Under
Atlantic Cost Line v. Riverside Mills,
219 U. S. 186, and
Galveston, Harrisburg &c. Ry. Co. v. Wallace,
223 U. S. 481,
which sustained the Carmack Amendment, stipulations in a bill of
lading for interstate shipment that no carrier shall be liable for
damages not occurring on its portion of the through route are void,
and the initial carrier is liable whether the through route
connections are designated by it or by the shipper.
111 Va. 813 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality of the Carmack
Amendment when applied to interstate shipments on through routes
where the connecting carriers are designated by the shipper, are
stated in the opinion.
Page 228 U. S. 594
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action brought by the defendant in error to recover
for damage to tobacco shipped by it on the railroad at Bedfore
City, Virginia, to Marshall, Texas. The plaintiff got a verdict and
judgment, which was affirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeals (111
Va. 813), the case having been taken there on the ground that the
Act of June 29, 1906, c. 3591, § 7, 34 Stat. 584, 595, amending §
20 of the Act to Regulate Commerce, of February 4, 1887, c. 104, 24
Stat. 379, 386, is unconstitutional. This section requires any
common carrier receiving property for transportation
Page 228 U. S. 595
from a point in one state to a point in another to issue a
receipt or bill of lading for the same; makes the receiving carrier
liable for loss caused by any common carrier
in transitu,
and provides that no contract shall exempt it from the liability
thus imposed.
The bill of lading stipulated that no carrier should be liable
for damages not occurring on its portion of the through route.
There was evidence that the tobacco was damaged after it left the
railroad company's hands, and the defendant asked an instruction
that, if the jury believe that it delivered the tobacco in good
order to the next carrier the verdict should be in its favor. This
instruction was refused, and the defendant excepted. There was
evidence also that the plaintiff chose the route for the tobacco,
being partly by sea, and a different one from that which the
railroad would have adopted, which would have been all rail. The
railroad had no through route or rate established with the line of
steamers by which the tobacco went. Instructions were asked and
refused, subject to exception, that the bill of lading controlled
and that the above statute, so far as it attempts to invalidate
limitations or liabilities like that quoted above, is void.
The Supreme Court of Appeals followed the ruling in
Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills, 219 U.
S. 186 (to which may be added
Galveston, Harrisburg
& San Antonio Ry. Co. v. Wallace, 223 U.
S. 481), as conclusive. The plaintiff in error contends
that these cases may be distinguished on the ground that, in both
of them, it was to be presumed that the carrier was a voluntary
party to a through route and rate, whereas here the stipulation
against liability beyond its line, and the fact that it had no
through route with the steamship company, exclude that presumption.
It argues that, as it was bound to accept goods destined beyond its
line for delivery to the next carrier, and was required by the
statute to give a through bill of lading, if, on such compulsory
acceptance,
Page 228 U. S. 596
it is made answerable for damages done by others, its property
is taken without due process of law. But in the former case, there
was the same stipulation in the bill of lading, and the supposed
through routes were only presumed. In the second case, the carrier
is spoken of as voluntarily accepting goods for a point beyond its
line, but there too there was the same attempt to limit liability,
and in the present case, the acceptance was voluntary in the same
degree as in that. There is no substantial distinction between the
earlier decisions and this.
Judgment affirmed.