If the judgment of the state court rests on federal and
nonfederal grounds, and the latter be sufficient to support it,
there can be no review by this Court.
Preston v. Chicago,
226 U. S. 447.
The application of laches and the statute of limitation does not
present a federal question.
This Court can only review findings of fact by the state court
to the extent necessary to determine whether, there being no
evidence to support them, a federal right has been denied by them,
or where conclusions of law as to a federal right and questions of
fact are so intermingled as to make such review necessary for the
purpose of passing on the federal question.
Chapman v.
Goodnow, 123 U. S. 540.
The highest court of the state having held, following its former
decisions on the same subject, that the plaintiff's cause of action
was barred by laches and
res judicata, the judgment rests
on nonfederal grounds sufficient to sustain it.
This Court will not review the judgment of the highest state
court in accepting its former decisions as determining the law of
the state and give a different interpretation of that law. To do so
would give this Court power to review all judgments of state courts
where federal questions are set up and to substitute its judgment
for that of the state courts as to state laws.
Writ of error to review 95 Miss. 63 dismissed.
The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this Court to
review a judgment of the state court when the same rests on
nonfederal as well as federal grounds, are stated in the
opinion.
Page 228 U. S. 673
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
This suit concerns the title to certain lands in the State of
Mississippi. There was an original and an amended bill. The
original bill was one to quiet title simply. An answer was filed to
it which, among other defenses, set up the decree, hereafter
referred to, and adverse possession under the decree. Other
defendants were brought in and an amended bill filed. The bills
allege the following: plaintiffs derive title through a patent to
the state under the Swamp Land Act of 1850, 9 Stat. 519, c. 83, and
patent from the state to the Pearl River Improvement &
Navigation Company in 1871, certain conveyances on account of a
sale for taxes, and an act of the legislature of the state,
approved April 19, 1873, by which, it is alleged, all the acts,
deeds, and proceedings of the Pearl River Improvement &
Navigation Company were ratified, approved, and confirmed.
On the 14th of October, 1891, the defendant the Southern Pine
Company brought a suit making three of the plaintiffs in this suit
defendant, in which it was alleged, among other things, that the
company was the owner of the lands described and that the
plaintiffs herein asserted title thereto, and prayed that it be
cancelled, as it cast a cloud upon the title of the company. The
plaintiffs (defendants in that suit) made their answer a cross-bill
and prayed that the title of the Southern Pine Company be cancelled
as a cloud on their title.
Plaintiffs employed one E. E. Baldwin, who was then and for many
years thereafter engaged in the practice of the law at Jackson,
Mississippi, to conduct the suit for them. By virtue of his
employment, he appeared at the November term of court in 1891 and
at each subsequent
Page 228 U. S. 674
term until the July term, 1895. During that time, nothing was
done in the case. Baldwin was paid to conduct the suit from its
inception to its termination, but, unknown to plaintiffs, early in
October, 1895, he was afflicted with a severe stroke of paralysis,
and another in May, 1896, and from that time plaintiffs were
informed and believed that he became mentally and physically
incapacitated from looking after his engagements.
At the July term, 1896, while plaintiffs were absent from the
state, they being nonresidents, and while Baldwin, their counsel,
was incapacitated and not cognizant of what was going on, the
Southern Pine Company set down the case for final hearing, and at
its request a decree was rendered, cancelling plaintiffs' title to
the lands as a cloud upon that of the Southern Pine Company. The
record was made part of the bill. Neither of the plaintiffs had any
knowledge or information of the rendition of the decree nor of the
incapacity of their counsel until the latter part of the year 1900
or the first of the year 1901, when they began to take steps to
assert their rights in the premises.
Plaintiffs allege that, under the circumstances, the decree
should be set aside and held to be absolutely void. And it is
alleged that, while the suit was pending, the Southern Pine Company
conveyed the lands to the defendant, A.M. Chesborough, who conveyed
undivided interests therein to other defendants, and that they
claim title to the lands by virtue of the conveyances and the
decree in favor of the Southern Pine Company.
There were demurrers to the bills, which were overruled, and
defendants answered. The answer denied the validity of the acts of
1871 and 1873 under which plaintiffs claimed, and the validity of
the title asserted through them; admitted that the Southern Pine
Company brought suit as alleged by plaintiffs, and averred that the
rendered therein, and averred that the latter was
res
judicata;
Page 228 U. S. 675
alleged that belief that Baldwin, plaintiff's counsel, abandoned
the defense of that suit for the reason that the Supreme Court of
Mississippi had decided in the case of
Hardy v. Hartman,
65 Miss. 504, and the United States Circuit Court for the Eastern
District of Mississippi, in
Bradford v. Hall, 36 F. 801,
that the patents issued to the Pearl River Improvement &
Navigation Company were null and void, and no defense could have
been interposed to the suit. To the amended bill as a bill of
review defendants pleaded the statute of limitations of two years
and laches.
