J.P., by his last will, after certain pecuniary legacies,
devised as follows:
"Item. I give and bequeath unto my loving wife M. all the rest
of my lands and tenements whatsoever whereof I shall die seized in
possession, reversion, or remainder, provided she has no lawful
issue."
"Item. I give and bequeath unto M., my beloved wife, whom I
likewise constitute, make, and ordain my sole executrix of this my
last will and testament, all and singular my lands, messuages, and
tenements, by her freely to be possessed and enjoyed, . . . and I
make my loving friend H.J. executor of this my will, to take care
and see the same performed according to my true intent and
meaning,"
&c. The testator died seized without issue, and after the
death of the testator, his wife M. married one G.W., by whom she
had lawful issue.
Held that she took an estate for life
only, under the will of her husband, J.P.
Where there are no words of limitation to a devise, the general
rule of law is that the devisee takes an estate for life only,
unless from the language there used or from other parts of the will
there is a plain intention to give a larger estate.
To make a pecuniary legacy a charge upon lands devised, there
must be express words or a plain implication from the words of the
will.
General rule as to what words will carry a fee.
An introductory clause showing an intention to dispose of the
whole of the testator's estate will not attach itself to a
subsequent devising clause so as to enlarge the latter to a
fee.
A charge upon lands cannot be created by implication unless the
implication is plain.
Effect of the words, "in possession, reversion, or remainder,"
&c.
Where words are used by a testator which are insensible in the
place where they occur or their ordinary meaning is deserted and no
other is furnished by the will, they must be entirely
disregarded.
The word "tenements" does not carry a fee independent of other
circumstances.
This was an action of ejectment brought in the court below. The
sole question arising upon the state of facts in the cause was upon
the construction of the will of James Page, made on 15 February,
1774. By that will, after the usual introductory clause, the
testator proceeds as follows:
"Item. I give and bequeath unto my beloved sister, Rebecca, 100
pounds, proclamation money, to be paid in four years after my
decease."
"Item. I give and bequeath unto my beloved sister Hannah the sum
of 50 pounds proclamation money, to be paid when she is of
age."
"Item. I give and bequeath unto my sister Abigail the like sum
of 50 pounds, proclamation money, to be paid when she arrives at
age."
"Item. I give and bequeath unto my loving wife Mary all the rest
of my lands and tenements whatsoever whereof I shall die seized in
possession, reversion, or remainder, provided she has no lawful
issue."
"Item. I give and bequeath unto Mary, my beloved wife, whom I
likewise constitute, make, and ordain, my sole executrix of this my
last will and testament, all and singular my lands, messuages, and
tenements, by her freely to be possessed and enjoyed, and I do
hereby utterly disallow, revoke, and disannul all and every other
former testaments, wills, legacies, and bequests by me in any ways
before named, willed, and bequeathed, ratifying and confirming this
and no other to be my last will and testament. And I make
Page 23 U. S. 206
my loving friend, Henry Jeans, of the county and province
aforesaid mentioned, executor of this my will, to take care and see
the same performed according to my true intent and meaning, and for
his pains, [leaving the sentence incomplete]. In witness
whereof,"
&c., (in the common form of attestation). The testator was
seized of the land in controversy at the time of the will, and died
seized, without issue, on 10 October, 1774, leaving his wife Mary,
the devisee, who afterwards married one George Williamson, by whom
she had lawful issue still living, and died in the year 1811. The
lessor of the plaintiff is the brother of the testator and his only
heir at law. The defendant claims title to the premises as a
purchaser under Mary, the wife of the testator.
The title of the testator to the premises was derived from a
devise in the will of his father, John Page, dated 11 November,
1773. That will, among other things, contained the following
clause:
"Item. I give and devise unto my son James one equal half part
of my land, [comprising the land in controversy], with all my
plantation, utensils, &c., to him, his heirs and assigns
forever."
