The question whether a classification of milk vendors who
produce their milk outside of the city to which they send milk
deprives such producers of the equal protection of the law when
there are different rules for vendors who produce their milk within
the city limits has not been so far foreclosed by prior decisions
of this Court as to render its discussion unnecessary, and a motion
to dismiss is denied.
Whether rules provided to be made by a police ordinance were
properly promulgated and whether the officer promulgating them had
authority so to do are not federal questions.
Different situations of the objects regulated by a municipal
ordinance may require different regulations.
A classification in a municipal ordinance by which vendors of
milk drawn from cows outside the city are subjected to different
regulations from those to which vendors of milk drawn from cows
within the city is not, provided, as in this case, the regulations
are reasonable and proper, a denial of equal protection of the law
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, and so
held as to
the milk ordinance of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
The police power of the state is adequate to protect the people
against the sale of impure food such as milk.
An ordinance regulating the sale of food products must be
summarily enforced, and the destruction of impure food, such as
milk, is the only available and efficient penalty for its
violations, and does not deprive the owner of his property without
due process of law, and so
Page 228 U. S. 573
held as to the milk ordinance of Milwaukee, Wisconsin.
Lieberman v. Van De Carr, 199 U.
S. 552.
This court does not pass upon question before they have reached
a justiciable stage.
As a provision in a municipal ordinance holding health of
officers enforcing it harmless for the destruction of offending
property "if done in good faith" may be separable, this Court will
not determine whether it is an unconstitutional taking of property
without due process of law in an action in which it appears that
none of plaintiff's goods have been or could be destroyed before
the state court has construed the statute in that respect.
144 Wis. 371 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment,
are stated in the opinion.
Page 228 U. S. 576
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Error to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
sustaining the validity of an ordinance of the common council of
the City of Milwaukee, regulating the sale of milk.
*
Page 228 U. S. 577
The ordinance provides that no milk drawn from cows outside of
the city shall be brought into the city, contained in cans,
bottles, or packages, unless they be marked with a legible stamp,
tag, or impression bearing the name and address of the owner of the
cows, and unless such owner shall, within one year from the passage
of the ordinance, file in the office of the commissioner of health
a certificate of a duly licensed veterinary surgeon or other person
given authority by the state Live Stock Sanitary Board to make
Page 228 U. S. 578
tuberculin tests, stating that such cows have been found free
from tuberculosis or other contagious diseases. The certificate is
required to give a number which has been permanently attached to
each cow and a description sufficient for identification. The
certificate must be renewed annually, and must show that the cows
are free from tuberculosis or other contagious diseases.
A short time before the ordinance was to go into effect, this
suit was brought against the city and Dr. Bading, its health
commissioner, to restrain the enforcement of the ordinance. After a
hearing, judgment was entered dismissing the complaint, and the
judgment was affirmed by the supreme court of the state.
The plaintiff (we shall so call him) alleged that he brought the
suit for himself and all other producers of and dealers in pure,
wholesome milk, as it involved a question of common interest to
many persons. He alleged also the following: he is a farmer, living
about 17 miles from Milwaukee, and maintains a large dairy herd of
cattle, and is enjoying a profitable dairy business, shipping milk
into Milwaukee to certain retail milk dealers in the city. His herd
is healthy, so far as he is able to know or judge. He keeps his
stables wholesome and clean, and if his cows become sick or
affected in any way with any infectious or contagious disease, so
far as he is able to learn or discover by giving careful attention
to his herd in its feeding and care, he removes such animals
immediately. So far as he is able to discover, his herd is
absolutely free from disease, and the milk he offers for sale in
Milwaukee, or will offer for sale, is and will be, so far as he is
able to discover, absolutely pure and wholesome, and all that
proves to be impure and unwholesome upon being tested in the usual
and customary manner will be withdrawn from sale.
Bading, as Commissioner of Health of the City of Milwaukee,
threatens, on and after April 1, 1909, to execute
Page 228 U. S. 579
the ordinance, and confiscate, forfeit, and destroy all milk
shipped by plaintiff and other producers to be sold in Milwaukee
contrary to the requirements of the ordinance unless restrained,
and if he does so, irreparable injury will be caused plaintiff and
such other producers, and make their business of maintaining a
dairy absolutely unprofitable as well as impracticable.