Testimony was submitted and there was an agreed statement of
facts. A decree was entered dismissing the original and amended
bills. It was affirmed by the supreme court of the state. 95 Miss.
63.
The supreme court rested its decision entirely upon the decree
rendered in the suit of the Southern Pine company, and, stating the
facts, said that the Southern Pine Company claimed by virtue of
patents issued by the state subsequent to 1871, and plaintiffs
(defendants in that suit) claimed under the Pearl River Improvement
& Navigation Company Act of 1871, dealt with in the case of
Hardy v. Hartman, supra. The case, the court further said,
was continued from term to term, and was finally submitted upon the
pleadings, certain exhibits and documentary evidence, and a decree
rendered for the company, confirming its title and cancelling that
of the defendants. The decree was not appealed from within the two
years allowed by law for taking appeals. In 1902, six years after
the rendition of the decree, plaintiffs filed their original bill.
Upon hearing, and being met by a plea of
res judicata,
they filed an amended bill, seeking to have the decree set aside
because their attorney was too ill to give the case proper
attention. This illness, the court, however, said, came to the
knowledge of plaintiffs three and one-half years before it was
sought to set aside the decree. "In this state of facts," the court
continued,
Page 228 U. S. 676
"there is no escape from the authority of
Brooks v.
Spann, 63 Miss. 198, and an attentive examination of that case
will show that it can make no difference whether the amended bill
is or is not technically a bill of review. Furthermore, we do not
think there is such diligence shown by appellants [plaintiffs in
error] in this case as would entitle them to vacate the former
decree, even though no statute of limitations barred the way. We
cannot see our way clear to go further than this and decide the
other important and interesting questions presented, since the
action of the court in upholding the plea of
res
adjudicata disposes of the case."
It will be observed that the trial court based its decision upon
the effect of the decree in favor of the Southern Pine Company as
an adjudication of the issues, and that the supreme court rested
its decision mainly upon the statute of limitations and laches.
A motion is made to dismiss on the ground that the case was
decided upon nonfederal questions sufficient to sustain the
judgment. The motion is resisted by plaintiffs. They contend that
the ground urged for its support does not apply because they
"constitutional pleaded and continually urged constitutional
immunities," and that the jurisdiction of this Court "cannot be
ousted by mere action of the state court in ignoring and refusing
to consider such constitutional questions," by assuming that its
decision on a point of local law is decisive of constitutional
questions, "particularly when the decision of the points of general
and local law necessarily include a consideration of the
constitutional immunities." An elaborate argument is submitted to
establish these contentions. The foundation of it is that federal
questions were essentially involved, and their decision was evaded
by the supreme court. These questions arose, it is contended, by
the impairment of the contract constituted by the Acts of 1871 and
1873, under which plaintiffs claim title, by the repeal of those
acts by the legislature of the state, and the
Page 228 U. S. 677
cancellation of the titles founded upon them in the hands of
bona fide transferees, and by executive action pursuant to
the repealing acts, granting the lands to others. Such action, it
is contended, "impaired the obligation of contracts by legislative
enactment, and deprived the plaintiffs of property without due
process of law."
The contention undoubtedly presents a federal question, and, on
account of it, it is said that we may review the local questions on
which, we have seen, the supreme court of the state based its
decision. It is, however, argued that
"if the pleadings or proceedings in the state court present or
disclose the assertion of a federal right or constitutional
immunity, this Court has jurisdiction to review the decision of the
state court even though that decision is based entirely upon the
questions of local law, and the decision of this Court may decide
those questions only."
This is, in effect, saying that, in all cases, if there be local
and federal questions, we may pass upon both and reverse the state
court upon both. And yet it is well established that, if there be
federal and nonfederal grounds and the latter be sufficient to
support the judgment of the state court, there can be no review by
this Court. And certainly the application of laches and the statute
of limitations does not present a federal question.
Gaar, Scott
& Co. v. Shannon, 223 U. S. 468;
Preston v. Chicago, 226 U. S. 447,
226 U. S.
450.
Plaintiffs, however, advance their contention with confidence,
and attempt to support it by a citation of cases. We need not
review them all. They do not impugn the doctrine that there may be
a nonfederal question decided broad enough to support the state
court's decision which we are without power to review, though there
may also be federal questions in the case. They only hold that the
sufficiency of the federal right set up cannot be evaded if
necessary to the determination of the case, and it may be admitted
that of such necessity this Court must in
Page 228 U. S. 678
each instance decide.