He then gives the other moiety of the land to his son John, to
him, his heirs and assigns. He then bequeaths several legacies to
his daughters, Sarah and Mary, and adds,
"Item. I give and bequeath to my three daughters, Rebecca,
Hannah, and Abigail, Rebecca the sum of 50 pounds, Hannah and
Abigail the sum of 50 pounds each of them. Likewise
Page 23 U. S. 207
it is my will that my son James to pay Hannah and Abigail the
said sum of fifty pounds each when they come of age."
He then concludes his will by appointing an executor and
revoking all former wills, &c., and died soon afterwards. James
(the son) left no other real estate than that devised to him by
this will. What personal estate he or his father left at the times
of their decease was not found in the case, and therefore it did
not appear whether or not it was sufficient to pay the legacies in
their wills.
The court below gave judgment for the lessor of the plaintiff,
who was the heir at law of the testator, and the cause was brought
by writ of error to this Court.
Page 23 U. S. 225
MR. JUSTICE STORY delivered the opinion of the Court, and after
stating the case, proceeded as follows:
The principal question arising in this case is what estate Mary,
the wife of James Page, took under his will -- whether an estate
for life or in fee. If the former, then the judgment of the circuit
court is to be affirmed; if the latter, then it is to be
reversed.
Some reliance has been placed upon the will of John Page, the
father, to show the predicament of the land in the possession of
his son James, and thence to draw aid in the construction of the
will of the latter. Without doubt James took a fee in the moiety
devised to him by his father (which includes the land in
controversy), for it is given "to him, his heirs and
Page 23 U. S. 226
assigns." But it is argued that the land came into his hands
charged with the legacies payable to his sisters Hannah and
Abigail, and as these legacies were not payable until they came of
age, they remained a charge upon the land in the hands of James at
his death. Whether the sisters were of age at his death or not or
had received their legacies or not does not appear from the
statement of facts, and nothing can be presumed either way. But
what is there to show that these legacies were a charge on the
land? The direction in the will is that "James do pay Hannah and
Abigail the said sum of 50 pounds each when they come of age," but
it is not said or implied anywhere in the will, that these legacies
shall be a charge on the land. The direction is personal, and must
be a charge on the person only, unless it can be shown from other
parts of the will that the testator intended a charge on the land.
A testator may devise lands with a view to legacies, and make them
a charge on the land or on the person of the devisee, or on
both,{1} and whether a particular legacy be in either predicament,
must depend upon the language of the will. In the large class of
cases which have been decided on this subject and which has
principally arisen from questions respecting the quantity of the
estate taken by the devisee, the ground assumed has been that the
will must speak expressly or by fair implication
Page 23 U. S. 227
that the testator intends the legacies to be a charge on the
land. When, therefore, the testator orders legacies to be paid out
of his lands, or where, subject to legacies or after payment of
legacies, he devises his lands, courts have held the land charged
with the legacies upon the manifest intention of the testator. But
here there is no such language. There is no direction that the
devisee shall pay the legacies out of the land. The charge is
personal, and the case falls directly within the authority of
Reeves v. Gower, 11 Mod. 208.
We may, then, proceed to the consideration of the will of James
Page, inasmuch as that of his father affords no light to guide us
in the construction. The grounds mainly relied on to establish that
Mary, the wife of the testator, took a fee are that the legacies
given to his sisters are a charge on his real estate in the hands
of his widow; that all the rest of his "lands and tenements," in
possession, reversion, or remainder, are given; that the devise is
subject to the proviso "that she has no lawful issue," which is not
a condition merely, but a substitution for an estate intended for
his children; and finally that the lands, &c., are devised to
her "freely to be possessed and enjoyed," which words are best
satisfied upon the supposition of a fee.
