A question of fact under the slave trade acts as to a vessel
claimed by a Spanish subject, as having been engaged in the trade
under the laws of his own country, but proved to have been
originally equipped in the United States for the voyage in
question.
Under the Slave Trade Act of 1794, c. 11, the forfeiture
attaches where the original voyage is commenced in the United
States, whether the vessel belong to citizens or foreigners, and
whether the act is done
suo jure or by an agent for the
benefit of another person who is not a citizen or resident of the
United States.
Circumstances of a pretended transfer to a Spanish subject and
the commencement of a new voyage in a Spanish port
held
not to be sufficient to break the continuity of the original
adventure and to avoid the forfeiture.
It is not necessary, to incur the forfeiture under the slave
trade acts, that the equipments for the voyage should be completed.
It is sufficient if any preparations are made for the unlawful
purpose.
This was a seizure of the schooner
Plattsburgh,
otherwise called
The Maria Gertrudes, on the Coast of
Africa, made by the United States ship of war
The Cyane in
the year 1820. The
Page 23 U. S. 134
vessel was brought into the port of New York for adjudication,
and a libel of information was filed in the district court under
the Acts of Congress of 1794, c. 11. and of 1800, c. 205,
prohibiting the slave trade. A claim was given in on behalf of Juan
Marino, a Spanish subject and a resident merchant of St. Jago de
Cuba. Upon the proofs taken, a decree of condemnation was
pronounced in the district court, which was affirmed in the circuit
court
pro forma and the cause was brought by appeal to
this Court.
Page 23 U. S. 135
MR. JUSTICE STORY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is a libel founded on the several acts of Congress for the
prohibition of the slave trade, and contains various distinct
allegations, and especially counts framed on the Slave Trade acts
of 1794, ch. 11. and 1800, ch. 205. It is unnecessary to enter upon
a minute examination of the pleadings, because the whole case turns
upon the question whether, in point of fact the voyage was
originally undertaken from the United States or was undertaken by
the claimant, Mr. Marino, from the Island of Cuba after a
bona
fide purchase made by him altogether disconnected from the
original enterprise.
The
Plattsburgh was duly registered at Baltimore as an
American vessel, owned by Messrs. Sheppard, D'Arcy & Didier,
Jr., of that place in October, 1817. She cleared out at the custom
house under the command of Captain Joseph F. Smith in December,
1819, having what is called an assorted cargo on board on a voyage
ostensibly for St. Thomas, in the West Indies, but in reality, for
St. Jago, in the Island of Cuba. Up to this period, the ownership
remained upon the ship's papers wholly unchanged. But it is now
asserted that the shares of D'Arcy and Didier were purchased by
Sheppard for the sum of $6,000, and that the voyage was wholly
undertaken on his account. The first remark which arises upon this
state of the case is how it should come to pass, if the purchase
were
bona fide, that the requisite alterations were not
made
Page 23 U. S. 136
in the ship's papers, since, by the act of Congress, unless
registered anew upon such sale, the vessel forfeits her American
character? Sheppard, in his testimony, gives an extraordinary
reason for the occurrence, declaring that he was insolvent at the
time of the purchase, and so could not give the usual bond for the
proper use and delivery up of the registry upon any future sale.
Yet according to his own showing and that of the other part owners,
he was at this time the owner of one-half of the
Plattsburgh, valued at $6,000, and of an interest in
another vessel valued at $4,000. Sheppard further states that one
of his inducements to purchase the
Plattsburgh was an
offer made to him by one George Stark (who became a conspicuous
character in the subsequent proceedings) to get for her $12,500 in
St. Jago de Cuba, Stark asserting that he was authorized to
purchase a vessel at that place. Accordingly, Sheppard determined
to entrust Stark with the negotiation, and a bill of sale of the
schooner was executed to Stark by all the owners to enable him to
convey the same to any purchaser. The cargo of the
Plattsburgh, as contained in the manifest, consisted
principally of goods belonging to various shippers who are not in
the slightest degree implicated in any part of the guilt of this
transaction, and upon the sales of the same at St. Jago de Cuba,
the proceeds were regularly remitted to them. These shippers all
contracted with Stark for the shipment and freight of their goods,
and he informed one of
Page 23 U. S. 137
them that he had purchased the schooner for certain persons in
the Island of Cuba and that he had no interest in her himself, but
was to receive $2,000 for delivering her at that port. How far this
statement is reconcilable with the account given of the transaction
by the owners of the
Plattsburgh it is unnecessary to
examine.