Huntington v. Attrill,
146 U. S. 657, is
an example, and also
Creswill v. Knights of Pythias,
225 U. S. 246, and
Kansas City Southern R. Co. v. Albers Commission Co.,
223 U. S. 573.
Chapman v. Goodnow, 123 U. S. 540, is
an illustration of the doctrine and its explanation. In
Creswill v. Knights of Pythias, it is decided that this
Court will review the findings of fact by a state court (a) where
the federal right was denied as a result of them and there is no
evidence to support them, a question of law hence resulting for
decision, and (b) where a conclusion of law as to a federal right
and finding of fact are so intermingled as to cause it to be
necessary, for the purpose of passing on the federal question, to
analyze and dissect the facts. To the extent necessary to do so,
the power exists as a necessary incident to a decision upon the
claim of denial of the federal right.
Neither condition exists in the case at bar. It comes, instead,
under the principle of
Chapman v. Goodnow. There, the
federal question alleged to have been involved in a former decree,
and to which due faith and credit under the Constitution of the
United States, it was insisted, should have been accorded, was held
to be superseded by a new promise. So in the case at bar. The
rights of plaintiffs based on the Act of 1871, under which the
patent to the Pearl River Improvement & Navigation Company was
issued, and the confirmatory Act of 1873, were determined in the
suit of the Southern Pine Company against certain of the
plaintiffs, and through whom title is deraigned. That decree stood
as an obstruction to the assertion of plaintiffs' title. They
attacked it in their amended bill and sought to have it reviewed
and set aside. The trial court denied the prayer of the bill and
held the decree
res judicata. The supreme court decided
that the statute of limitations of the state precluded the relief
sought, and for the decision cited
Brooks v. Spann, 63
Miss.198. The court further decided that "even though no
statute
Page 228 U. S. 679
of limitations barred the way," there was no "such diligence
shown by plaintiffs to entitle them to vacate the former
decree."
In
Brooks v. Spann, to avert the effects of a plea of
res judicata against the cause of action set up, an
amendment was made which asserted not only the original grounds of
recovery, but also averred that the suit, the decree of which was
so pleaded, was instituted and prosecuted without the consent,
knowledge, or procurement of the party against whom it was
rendered. A demurrer to the bill set up, among other grounds, the
statute of limitations of the state. Commenting on the decree, the
court said that it presented, if valid, an insurmountable obstacle
to the suit; it had to be attacked and nullified, or all
controversy over its subject matter was by it forever foreclosed.
Holding that the suit was barred by the statute of limitations, the
court said:
"There is no statute of limitations applicable, by its terms, to
the right to annul the decree, but, in the absence of such statute,
the court will adopt that one which is applicable to analogous
rights. By §§ 2680 and 2681 of the Code of 1880, the time in which
bills of review and appeals may be prosecuted is limited to two
years, and by § 2075 a like limitation is imposed upon the right to
surcharge and falsify the accounts of executors, administrators,
and guardians. It thus appears that, for errors of law or fact in
the classes of cases named in these statutes, a uniform limitation
of two years has been declared, and within such time, we think,
persons having notice of decrees affecting their rights which for
fraud or other sufficient reasons should be vacated by the courts
ought to take action, failing in which, relief should be denied.
Plymouth v. Russell Mills, 7 Allen 438;
Evans v.
Bacon, 99 Mass. 213;
Gordon v. Ross, 63 Ala.
363."
The supreme court, in the case at bar, accepted this decision as
determining the law of the state, and we cannot
Page 228 U. S. 680
review its judgment and give a different interpretation of that
law. That case and this have many features of resemblance. The suit
and decree pleaded in that case was a suit and decree in the state
court. The suit at bar was commenced in the state court, and the
decree pleaded and which is sought to be set aside was rendered in
the same court. It was subject, therefore, to the local procedure
and local laws. If we should assert a power of review in such case,
we could exercise like power in all cases where federal questions
are set up, and substitute our judgment for the judgment of the
state courts as to the state laws.
We may say in conclusion that there are many cases illustrating
the power of the states over the pleadings and practice in their
courts, and the right to prescribe within what time and upon what
conditions suits can be commenced and maintained.
Texas &
New Orleans R. Co. v. Miller, 221 U.
S. 408;
Brinkmeier v. Missouri Pacific Railway
Co., 224 U. S. 268.
The motion to dismiss must be, and it is, granted.
Dismissed.