are thus
deposited in conformity with law, he is not debarred from passing
title or creating a special interest by way of pledge.
The fundamental objection is that the custom, to which the
entire trade is adjusted, is opposed to public policy. But we know
of no ground for thus condemning honest transactions which grow out
of the recognized necessities of a lawful business. The case is not
one where credit may be assumed to be given upon the faith of the
ostensible ownership of goods in the debtor's possession. Everyone
dealing with distillers is familiar with the established practice
in accordance with which spirits are held in store,
Page 232 U. S. 186
under governmental control, and are transferred by the delivery
of such documents as we have here. There is no warrant for saying
that creditors are misled by delusive appearances. The usage serves
a fair purpose, and there is no public policy which requires that
the trade should be thrown into disorder by a refusal to uphold it.
It is urged that frauds may be perpetrated by the duplication of
such documents; but the present dispute does not call for the
determination of the equities as between two innocent purchasers.
We are concerned here simply with the rights of creditors
represented by a trustee in bankruptcy, and we agree with the court
below in its conclusion that, in the circumstances disclosed, his
right is inferior to that of the appellee.
The decree is affirmed.
Affirmed.