Before proceeding to the particular examination of the legal
effect of these different clauses in the will, it is necessary to
state that where there are no words of limitation to a devise, the
general rule of law is that the devisee takes an
Page 23 U. S. 228
estate for life only unless, from the language there used or
from other parts of the will, there is a plain intention to give a
larger estate. We say a plain intention because if it be doubtful
or conjectural upon the terms of the will or if full legal effect
can be given to the language without such an estate, the general
rule prevails. It is not sufficient that the court may entertain a
private belief that the testator intended a fee; it must see that
he has expressed that intention with reasonable certainty on the
face of his will. For the law will not suffer the heir to be
disinherited upon conjecture. He is favored by its policy, and
though the testator may disinherit him, yet the law will execute
that intention only when it is put in a clear and unambiguous
shape.
In the present case there is no introductory clause in the will
expressing an intention to dispose of the whole of the testator's
estate. Nor is it admitted that such a clause, if it were inserted,
would so far attach itself to a subsequent devising clause as
per se to enlarge the latter to a fee where the words
would not ordinarily import it. Such a doctrine would be repugnant
to the modern as well as ancient authorities. The cases of
Frogmorton v. Wright, 2 W.Bl. 889,
Right v.
Sidebottom, Dougl. 759,
Child v. Wright, 8 D. &
E. 64,
Denn v. Gaskin, Cowper 657,
Doe v. Allen,
8 D. & E. 497, and
Merson v. Blackmore, 2 Atk. 341,
are full to the point. The most that can be said is that where the
words of the devise admit of passing a greater interest than for
life, courts will lay
Page 23 U. S. 229
hold of the introductory clause to assist them in ascertaining
the intention. The case of
Hogan v. Jackson, Cowper 297,
admits this doctrine. That case itself did not turn upon the effect
of the introductory clause, but upon the other words of the will,
which were thought sufficient to carry the fee, particularly the
words, "all my effects, both real and personal." The case of
Grayson v. Atkinson, 1 Wils. 333, admits of the same
explanation, and besides the inheritance was there charged with
debts and legacies.
There is no doubt that a charge on lands may be created by
implication as well as by an express clause in a will. But then the
implication must be clear upon the words. Where is there any such
implication in the present will? The testator has not disposed of
the whole of his personal estate, which is the natural fund for the
payment of legacies,
non constat how much or how little he
left. For aught that appears, the personal estate may greatly have
exceeded all the legacies, and if it did not, that would be no
sufficient reason to charge them on the land. It is not a sound
interpretation of a will to construe charges which ordinarily
belong to the personalty to be charges on the realty simply because
the original fund is insufficient. The charge must be created by
the words of the will. Now from what words are we to infer such a
charge in this case? It is said from the words "all the rest;" but
"all the rest" of what? Certainly not of the personal estate,
because the words immediately
Page 23 U. S. 230
following are, "of my lands and tenements," which exclude the
personalty. The words, "all the rest" have then no appropriate
meaning in reference to the personal estate, for the connection
prohibits it. Can they then be supposed to import "all the rest of
my lands, &c., after payment of the legacies," and so be a
charge on them? This would certainly be going much further than the
words themselves authorize, and much further than any preceding
clause requires or justifies. A charge of legacies on land would
not be a devise of the real estate in the ordinary understanding of
men, nor in the contemplation of law. It would make them a lien on,
and payable out of, the land, but it would still be distinguishable
from an estate in the land. But it is sufficient for us to declare
that we cannot make these legacies a charge on the land except by
going beyond, and not by following, the language of the will; we
must create the charge, and not merely recognize it. The case of
Markant v. Twisden, Gilb.Eq. 30, was much stronger than
the present. There the testator had settled all his freeholds on
his wife for life as a jointure, and by his will he bequeathed
several legacies, and then followed this clause, "all the rest and
residue of my estate, chattels, real and personal, I give to my
wife, whom I make sole executrix." But the court held that the wife
did not take the reversion of the jointure by the devise, for as
the testator had not in the preceding part of the will devised
any
Page 23 U. S. 231
real estate, there could be no residue of real estate on which
the clause could operate.
