The rule commonly accepted in this country from the English
cases is that a ticket to a place of entertainment for a specified
period does not create a right
in rem.
A contract binds the person of the maker, but does not create an
interest in the property it concerns unless it also operates as a
conveyance; a ticket of admission cannot have such effect, as it is
not under seal and by common understanding it does not purport to
have that effect.
Specific performance of rights claimed under a mere ticket of
admission to property cannot be enforced by self-help; the holder
refused admission must sue for the breach.
While there might be an irrevocable right of entry under a
contract incidental to a right of property in land or in goods
thereon, where the contract stands by itself, it must be a
conveyance or a mere revocable license.
35 App.D.C. 82 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the rights of the purchaser of a ticket
to a racetrack, and liability for his ejection therefrom, are
stated in the opinion.
Page 227 U. S. 635
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This is an action of trespass for forcibly preventing the
plaintiff from entering the Bennings Race Track in this District
after he had bought a ticket of admission, and for
Page 227 U. S. 636
doing the same thing, or turning him out, on the following day,
just after he had dropped his ticket into the box. There was also a
count charging that the defendants conspired to destroy the
plaintiff's reputation, and that they excluded him on the charge of
having "doped" or drugged a horse entered by him for a race a few
days before, in pursuance of such conspiracy. But, as no evidence
of a conspiracy was introduced, and as no more force was used than
was necessary to prevent the plaintiff from entering upon the
racetrack, the argument hardly went beyond an attempt to overthrow
the rule commonly accepted in this country from the English cases,
and adopted below, that such tickets do not create a right
in
rem. 35 App.D.C. 82.
Wood v. Leadbitter, 13 M. &
W. 838;
McCrea v. Marsh, 12 Gray 211;
Johnson v.
Wilkinson, 139 Mass. 3;
Horney v. Nixon, 213 Pa. 20;
Meisner v. Detroit, Belle Isle & Windsor Ferry Co.,
154 Mich. 545;
W. W. V. Co. v. Black, 113 Va. 728;
Shubert v. Nixon Amusement Co., 83 N.J.L. 101;
Taylor
v. Cohn, 47 Or. 538, 540;
People v. Flynn, 114
App.Div. 578.
We see no reason for declining to follow the commonly accepted
rule. The fact that the purchase of the ticket made a contract is
not enough. A contract binds the person of the maker, but does not
create an interest in the property that it may concern unless it
also operates as a conveyance. The ticket was not a conveyance of
an interest in the racetrack, not only because it was not under
seal, but because, by common understanding, it did not purport to
have that effect. There would be obvious inconveniences if it were
construed otherwise. But if it did not create such an interest --
that is to say, a right
in rem, valid against the
landowner and third persons -- the holder had no right to enforce
specific performance by self-help. His only right was to sue upon
the contract for the breach. It is true that, if the contract were
incidental to a
Page 227 U. S. 637
right of property either in the land or in goods upon the land,
there might be an irrevocable right of entry; but when the contract
stands by itself, it must be either a conveyance or a license,
subject to be revoked.
Judgment affirmed.
