Unless the statutes of the United States control, this Court
follows the state court as to whether real estate is separate or
community property.
Until the title of an entryman is completed, the laws of the
United States control; but after completion, the land becomes
immediately subject to state legislation.
McCune v. Essig,
199 U. S. 382.
Even if the United States could impress a peculiar character
upon land within a state after parting with it, it would only be by
clearly expressing it in a statute, which has not been done.
Wright v. Morgan, 191 U. S. 55.
A state law that, after completion of the entryman's title, the
property becomes community property is not like a contract for sale
to a third party, but is consistent, and not in conflict, with the
provisions of the Act of March 3, 1891, prohibiting alienation of
homestead entries. The highest court of the State of Washington
having held that, immediately on completion of title of an
entryman, the property becomes community property, and that, on the
death of the wife after such completion, her children have an
interest therein, this Court follows that decision.
202 F. 854 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the construction and application of
statutes of the Washington relating
Page 231 U. S. 158
to property acquired by an entryman under the laws of the United
States, are stated in the opinion.
Page 231 U. S. 161
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a bill to quiet title, alleging that the plaintiff, a
married man, made entry and acquired title to the land in question
under the homestead laws of the United States by patent issued
December 17, 1903; that thereafter his wife died, and that the
defendants, the children of the marriage, claim an interest in the
land. By the laws of the State of Washington, in which the property
is situated, it became community property unless the statutes of
the United States Forbid.
Teynor v. Heible, 74 Wash. 222.
On that point, we follow the Washington decisions. There was a
demurrer, which was sustained by the district court,
sub nom.
Buchser v. Morss, 196 F. 577, and by the circuit court of
appeals, 202 F. 854.
There is no doubt, of course, that, until the title is
completed, the laws of the United States control.
Wadkins v.
Producers Oil Co., 227 U. S. 368;
Bernier v. Bernier, 147 U. S. 242;
Hall v. Russell, 101 U. S. 503;
Gibson v.
Chouteau, 13 Wall. 92. But when the title has
passed, then the land, "like all other property in the state, is
subject to state legislation."
Wilcox v.
Jackson, 13 Pet. 498,
38 U. S. 517;
Irvine v.
Marshall, 20 How. 558,
61 U. S. 564;
McCune v. Essig, 199 U. S. 382,
199 U. S. 390.
If the United States could impress a peculiar character upon land
within a state after parting with all title to it, at least the
clearest expression would be necessary before such a result could
be reached.
Wright v. Morgan, 191 U. S.
55,
191 U. S. 58.
But it has not tried to do anything of the sort.
No one would doubt that this title was subject to the same
incidents as any other so far as events subsequent to its
acquisition were concerned.
See Wright v. Morgan, supra.
It could be lost by adverse occupation for the time prescribed by
state law, and in a state that adopted the common law as to dower,
it would be subject to dower
Page 231 U. S. 162
if the settler subsequently married. The only semblance of
difficulty is due to the coincidence in time of the acquisition of
a separate right by the settler and the beginning of a community
right in the wife. But this is by no means an extreme illustration
of the division of an indivisible instant that is practiced by the
law whenever it is necessary. A statute may give a man a right of
action against another for causing his death, that accrues to him
at the instant that he is
vivus et mortuus. Higgins v.
Central New England & Western R. Co., 155 Mass. 176, 179.
In the present case, the acquisition under the United States law is
complete, and that law has released its control before the state
law lays hold, and, upon grounds in no way connected or interfering
with the policy of Congress, brings the community regime into play.
The special family relations thus created are not like contracts
with third persons impliedly forbidden by the Act of March 3, 1891,
c. 561, § 5, 26 Stat. 1097, amending Rev.Stat. § 2290. They are
consistent with the policy of the statute, which is to enable the
settler and his family to secure a home.
See § 2291.
Decree affirmed.