At the time of the equipment of the
Plattsburgh at
Baltimore, there was another vessel, the brig
Eros, which
was also fitting out at that port for St. Jago de Cuba, with a
cargo suited for the slave trade, under the management of Stark as
charterer for the voyage. This vessel was at first detained by the
collector upon suspicion, but he, being satisfied upon inquiry that
the owner of the
Eros had no intention of having her
engaged in the slave trade, afterwards released her, taking out
some few of her equipments. The
Plattsburgh first dropped
down the Chesapeake Bay, and afterwards (if the witnesses are to be
believed) some grape, canister, and round shot were taken on board,
and on stowing them away, a barrel of irons or handcuffs was
discovered which was not contained in the manifest of the cargo.
The vessel then sailed down to New Point Comfort, and there waited
ten or twelve days for the
Eros, and as soon as the latter
appeared, after taking on board Mr. Stark, the
Plattsburgh
sailed in company with the
Eros directly for St. Jago de
Cuba. The crew on board are represented to have distinctly
understood, soon afterwards, that the voyage was designed
ultimately for the African coast for slaves.
Page 23 U. S. 138
In due time, both vessels arrived at the port of destination and
unladed their cargoes. And here the sale to Mr. Marino is alleged
to have taken place, in entire good faith, for the sum of $12,000,
although, upon the production of the bill of sale, the sum is there
asserted to be $8,000 only. Both of the vessels are consigned to a
Mr. Wanton at St. Jago, through whom the negotiation seems to have
been made. After the ostensible sale, the
Plattsburgh
underwent repairs under the agency of Wanton, and was in due form
made a Spanish ship, with Spanish national documents, and the usual
preparations were made and the usual passports obtained to equip
her for a slave voyage to the coast of Africa under her new owners.
A part of the cargo of the
Eros was taken on board of the
Plattsburgh, and particularly about 300 casks of
gunpowder. The original crew was apparently discharged, but Captain
Smith, two of the mates, and six or eight of the men, together with
Stark, still remained on board and accompanied the vessel to the
coast of Africa, she being, during that voyage, under the nominal
command of a Mr. Gonzalez, with the assumed name of the Maria
Gertrudes. She was captured while lying on the coast of Africa,
north of the line, by the boats of the United States ship of war
Cyane, under Lieutenant Stringham, and was brought into
the port of New York for adjudication, and was there finally
condemned by the district and circuit courts, and the present
appeal is from
Page 23 U. S. 139
the decree pronounced,
pro forma, by the latter.
Such is a general outline of the circumstances of the case, upon
which it is material to observe that if the original object of the
equipment and voyage from Baltimore was for the purpose of carrying
on the African slave trade, the forfeiture equally attaches whether
the schooner was then owned by American citizens or by a foreigner.
The act of 1794, ch. 11, expressly declares that no citizen or
resident in the United States shall, for himself or any other
person whatsoever, either as master, factor, or owner, build, fit,
equip, load or otherwise prepare any vessel within any port of the
United States, nor cause any vessel to sail from any port within
the same, for the purpose of carrying on any trade or traffic in
slaves to any foreign country, &c., under the penalty of
forfeiture. Under this act, it is immaterial to whom the ownership
belongs and whether the act is done
suo jure, or for the
benefit of another person. If, therefore, the
Plattsburgh
was equipped at Baltimore by the owners, or by the master, or by
Stark, as factor or agent, to carry on the slave trade for the
benefit of Marino, the case falls directly within the prohibitions
of the act. And in this view the declarations of Sheppard and Stark
respecting the sale are not without considerable significance. But
there is no pretense to say upon the facts in proof that the actual
ownership at the commencement of the voyage was not in Sheppard and
his partners or in Stark. We
Page 23 U. S. 140
find the latter traveling with the vessel through all her
subsequent wanderings, with a considerable cargo on board which
belonged to himself when she left Baltimore and which was at St.