The tuberculin test required by the ordinance is, as plaintiff
is informed and believes, wholly unreliable, untrustworthy, and
entirely worthless so far as being a guide or protection to the
public as to whether or not the cows tested by it are free from the
germs of tuberculosis or any other infectious disease.
The milk threatened to be confiscated, shipped to Milwaukee for
sale by plaintiff and other producers, when pure and wholesome is
not dangerous to public health because, perchance, the owners of
the cows producing the milk have not had the cows tested, or have
failed to secure the certificate of a veterinary surgeon or other
person, as required by the ordinance.
It is alleged that the Constitution of the state and the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States are
violated.
A motion to dismiss is made on the ground that the questions in
this case, under the decisions of this Court, are so far foreclosed
as to make their discussion unnecessary. The motion is
overruled.
The particular contention of plaintiff is that the ordinance
violates the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
States because it discriminates between milk drawn from cows
outside of Milwaukee and milk drawn from cows within the city.
Therefore the charge is that the ordinance does not affect all
persons alike. If we regard the territorial distinction merely,
that is, milk from cows outside and milk from cows within the city,
there is certainly no discrimination. All producers
Page 228 U. S. 580
outside of the city are treated alike. Plaintiff identifies
himself in interest with all of them, and sues for all of them. He
therefore seeks grounds of comparison other than the locality of
the dairies, and urges that the discrimination exists in the
difference between the tests to which cows kept outside of the city
are subject and the test to which cows within the city are
subject.
To sustain his contention, plaintiff in error cites an ordinance
of the city which provides that no cows or cattle shall be kept in
the city without permit from the commissioner of health, except at
places provided or established for purposes of slaughtering, and
that the stables and places where such animals may be shall be kept
at all times in a cleanly and wholesome condition and properly
ventilated, and that no person shall allow any animal to be therein
which is affected with any contagious and pestilential disease.
This ordinance was supplemented by various rules made by the
health commissioner in regard to cleanliness of the stabling of the
animals, keeping from them persons infected or who have been
exposed to disease, requiring applications for permits to be
accompanied by the certificate of the veterinary surgeon, showing
that the animals have been tested by the tuberculin test, and shown
by said test to be free from tuberculosis, and that they are not
affected with any infectious or contagious disease. If the animals
become subsequently infected, they are to be removed from the city,
or disposed of in the manner provided by law.
Three contentions are, notwithstanding, made: (1) the rules were
promulgated after this suit was begun; (2) the Commissioner had no
authority to make the rules; (3) they are radically different rules
from the rules as to cows kept outside of the city.
The third contention is the only one that involves a federal
question. The others involve local questions only,
Page 228 U. S. 581
and the supreme court of the state decided that the sale of milk
drawn from diseased cows is forbidden within the city; that the
health officer may remove a diseased animal to a place where it
will not spread infection, and that he may apply any known test to
determine whether the animal is afflicted with tuberculosis.
Inspection and care therefore can be applied to the animals within
the city, and it is applied also to the milk drawn from such
animals. It cannot be applied to animals kept outside of the city.
It can only be applied to the milk drawn from them. The court
noticed this difference and the difference in the regulations, made
necessary by it. "There are brought into Milwaukee," the court
said,
"from outside of the city, about 28,000 gallons of milk every
day, drawn from more than 10,000 cows. It would be practically
impossible to subject this quantity of milk to a microscopic
examination, or to subject it to what is called in the evidence the
centrifugal test, which would also require the use of a microscope,
although not to the same extent. Each animal within the city can be
subjected to an individual examination, a microscopic test of
samples of its milk, an inspection as to its condition of health,
and the tuberculin test applied directly under the orders of the
health Commissioner. This is a sufficient basis for separate
legislation relating to milk shipped into the city. There are other
regulations covering the sale of milk drawn from cows kept within
in the city."