But admitting that the present legacies were a charge on the
lands of the testator, this would not be sufficient to change the
wife's estate into a fee. The clearly established doctrine on this
subject is that if the charge be merely on the land, and not on the
person of the devisee, then the devisee, upon a general devise,
takes an estate for life only. The reason is obvious. If the charge
be merely on the estate, then the devisee (to whom the testator is
always presumed to intend a benefit) can sustain no loss or
detriment in case the estate is construed but a life estate, since
the estate is taken subject to the encumbrance. But if the charge
be personal on the devisee, then if his estate be but for life, it
may determine before he is reimbursed for his payments, and thus he
may sustain a serious loss. All the cases turn upon this
distinction.
Canning v. Canning, Moseley 240,
Loveacres v. Blight, Cowp. 352,
Denn, ex dem. Moor v.
Mellor, 5 D. &. E. 558, and 2 Bos. & Pull. 227,
Doe v. Holmes, 8 D. & E. 1,
Goodtitle v.
Maddem, 4 East 496 all recognize it. And
Doe & Palmer
v. Richards, 3 D. & E. 356, proceeds upon it, whatever
exception may be thought to lie to the application of it in that
particular case. We are then of opinion that there is no charge of
the present legacies on the land, and, if there were, no inference
could be drawn from this circumstance to
Page 23 U. S. 232
enlarge the estate of the wife to a fee, since they are not made
a personal charge upon her.
The next consideration is whether the words, "all the rest of my
lands and tenements," &c., import a fee. In the first place,
this clause is open to the objection that it is not a residuary
clause in the will, for no estate in the lands is previously given,
and consequently, if it operates at all on the fee, it gives the
entire inheritance, and not a mere residuum of interest. And if a
devise of "all the rest and residue of lands" in a clear residuary
clause was sufficient to carry a fee by their own import, it would
follow that almost every will containing a residuary clause would
be construed, without words of limitation, to pass a fee. Yet the
contrary doctrine has most assuredly been maintained. In
Canning v. Canning, Moseley 240, the testator devised as
follows:
"All the rest, residue and remainder of my messuages, lands,
&c., after my just debts, legacies, &c., are fully
satisfied and paid I give to my executors in trust for my
daughters,"
and the question was whether these words passed an estate in fee
or for life to the executors. The court decided that they passed a
life estate only. The authority of this case was fully established
in
Moor v. Denn, ex dem. Mellor, 2 Bos. & Pull. 247,
in the House of Lords, where words equally extensive occurred, and
the authority of this last case has never been broken in upon.
The cases which seem at first view to interfere with and control
this doctrine will be
Page 23 U. S. 233
found upon close examination to turn on other points. Thus, in
Palmer v. Richards, 3 D. & E. 356, where there was a
devise of "all the rest and residue of the testator's lands,"
&c., his legacies and personal expenses being thereout paid.
Lord Kenyon admitted that the words "rest and residue," &c.,
were not sufficient to carry a fee, but he relied on the subsequent
words, "legacies, &c., being thereout paid," which he
considered as creating a charge upon the lands in the hands of the
devisee of such a nature as to carry a fee. In this opinion the
court concurred, and though this case has been since questioned on
its own circumstances, its general doctrine remains untouched. So
in the case of
Norton v. Ladd, 1 Lutw. 755, 759, where the
devise was to A.C., his sister, for life, of all his lands,
&c., after the decease of his mother; then to J.C. his brother,
"the whole remainder of all those lands and tenements," given to
A.C. for life, if he survived her; and if not, then "the whole
remainder and reversion of all the said lands, &c., to his
sister, C.E. and A., and to their heirs forever," the court held
that a fee passed to J.C. under the devise upon the ground, that
taking the whole will, the words "whole remainder" properly
referred to the estate or interest of the testator undisposed of to
his sister, A.C., and that the words could not relate to the
quantity of lands, which the testator intended to devise to his
brother J.C., for he had plainly devised all his lands to his
sister, A.C., and all the lands he had devised to A.C. he had
devised to J.C.,
Page 23 U. S. 234
so that the words naturally and properly had relation to the
quantity of estate which the testator intended to give J.C. -- that
is, all the remainder, which is the same in effect as all his
estate. If the words were merely to be referred to the lands he
intended to devise to J.C., they would be ineffectual, for it was
impossible that he could have any remainder of lands when he had
devised all to A.C., so that they must refer to the estate in the
lands.
