The Employers' Liability Act of 1908, as heretofore construed by
this Court, is intended only to compensate the surviving relatives
of a deceased employee for actual pecuniary loss sustained by his
death.
A recovery under the Employers' Liability Act of 1908 must be
limited to compensating those relatives for whom the administrator
sues as are shown to have sustained some pecuniary loss.
While the judgment for a claim under the Employers' Liability
Act of 1908 may be for a gross amount, the interest of each
individual must be measured by his or her industrial pecuniary
loss; this apportionment is for the jury to return.
As the judgment in this case must be reversed on a federal
question and sent back for new trial, this Court declines to
express an opinion on the other questions; upon another trial, the
facts may be different.
The facts, which involve the construction of the provisions of
the Employers' Liability Act of 1908 defining who are entitled to
compensation for damages thereunder, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE LURTON delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action was brought in a state court of Texas under the
Employers' Liability Act of April 22, 1908, 35 Stat. 65, c. 149, by
the administratrix of W. T. McGinnis, to recover
Page 228 U. S. 174
damages for his negligent death while in the service of the
plaintiff in error, and while engaged as engineer on an interstate
passenger train. The cause of the death was a derailment which
occurred while the train was passing over a switch. The defense of
the company was that the derailment was caused by malicious
tampering with the switch by a stranger, and that the company had
not been guilty of any negligence in either providing a safe track
and appliance or in the inspection or maintenance of the track and
appliances. There was a jury, verdict, and judgment for the
plaintiff, which, upon writ of error to the Court of Civil Appeals
for the Third Supreme Judicial District of the State of Texas, was
affirmed. A writ of error has been allowed to that court, it being
the highest court to which the case could be carried under the law
of the state.
It is assigned as error that the court misconstrued the
character of the liability imposed by the act under which the suit
was brought by a ruling that there might be a judgment for the
benefit of one of the surviving children, although there was
neither allegation nor evidence that that surviving child was
either dependent upon, or had any reasonable ground for expecting,
any pecuniary benefit from a continuance of the decedent's
life.
The decedent left a widow and four children, and the suit was
brought by the widow, as administratrix, for the benefit of herself
and the four children named in the petition. One of the surviving
children was Mrs. Nellie Saunders, a married woman, residing with
and maintained by her husband. There was neither allegation nor
evidence that Mrs. Saunders was in any way dependent upon the
decedent, nor that she had any reasonable expectation of any
pecuniary benefit as a result of a continuation of his life. The
court was requested to instruct the jury that it could not find any
damage in favor of Mrs. Saunders, but this it declined to do.
Page 228 U. S. 175
The jury was instructed, if they found for the plaintiff, to
return a verdict for such a sum as would justly compensate the
persons for whose benefit the suit was brought for such pecuniary
benefits as they might believe from the evidence the beneficiaries
had a reasonable expectation of receiving from the decedent if his
death had not been so occasioned. They were further told to find a
round sum in favor of the plaintiff, and then apportion that sum
among all the persons for whom the suit had been brought, stating
in their verdict, "how much, if anything, you find for each of said
persons." The jury returned a verdict for $15,000, and apportioned
it one-half to the widow and the remainder equally among the four
children, including Mrs. Saunders.
The court of civil appeals upheld this ruling, saying that the
federal
"statute expressly authorized the suit to be brought by the
personal representative for the benefit of the surviving wife and
children of the deceased, irrespective of whether they were
dependent upon him, or had the right to expect any pecuniary
assistance from him."
This construction of the character of the statutory liability
imposed by the act of Congress was erroneous. In a series of cases
lately decided by this Court, the act in this aspect has been
construed as intended only to compensate the surviving relatives of
such a deceased employee for the actual pecuniary loss resulting to
the particular person or persons for whose benefit an action is
given. The recovery must therefore be limited to compensating those
relatives for whose benefit the administrator sues as are shown to
have sustained some pecuniary loss.
Michigan Central Railroad
v. Vreeland, 227 U. S. 59;
American Railroad v. Didricksen, 227 U.
S. 145. In the last-cited case, speaking of the
Employers' Liability Act, we said:
"The cause of action which was created in behalf of the injured
employee did not survive his death nor pass to his representatives.
But the act, in case of the death of
Page 228 U. S. 176
such an employee from his injury, creates a new and distinct
right of action for the benefit of the dependent relatives named in
the statute. The damages recoverable are limited to such loss as
results to them because they have been deprived of a reasonable
expectation of pecuniary benefits by the wrongful death of the
injured employee. The damage is limited strictly to the financial
loss thus sustained."
The statutory action of an administrator is not for the equal
benefit of each of the surviving relatives for whose benefit the
suit is brought. Though the judgment may be for a gross amount, the
interest of each beneficiary must be measured by his or her
individual pecuniary loss. That apportionment is for the jury to
return. This will, of course, exclude any recovery in behalf of
such as show no pecuniary loss.
It has also been assigned as error that the defense of assumed
risk was, in legal effect, denied, because the court overruled a
motion to instruct a verdict for the defendant. The defense of
assumed risk was submitted to the jury under a full and fair
general charge. In addition, a number of special requests asked by
the railroad company in respect to several aspects of the facts
were given. The contention is that, upon all of the evidence in the
case, there was no sufficient evidence of any negligence for which
the company was chargeable, in law, and that, in such case, the
death of the decedent must have been due to some assumed risk. We
pass this by.
The judgment must be reversed upon the federal question already
considered. Upon another trial, the facts may be altogether
different, and we decline to express any opinion as to their legal
effect.
Murdock v.
Memphis, 20 Wall. 590.
For the cause indicated, the judgment will be reversed and the
case remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.