We concur in the conclusion of the court. The different
situations of the animals require different regulations. Cows kept
outside of the city cannot be inspected by the health officers;
they can be inspected by a licensed veterinary surgeon, and a
certificate of the fact and the identity of the cows and the milk
authenticated as required by the ordinance. The requirements are
not unreasonable; they are properly adaptive to the conditions.
They are not discriminatory; they have proper relation to the
purpose
Page 228 U. S. 582
to be accomplished. That purpose and the necessity for it we
cannot question.
Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S.
11;
Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San Francisco,
216 U. S. 358;
Mutual Loan Co. v. Martell, 222 U.
S. 225;
Purity Extract & Tonic Co. v.
Lynch, 226 U. S. 192;
Crossman v. Lurman, 192 U. S. 189;
New Orleans Gas Light Co. v. Drainage Commission,
197 U. S. 453.
In
St. John v. New York, 201 U.
S. 633, we said that, in considering the classification
of a law, not only its final purpose must be regarded, but the
means of its administration. The case is quite in point. There,
regulations were attacked as discriminating between producing and
nonproducing vendors of milk with a view to securing its freedom
from adulteration, and adulterated milk was defined by law to be
that to which something was added or from which the cream was
removed or was naturally deficient, or taken from cows fed on
certain things or when in certain conditions. The regulations were
directed to the inspection of samples of milk from the entire herd.
A producing vendor could exempt himself from the penalties of the
law by proving that his milk was in the same condition as when it
left the herd. The nonproducer had not that privilege. St. John,
who was a nonproducing vendor, offered to prove such fact as to the
milk he offered for sale, but the proof was rejected and he was
convicted of violating the law. The conviction was sustained
against his attack of discrimination in the law. In that case, as
in this, a disregard of the regulations was sought to be justified
by the assertion of the purity of the milk offered for sale.
Plaintiff also contends that the provision of the ordinance
which requires milk that does not conform to its requirements to be
confiscated, forfeited, and immediately destroyed, takes his
property without due process of law.
To sustain his contention, he assumes the purity of his milk,
though it has not been tuberculin tested, and then
Page 228 U. S. 583
asserts that
"milk of this kind cannot be confiscated and destroyed simply
because it is not accompanied with a certificate of a veterinary
surgeon or of some person authorized by the Live Stock Sanitary
Board of the State of Wisconsin, as provided by said ordinance,
certifying that the tuberculin test has been applied."
But plaintiff overlooks the allegation of his complaint. His
allegation is not that his cows are free from infectious or
contagious disease, but only "so far as he is able to learn or
discover." And the allegation of his willingness to withdraw
tainted milk from sale depends upon the same contingent knowledge
or information. He overlooks also the findings of the courts
against the sufficiency of his information, and their demonstration
of the necessity of the tests established by the ordinance. But
even if the necessity of the tests be not demonstrated and the
beliefs which induced them may be disputed, they cannot be
pronounced illegal. In
Laurel Hill Cemetery v. San
Francisco, 216 U. S. 358, we
expressed the deference which must be accorded to local beliefs,
saying that we would not overthrow an exercise of police power
based on them to protect health merely because of our adherence to
a contrary belief. It will be observed, therefore, that the
contention of plaintiff is without foundation, and that the
ordinance is not an arbitrary and unreasonable deprivation of
property in a wholesome food, but a regulation having the purpose
of and found to be necessary for the protection of the public
health.
The police power of the state must be declared adequate to such
a desired purpose. It is a remedy made necessary by plaintiff's
acting in disregard of the other provisions of the ordinance --
that is, failing to have his cows tested and their milk
authenticated, as prescribed. The city was surely not required to
let the milk pass into consumption and spread its possible
contagion. This seems to be the alternative for which plaintiff
contends, and might occur. All milk produced outside of the city
had amounted, the
Page 228 U. S. 584
supreme court said, to 3,500 eight-gallon cans daily. Criminal
pains and penalties would not prevent the milk from going into
consumption. To stop it at the boundaries of the city would be its
practical destruction. To hold it there to await judicial
proceedings against it would be, as the supreme court said, to
leave it at the depots,
"reeking and rotting, a breeding place for pathogenic bacteria
and insects during the period necessary for notice to the owner and
resort to judicial proceedings."