Such is the substance of the reasoning of the court, upon which
it is unnecessary to say more than that the case turned upon the
supposed incongruity of construing the testator's words otherwise
than as importing the whole remaining interest in the lands, upon
all of which lands a life estate was already attached. And the
final devise over, which carried a plain fee to the sisters, being
a substitution for the former estate to J.C. in the event of his
death before the testator, greatly fortifies this interpretation.
This case has been much relied on by the plaintiff in error upon
the present argument, but it is very distinguishable from that
before the Court. There, a life estate was given, and the terms,
"whole remainder" had a natural meaning as embracing the whole
remaining interest. Here, on the contrary, there is no preceding
interest given in the real estate, and therefore the terms, "all
the rest" are not susceptible of that sense. There, a substituted
estate in fee was clearly given; here, no clause occurs leading
necessarily to such a conclusion. All that the case in Lutwyche,
taken as the fullest authority,
Page 23 U. S. 235
establishes is that the words "rest and residue" may, in certain
connections, carry a fee.{2} This is not denied or doubted, but
then the words attain their force from their juxtaposition with
other words which fix the sense in which the testator has used
them. In
Farmer v. Wise, 3 P.Wms. 294, the residuary
clause was of "all the rest of his estate, real and personal," and
the word "estate" has long been construed to convey a fee. This
Court has carried the doctrine still further and adjudged a devise
of "all the estate called Marrowbone" to be a devise of the fee,
construing the words not as words merely of local description, but
of the estate or interest also in the land.
Lambert's
Lessee v. Paine, 3 Cranch 79,
Murray v.
Wise, 2 Vern. 564,
S.C. Prec. in Ch. 246, contained a
devise, after a legacy, of all the residue of his real and personal
estate, and rests on the same principle, as do
Beachcroft v.
Beachcroft, 2 Vern. 690, and
Ridart v. Paine, 3 Atk.
486. In
Willows v. Lydcott, Carth. 50, 2 Vent. 285, the
residuary devise was to A. and her assigns forever, which latter
words indicate a clear intention to pass a fee. In
Grayson v.
Atkinson, 1 Wils. 333, there was an introductory clause
purporting the intention of the testator to dispose of all his
temporal estate, then several legacies were given, and a direction
to A. to sell any part of his real and
Page 23 U. S. 236
personal estate for payment of debts and legacies; and then the
will says, as to the rest "of my goods and chattels, real and
personal, moveable and immoveable, as houses, gardens, tenements,
my share in the copperas works, &c., I give to the said A."
Lord Hardwicke, after some hesitation, held it a fee in A., relying
upon the introductory clause, and the charge of the debts and
legacies on the land, and upon the language of the residuary
clause. Whatever may be the authority of this decision, it
certainly does not pretend to rest solely on the residuary clause,
and its containing a mixed devise of real and personal estate was
not insignificant in ascertaining the testator's intention.
It may also be admitted that the words "lands and tenements" do
sometimes carry a fee, and are not confined to a mere local
description of the property. But in their ordinary sense, they
import the latter only, and when a more extensive signification is
given to them in wills, it arises from the context, and is
justified by the apparent intention of the testator to use them in
such extensive signification. The cases cited at the bar reach to
this extent and no further. Their authority is not denied, but
their application to the present case is not admitted.
