When the state court has overruled an objection that the federal
right was not clearly presented, the objection is not open in this
Court.
Quaere whether plaintiff can sue upon a statute of one
jurisdiction when the action can be maintained only on that of
another.
In a suit for personal injuries resulting in the death of
plaintiff's intestate, plaintiff sued an interstate carrier on two
counts, one for pecuniary loss to next of kin and the other for
injury and pain sustained by the intestate before death. There was
a recovery on both counts which the supreme court of the state
sustained on the ground that the Employers' Liability Act was only
supplementary, and the judgment could be upheld under the state
law.
Held error, and that:
In a suit for personal injuries against an interstate railway
carrier, plaintiff, not defendant, has the election how the suit
shall be brought.
The Federal Employers' Liability Act supersedes state laws in
the matters with which it deals, including liability of carriers
while engaged in commerce between the states for defects of
cars.
In case of death of an injured employee, the only action under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908 is one for the benefit
of the next of kin; there can be no recovery for the pain suffered
before death.
The Employers' Liability Act, as amended in 1910, saves the
rights of the injured employee but allows only one recovery; the
act as amended,
Page 228 U. S. 703
not having a retroactive, effect does not apply where the death
occurred prior to the amendment.
8 Ark. 240 reversed.
The facts, which involve the construction of the Employers'
Liability Act of 1908 and the extent to which it superseded state
statutes, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action for personal injuries resulting in the death
of the plaintiff's intestate. There are two counts, the first for
the pecuniary loss to the next of kin, laid at $5,000, the other
for the injury and pain suffered by the intestate, laid at $25,000.
The death was caused by a defect in a car on which the intestate
was a brakeman, the car being part of a train running from Van
Buren, Arkansas, to Coffeyville, Kansas. The jury found a verdict
for the plaintiff for $2,000 on the first count, and for $10,000 on
the second. The supreme court of the state sustained the judgment
on condition of a remittitur of $5,000; this was entered, and
judgment was rendered for $7,000. At the trial, the defendant asked
for a ruling that the plaintiff could not recover damages for pain
under the second count, which was denied, subject to exception. The
supreme court treated the request as intended to raise the question
whether the Employers' Liability Act of Congress of April 22, 1908,
c. 149, 35 Stat. 65, displaced the state law, as undoubtedly it
was; stated that the suit was
Page 228 U. S. 704
not based upon that act, and held that the Act of Congress was
only supplementary, and that the judgment could be upheld under the
state law. 98 Ark. 240.
The plaintiff contends that the claim of right under the law of
the United States, and against that under the law of the state, was
not presented with clearness enough to save it. But, as the supreme
court held the question sufficiently raised and decided it, that
objection is not open here.
San Jose Land & Water Co. v.
San Jose Ranch Co., 189 U. S. 177,
189 U. S. 180;
Eau Claire Nat. Bank v. Jackman, 204 U.
S. 522,
204 U. S.
533.
The same answer may be given to the suggestion that the
defendant is estopped having pleaded contributory negligence, and
thus having relied upon the state law. Moreover, the plaintiff, not
the defendant, had the election how the suit should be brought,
and, as he relied upon the state law, the defendant had no choice
if it was to defend upon the facts. Whether the defendant could
have defeated the first count also on the ground that the plaintiff
was suing upon a statute of one jurisdiction, whereas the action
could be maintained only on that of another, need not be decided,
since the defendant asks reversal of only so much of the judgment
as rests on the second count. Hence, it is unnecessary to consider
whether the principle of
Union Pacific Ry. Co. v. Wyler,
158 U. S. 285; or
that of
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Wulf,
226 U. S. 570,
226 U. S. 577,
should be applied.
See further Troxell v. Delaware, Lackawanna
& Western R. Co., 227 U. S. 434,
227 U. S. 442;
Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. Slaght, 205 U.
S. 122,
205 U. S. 131;
United States v. Dalcour, 203 U.
S. 408,
203 U. S.
423.
Coming to the merits, it now is decided that the Act of Congress
supersedes state laws in the matter with which it deals.
Mondou
v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R. Co., 223 U. S.
1,
223 U. S. 53-55;
Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. Co. v. Wulf, 226 U.
S. 570,
226 U. S. 576;
Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S.
59,
227 U. S. 67.
The act deals with
Page 228 U. S. 705
the liability of carriers, while engaged in commerce between the
states, for defects in cars. Section 1. In the case of death, the
only action is one for the benefit of the next of kin. § 1.
Michigan Central R. Co. v. Vreeland, 227 U. S.
59,
227 U. S. 67-68;
American R. Co. v. Didricksen, 227 U.
S. 145,
227 U. S. 149;
Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. McGinnis,
228 U. S. 173,
228 U. S. 175.
Therefore, the ruling of the state court was wrong. The amendment
of April 5, 1910, c. 143, § 2, 36 Stat. 291, in like manner allows
but one recovery, although it provides for survival of the right of
the injured person. The amendment, however, does not apply to this
case, as the death occurred in August, 1909.
Judgment reversed.