We agree with the court that the destruction of the milk was the
only available and efficient penalty for the violation of the
ordinance. The case therefore comes within the principle of the
cases we have cited, and of
Lieberman v. Van De Carr,
199 U. S. 552. In
other words, as the milk might be prohibited from being sold at the
discretion of the Board of Health, and even prohibited from
entering the city (
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.
S. 137), a violation of the conditions upon which it
might be sold involves as a penalty its destruction. Plaintiff sets
up his beliefs and judgment against those of government, and
attempts to defeat its regulations, and thereby makes himself and
his property a violator of the law. In
North American Storage
Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306,
211 U. S. 315,
we said, by Mr. Justice Peckham, that food which is not fit to be
eaten,
"if kept for sale or in danger of being sold is itself a
nuisance, and a nuisance of the most dangerous kind, involving as
it does the health, if not the lives, of persons who may eat
it."
And it was decided that in such case the food could be seized
and destroyed, and that a provision for a hearing before seizure
and condemnation was not necessary. It was also decided that the
owner of the food had his remedy against the arbitrary action of
the health officers.
It is, however, said that plaintiff is precluded from such
remedy because the ordinance expressly provides that the health
officers "shall be held harmless in damages" for
Page 228 U. S. 585
their acts "if done in good faith." It may be that that portion
of the ordinance is separable if invalid. The supreme court of the
state said it was not necessary to pass upon the provision. What
view it might entertain it did not clearly express. In determining
the validity of the provision, the court said that it "must assume
that the ordinance is otherwise valid," and that it could not
presume that plaintiff would disregard the ordinance held by it "to
be valid, or place his property in a condition to invite its
destruction." "Self-inflicted damage," the court added, "is not
recoverable." The open judicial inquiry is in such case: "was the
damage self-inflicted?" In other words, as we understand the court,
a question upon that portion of the ordinance has not yet reached a
justiciable stage. There is certainly no destruction of the milk
impending. Indeed, according to the allegations of the complaint,
there is a threat only, to be executed if plaintiff should take
milk into the city, which, though he alleges he is anxious to do,
he may not do.
Judgment affirmed.
*
"No person shall bring into the City of Milwaukee for sale,
either by wagon, cart, train, or any other kind of vehicle, or
keep, have, or offer for sale or sell in said city, any milk or
cream drawn from cows outside of said city, contained in cans,
bottles, or packages, unless such cans, bottles, or other packages
containing such milk or cream for sale, shall be marked with a
legible stamp, tag, or impression, bearing the name of the owner of
such cows from which such milk was drawn, giving his place of
business, including the name of city, street, and number, or other
proper address, and unless the owner or owners of such cows shall,
within one year from the passage of this ordinance, file in the
office of Commissioner of health, a certificate of a duly licensed
veterinary surgeon, or of any other person given authority by the
state Live Stock Sanitary Board to make tuberculin tests, stating
that such cows have been tested with tuberculin and found free from
tuberculosis or other contagious diseases. Such certificate shall
give a number which has been permanently attached to each cow, and
a description sufficiently accurate for identification, stating the
date and place of such examination, and such certificate shall be
good for one year from date of its issuance. Such certificate,
however, must be renewed annually and filed in the office of the
Commissioner of health, and each such certificate shall show in
each case that the animals from which such milk was drawn are free
from tuberculosis or other contagious diseases. All milk and cream
from sick and diseased cows, or cows fed on refuse or slops from
distilleries, or vinegar factories, unless such refuse or slops be
mixed with other dry sanitary grain or food to a consistency of a
thick mush, or other than good wholesome food, or milk that is
dangerous, or that may affect or be detrimental to life or health,
or that has been adulterated, or is below the standard fixed by §
17 of this chapter, or which does not conform to all other
provisions of this chapter, shall, upon discovery thereof, be
confiscated, forfeited, and immediately destroyed by or under the
direction of the Commissioner of health, bacteriologist, on officer
detailed, who shall, if done in good faith, be held harmless in
damage therefor, in any suit or demand made."
Ordinance of March 30, 1908, § 24.