We may, then, take it to be the general result of the
authorities that the words, "all the rest of my lands" do not of
themselves import a devise of the fee, but unless aided by the
context, the devisee, whether he be a sole or a residuary
Page 23 U. S. 237
devisee, will, if there be no words of limitation, take only a
life estate.
We next come to the effect of the words "in possession,
reversion, or remainder," and, as incidental thereto, the effect of
the word "tenements." That the term "remainder" may in some cases
connected with other clauses, carry a fee has been already
admitted, and was the very point in 1 Lutw. 755. The same is true
in respect to the word "reversion." This is affirmed in the case of
Bailis v. Gale, 2 Ves. 48, where the devise was "I give to
my son, C.G., the reversion of the tenement my sister now lives in
after her decease, and the reversion of those two tenements now in
the possession of J.C." Lord Hardwicke, in pronouncing judgment,
relied on the legal signification of the word "reversion," and that
its use by the testator was fairly to be inferred to be in its
legal sense, as the whole right of reverter, and he adverted to the
circumstance that the devise was to a child, to whom it could
scarcely be presumed the parent intended to give merely a dry
reversion or to split up his interest in it into parts. But in that
case, as in 1 Lutw. 755, there were antecedent estates created or
existing in the land, and the devise was of a "reversion," and not,
as in this case, of "all the rest of my lands &c., in
reversion," &c. The land now in controversy was not held by the
testators as a reversionary estate, but as an estate in possession,
and in no way, therefore, can the doctrine help the present case.
But there are cases which are contrary to
Bailis v. Gale
and
Page 23 U. S. 238
somewhat clash with its authority. In
Peiton v. Banks,
1 Vern. 65, the case was that a man devised his lands to his wife
for life, and he gave the reversion to A. and B., to be equally
divided betwixt them. The court decided that A. and B. took an
estate as tenants in common for life only. And Sergeant Maynard
stated a similar decision to have been made about twenty years
before that time. It is not material, however, to enter upon the
delicate inquiry which of these authorities is entitled to most
weight, because the present case does not require it.
In respect to the word "tenements," it is only necessary to
observe that is has never been construed in a will, independently
of other circumstances, to pass a fee. In
Canning v.
Canning, Moseley 240, and
Doe ex dem. Palmer, v.
Richards, 3 D. & E. 356, and
Denn ex dem. Moor v.
Miller, 5 D. & E. 558,
S.C. 2 Bos. & Pull.
247, the same term occurred, as well as the broader expression,
"hereditaments;" in neither case was the term "tenement" supposed
to have any peculiar effect, and the argument attempting to
establish a fee upon the import of the word "hereditaments" even in
a residuary clause was deliberately overruled by the court. The
same doctrine was held in
Hopwell v. Ackland, Salk.
239.
If, then, it is asked what interpretation the court put upon the
words "all the rest" in connection with "lands and tenements," the
answer is that no definite meaning can, in this will, be
Page 23 U. S. 239
annexed to them. It is our duty to give effect to all the words
of a will if by the rules of law it can be done. And where words
occur in a will, their plain and ordinary sense is to be attached
to them unless the testator manifestly applies them in some other
sense. But if words are used by him which are insensible in the
place where they occur, or their common meaning is deserted and no
other is furnished by the will, courts are driven to the necessity
of deeming them as merely insignificant or surplusage, and to find
the true interpretation of the will without them. In the present
case, the words, "all the rest of my lands and tenements" stand
wholly disconnected with any preceding clause. There is nothing to
which "the rest" has relation, for no other devise of real estate
is made. We have no certain guide to the testator's intention in
using them. We may indulge conjectures, but the law does not decide
upon conjectures, but upon plain, reasonable, and certain
expressions of intention found on the face of the will.