Jago transshipped from the
Eros; we find the original
master and mates with efficient authority on board on the coast of
Africa; we find all parties yielding obedience to them and to
Stark; we find the master resorting to subterfuges and concealments
after the capture, and the logbook kept in the English language,
and if the testimony of two of the crew is admitted (and one of
them is not in the slightest degree discredited), we find the most
decisive proofs that the original voyage was conceived and executed
solely with a view to the slave trade. Whatever exceptions may be
taken to the testimony of Ferver (and it is certainly open to much
animadversion from his first prevarications), it has the merit of
standing supported as to its main facts by all the other
circumstances of the case. The natural -- nay the almost necessary
-- inference from those circumstances is that they belong to a
meditated infringement of the acts prohibiting the slave trade.
It has been asked in what manner the original intention can be
deduced from the facts, since the
Plattsburgh had on board
an innocent cargo when she left Baltimore. That, however, is not
quite certain, for though nothing noxious appeared on the face of
the manifest, yet if Ferver and Flower are believed, there was a
barrel of handcuffs concealed in the run, demonstrating in no
Page 23 U. S. 141
equivocal manner the object of the parties. But assuming that
the equipments were all innocent in their own nature, that would
not help the case if there were positive proof of a guilty
intention. The law does not proceed upon the notion that provisions
or equipments which are adapted to ordinary voyages are not within
the forfeiting clause if they are intended for carrying on the
slave trade. Nor is it necessary that there should be complete
equipments for this purpose. It is sufficient if any preparations
are made for the unlawful purpose. Such was the doctrine of this
Court in the cases formerly adjudged, which were cited at the bar.
*
But there is no pretense to separate the voyage of the
Plattsburgh from that of the
Eros. Both were
undertaken by the same party, and for the same object. The
Eros carried out the cargo adapted to carry on the
traffic, and for the purpose of concealment, the
Plattsburgh was made to assume the garb of innocence. It
was an ingenious device to lull suspicions, and escape the
penalties of the law, but the intention is just as strongly
manifested as though all the offensive articles had been laden on
board the
Plattsburgh. In short, the
Eros may be
considered as the mere tender of the
Plattsburgh, and
subservient to all the objects of the latter. Her cargo found its
way on board after the arrival at St. Jago, under the direction of
Stark, who, true to his original purpose, remained with the
Plattsburgh as the
Page 23 U. S. 142
dux facti. It is impossible, upon any reasonable
grounds, to assume his intention to have been a purely lawful
traffic at St. Jago. If it had been so, why should he have been
found on board on the coast of Africa? Men do not ordinarily take
upon themselves such an odious and dangerous post, surrounding
themselves with penalties and suspicions, without causes deeply
connected with their own private interests and purposes.
But we are told that here was a genuine sale to a Spaniard, who
was authorized by the laws of his country to carry on the slave
trade, and however immoral or inhuman it may be, the Court is to
decide his case upon principles of law, and not merely upon
principles of justice or morality. Certainly the Court has nothing
to do with the conscience of the Spanish claimant if he has
established a
bona fide legal ownership. But that is the
very point in controversy. This is not the case of an ordinary
trade, where no disguise is necessary or useful. It is the case of
a trade prohibited to American citizens under very heavy penalties,
penalties which have since been aggravated to the infliction of
capital punishment. It is a trade odious in our country, and
carries a permanent stain upon the reputation of all who are
concerned in it, and is watched by the severest vigilance of the
government. Under such circumstances it is obvious that it cannot
be carried on under our flag but at the greatest hazards and with
few chances of escaping detection. If carried on at all, it must
therefore
Page 23 U. S. 143
be carried on by Americans under the disguise of foreign flags,
and it is notorious that in the colonial ports of Spain there is
little difficulty in procuring all the apparatus for the use of the
national flag. The existence of such a flag is not, when
circumstances of just suspicion occur, any decisive proof of
innocence, for it is just such a cover as must accompany the fraud.