The next clause is "provided she has no lawful issue." The
probable intention of this proviso was "provided she has no lawful
issue" by me. Men do not ordinarily look to remote occurrences in
the structure of their wills, and especially unlearned men. The
testator was young and his wife young, and it was natural for them
not to despair of issue, although at the time of the will he was in
ill health. In case of leaving children, posthumous or otherwise,
he might
Page 23 U. S. 240
think that the gift to his wife of the whole of his real estate
would be more than conjugal affection could require or parental
prudence justify. In that event, he might mean to displace the
whole estate of his wife, and to leave her to her dower at the
common law and the children to their inheritance by descent. This
interpretation would afford a rational exposition of the clause,
and perhaps ought not to be rejected, although there is no express
limitation in the words. In this view, it is not very material
whether it be considered as a condition precedent or subsequent,
though the general analogies of the law would certainly lead to the
conclusion that it was in the latter predicament. But even in this
view, which is certainly most favorable to the plaintiffs in error,
it falls short of the purposes of the argument. As a condition, in
the event proposed, the prior estate to the wife would be defeated,
but there would be no estate devised to the issue. They would take
by descent as heirs, and not by devise. It would be going quite too
far to construe mere words of condition to include a contingent
devise to the issue; to infer from words defeating the former
estate an intent to create a new estate in the issue, and that
estate a fee, and a clear substitute for the former. No court would
feel justified, upon so slender a foundation, to establish so broad
a superstructure. Nor can any intention to give a fee to the wife
be legally deduced from the proviso in any way of interpreting the
terms, because it is as perfectly consistent with the intention
Page 23 U. S. 241
to defeat a life estate, as a fee in the whole of the lands. The
testator, with a limited property, might justly think it too much
to take from his own issue the substance of their inheritance
during a long minority in favor of a wife, who might live many
years and form new connections. In such an event, leaving her to
the general provision of law as to dower would not be unkindness or
injustice. But it is sufficient to say that the words are too
equivocal to enable the court to ascertain from them the clear
purpose of establishing a fee. And if the proviso refers to any
lawful issue by any other husband, then it must be deemed a
condition subsequent, and in the events which have happened, the
estate of the wife, whether it be for life or in fee, has been
defeated, and the plaintiffs in error are not entitled to reverse
the present judgment.
Quacunque via data est, the proviso
cannot help the case.
It remains now to consider the succeeding clause of the will, in
which the testator repeats his devise and gives to his wife "all
his lands," &c., dropping the words "the rest," and therefore
showing that he did not understand them as having any other or
stronger import than the will presented without them. Then follow
the words "by her freely to be possessed and enjoyed," upon which
great stress has been laid at the bar. If these words had occurred
in a will devising an estate for years or for life or in fee in
express terms, they would not probably have been thought to have
any distinct auxiliary signification, but to be merely a more full
annunciation
Page 23 U. S. 242
of what the law would imply. Occurring in a clause where the
estate is undefined, they are supposed to have a peculiar force, so
that "freely to possess and enjoy" must mean to possess and enjoy
without any limitation or restriction as to estate or right. The
argument is that a tenant for life is restricted in many respects.
She can make no permanent improvements or alterations; she is
punishable for waste, and is subject to the inquisition of the
reversioner. But if this argument is admitted, it proves not that a
fee is necessarily intended, but that these restrictions on the
life estate ought to be held to be done away by the words in
question. They admit of quite as natural an interpretation by being
construed to mean free of encumbrances, and in this view are just
as applicable to a life estate as a fee. Perhaps the testator
himself may have entertained the notion that the legacies in his
will, or that of his father, were encumbrances on the estate, and
if so, the words would indicate an intention that the wife should
be disencumbered of the burden. But in what way are we to reconcile
the argument deduced from this clause with that drawn on the same
side from the preceding proviso? How could the testator intend that
the wife should "freely possess and enjoy" the lands in fee when in
one event he had stripped her of the whole estate, and that by a
condition inseparably annexed as an encumbrance to her estate? We
ought not to suppose that he intended to repeal the proviso under
such a general phrase. The
Page 23 U. S. 243
case of
Loveacres v. Blight, Cowp. 352, has been
supposed to be a direct support of the argument in favor of a fee.
In that case the testator made the following devise:
"As touching such worldly estate wherewith it hath pleased God
to bless me in this life, I give, . . . in the following manner and
form:"
"First of all, I give and bequeath to E.M., my dearly beloved
wife, the sum of five pounds, to be paid yearly out of my estate,
called G., and also one part of the dwelling house, being the west
side, with as much wood craft, home at her, as she shall have need
of, by my executors hereafter named. I give . . . unto my son T.M.
the sum of five pounds, to be paid in twelve months after my
decease. I give unto my granddaughter E. the sum of five pounds, to
be paid twelve months after my decease."
"Item. I give unto J.M., and R.M., my two sons, whom I make my
and ordain my sole executors, . . . all and singular my lands and
messuages, by them freely to be possessed and enjoyed alike."
The question was whether by this clause the sons took an estate
for life or in fee. The court held that they took a tenancy in
common in fee. Lord Mansfield, in delivering the opinion of the
court, admitted that if the intention were doubtful, the general
rule of law must take place. But he laid stress upon the
circumstance that the estate was charged with an annuity to his
wife, so that the testator could not mean by the word "freely" to
give it free of encumbrances. He thought the free enjoyment must
therefore mean free from
Page 23 U. S. 244
all limitations -- that is, the absolute property of the estate.
He also thought the introductory clause not unimportant, and that
the blank after "my" was intended to be filled with "heirs," and it
can scarcely escape observation that it was a case where the sons
of the testator were the devisees. These considerations may well
lead to a doubt whether Lord Mansfield intended to lay down any
general principle of construction in relation to the words "freely
to be enjoyed," &c. But if he did, the subsequent case of
Goodright v. Barron, 11 East 220, has manifestly
interfered with its authority. In that case, there was an
introductory clause, "as touching such worldly estate wherewith it
hath pleased God to bless me," &c., and the testator then
proceeded as follows:
"I give and bequeath to my brother T.D., a cottage house, and
all belonging to it, to him and his heirs forever, W.C. tenant.
Also, I give and bequeath to my wife E., whom I likewise make my
sole executrix, all and singular my lands, messuages, and
tenements, by her freely to be possessed and enjoyed."
The court held that the wife took an estate for life only; that
the words, being ambiguous, did not pass a fee against the heir,
but might mean free from encumbrances or charges, free from
impeachment for waste; and that the introductory clause could not
be brought down into the latter distinct clause to aid it, though,
if joined, it might have had that effect. The court distinguished
that case from the case before Lord Mansfield because in the
latter, as the testator had already
Page 23 U. S. 245
encumbered the estate, the words must have meant to pass a fee,
or they would have no meaning at all. Mr. Justice Le Blanc added
that the words used were not inconsistent with a life estate only,
and he distinguished between them and the words "freely to be
disposed of," admitting that the latter would pass a fee. So that,
taking both these cases together, the fair deduction is that the
words "freely to be possessed," &c., are too uncertain of
themselves to raise a fee, but they may be aided by other
circumstances.
The case before us is far less strong than either of the
foregoing cases, for there is no introductory clause showing an
intention to dispose of the whole property, as there was both in
Goodright v. Barron and
Loveacres v. Blight, nor
is there any encumbrance created by the testator on the land, which
was the decisive circumstance that governed the latter.
Upon the whole, upon the most careful examination, we cannot
find a sufficient warrant in the words of this will to pass a fee
to the wife. The testator may have intended it, and probably did,
but the intention cannot be extracted from his words with
reasonable certainty, and we have no right to indulge ourselves in
mere private conjectures.
Judgment affirmed with costs.
See Roe ex dem. Peter v. Day, 3 M. & S. 518; 5 East
87; 4 East 495.
See Lord Hardwicke's comments on this case in
Bailis v. Gale, 2 Vesey 48.