And these considerations cannot fail to attract the attention of a
bona fide Spanish purchaser. He cannot but know that
American cruisers are in search of those who violate our laws
respecting this traffic, and he would deem it the highest
imprudence to place his property in a situation in which it might
justly be suspected of an admixture of American interests. He would
studiously exclude from his ship all Americans lest they should
involve him in serious losses. Of course he would
a
fortiori exclude from his employment the original American
master and owner from whom he had purchased. He could not, without
the grossest rashness, be presumed to forget that an American owner
and master, on board of a vessel recently under their control and
recently purchased, would jeopard the whole adventure, for upon the
search of a cruiser, they would excite very strong presumptions of
guilt. How then can we reconcile with the notion of a
bona
fide purchase in this case the continued employment of the
owner, the master, the mates, and a large proportion of the crew of
the
Plattsburgh? Does it not necessarily diminish the
credibility of such a claim?
Page 23 U. S. 144
What then are the explanations attempted to be given upon this
subject? It is said that Smith and Stark were employed by Wanton to
go to the coast of Africa to transact business for him, and that
they were mere passengers. But what business of Wanton? None is
proved or attempted to be proved. And who, in fact, is Wanton? He
is the consignee of Stark, both for the
Plattsburgh and
the
Eros. He is the shipper of the cargo for the coast of
Africa, and upon the face of the bill of lading no other person
appears as owner, and it is now said that he is what is called an
actionist or shareholder in the voyage, and, by the Spanish laws or
course of trade, such persons do not appear as owners on the
papers. It is remarkable that if such be the law, Marino's name
should not appear on the bill of lading, and that Wanton's alone is
stated. The ambiguous fact is alleged that no freight is payable,
because the vessel and cargo are united for the voyage. Surely it
must have been in the power of the claimant to have given much more
full and exact information on this point.
Then, as to Captain Smith's being a mere passenger, on which so
much reliance is placed by the claimant, how does it comport with
the facts upon the record? At the time of the capture, he appeared
as a principal personage, and evidently conducted himself
differently from a person who had no interest in the voyage and was
a mere spectator. But what is decisive to show that this is a mere
disguise too thin not to be
Page 23 U. S. 145
easily seen through is the letter found on board, written by him
to the mate a short time before the vessel sailed from St. Jago, in
which the mask is stripped off and he appears in his natural
character as master. It is as follows:
"Sir, I wish you to get the schooner down to Moro in the
morning, and get the men quartered to the guns, and station them on
the tops and forecastle, the same as on board armed ships, and get
all ready for going to sea tomorrow night. After you get down to
the Moro, send the boat, with four men, for me. Yours, Jos.
Smith."
Nothing can be more unlike the character or authority of a
passenger than these directions. They belong to one who has a right
to command and knows he is to be obeyed. The language imports a
right to control the voyage, and could be dictated only by one in
possession of the effective command. It would be absurd for an
American passenger to address such a note to an American mate who
was responsible to a Spanish master for all his orders and conduct.
It would be an exercise of credulity far beyond any just claims of
the evidence to lead the court to the belief that Captain Smith was
a mere passenger. The circumstances of the case are at war with the
supposition, and the positive testimony of Ferver and Flower
completely overturns it.
Without going more at large into the evidence, in which there is
much matter open to observation, it is sufficient to state that in
the opinion of the Court, the reality of the asserted sale to
Marino is not established by the proofs, and our
Page 23 U. S. 146
conclusion is that the unlawful enterprise had its origin at
Baltimore.
Decree affirmed with costs.
*
The Emily and the
Caroline, 9 Wheat. 381.