The jurisdiction of this Court on appeal from the Supreme Court
of Porto Rico is confined to determining whether the facts found by
that court support the judgment, and whether there was material and
prejudicial error in the admission or rejection of evidence
manifested by exceptions duly certified.
In the absence of findings on a special verdict, there is
nothing for this Court to review except rulings on evidence, and in
absence of error in those rulings, the judgment must be
affirmed.
When the judgment record itself discloses that the opinion of
one of the judges deciding the case was made part of the judgment,
this Court may accept the statement of fact therein contained in
lieu of more formal findings.
A finding by the appellate court that the fundamental fact of
plaintiff's interest in the property sued for has not been proven
is equivalent to a negative finding upon a fact essential to
maintain the suit, and supports a judgment of dismissal by the
trial court.
16 P.R. 15 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the jurisdiction of this Court of
appeals from the Supreme Court of Porto Rico and whether the facts
found support the judgment in a suit to determine title to real
estate in Porto Rico, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE PITNEY delivered the opinion of the Court.
This action was brought in the District Court for the Judicial
District of Ponce, by the appellant, against the respondent, for
the purpose of establishing her ownership of an undivided interest
in certain real property in Ponce
Page 227 U. S. 585
of which the defendant was in possession, and for setting aside
the registration of possession and of ownership of the same
property in the name of the defendant, alleged to have been
fraudulently procured by him, and to stand as a bar, preventing the
registration of the plaintiff's alleged undivided interest.
The action was fully tried before the district court without a
jury, upon the issues raised by the plaintiff's amended complaint
and the defendant's answer thereto, and the following decision was
rendered:
"Ponce, P.R.,
April 26th, 1909"
"The question involved in this suit is to determine the rights
of Dona Marcelina Rosaly in a property which she, as a member of a
mercantile partnership, gave in lease to the defendant in the year
1880. The other members of said partnership were relatives of the
plaintiff herein. It seems that, in the year 1886 and following
years, the defendant bought the respective interests of the several
partners, and it seems also that he did not buy the interest
belonging to Dona Marcelina, for the reason that she had lost her
rights to an interest in the property belonging to said mercantile
partnership. More properly speaking, the defendant acquired all the
interests belonging to all such persons as he believed to have an
interest in the property referred to. Twenty-three years have
elapsed since the year 1886. The plaintiff lacks absolutely any
means to show what was her interest in the properties of the
partnership, and whether or not she had any interest whatever in
the year 1886. There is absolute lack of evidence on the part of
the plaintiff. This Court does not look at old claims with favor,
specially when the plaintiff's delay in bringing the action is not
explained. Counsel for both parties have entered into a lengthy
argument upon the construction of the mortgage law and other
points. But the court does not make any decision with regard to
Page 227 U. S. 5686
such questions at the present time. The most important matter is
the absolute want of evidence on which to base a judgment in favor
of the plaintiff. Therefore the action is dismissed, with costs
against the plaintiff."
"MARTIN E. GILL"
"
District Judge"
Judgment having been rendered accordingly, the plaintiff
appealed to the Supreme Court of Porto Rico. Thereafter her
attorneys filed in the district court what purports to be a full
history of the proceedings at the trial. It is entitled, "statement
of Facts and Bill of Exceptions," and is certified by Hon. Charles
E. Foote (who succeeded Judge Gill as judge of the district court)
to contain a
"true and accurate statement of all the evidence introduced,
exceptions taken, and proceedings had, during the trial of this
cause in the district court of Ponce."
The Supreme Court of Porto Rico, affirmed the judgment, Mr.
Justice del Toro delivering the opinion (16 P.R. 156), in which,
after stating the issues raised by the pleadings, he reviews the
evidence and states the conclusions of the court thereon as
follows:
"The first question to be considered and decided is the
following: did the plaintiff prove her title? She alleged, as shown
by the transcript made above, that she was, and has always been,
the owner, in full ownership, of an undivided interest, equivalent
to the sum of $6,253.67, in the total value of $27,443.67, which
value was given to the estate left at the death of Don Mateo and
Don Luis Rabainne in the partition proceedings of the said estate.
The defendant denied said allegation. And the evidence shows the
following:"
"It is true that, from the testamentary proceedings of Don Mateo
and Don Luis Rabainne, executed before a notary public and recorded
in a notarial protocol on the 28th of January, 1870, it appears
that the said Messrs.
Page 227 U. S. 587
Rabainne died, respectively, on the 23rd of April, 1868, and on
the 8th of April, 1869; that the former left as heirs his widow,
Dona Bernardina Franco, and his children, Luis, represented by his
daughter Luisa Rabainne y Rosaly; Ramona, represented by her
children, Jacobo, Ofelia, and Herminia Lopez y Rabainne; Josefa,
and Hortensia, and the latter, his said daughter Luisa, and his
widow, the plaintiff, Marcelina Rosaly; that the properties left at
their deaths were constituted by whatever interest might belong to
them in the partnership M. Rabainne e Hijos; that such partnership
was liquidated by a deed executed on the 19th of January, 1870, by
the heirs and representatives of both persons deceased; that among
the properties belonging to said partnership there were the lot and
building involved in this suit, which were valued at $9,108, and
steam engines, etc., valued at $18,335.67, both items aggregating
$27,443.67, of which $18,000 belonged to the estate of Don Mateo,
and $9,443.67 to that of Don Luis, and that the inheritance left by
Don Luis was adjudicated as follows: to his widow, Dona Marcelina
Rosaly, the plaintiff, $6,253.67, in partial payment of the
properties brought by her into her marriage, which amounted to
$19,030.39, and of one-half of the conjugal property belonging to
her, and to his daughter Luisa, $3,190."
"But the evidence shows that, although the above is true, the
plaintiff contributed all the capital adjudicated to her, to the
partnership which, under the firm M. Rabainne e Hijos, was
constituted by her, together with Dona Bernardina Franco, widow of
Rabainne, and Don Jobo Lopez, by a public deed executed on the 8th
of February, 1870. Such partnership which was to be engaged in the
same line of business followed by the extinguished partnership of
M. Rabainne e Hijo, constituted by Don Mateo and Don Luis, was
extended by public deeds executed on the 22nd of April 1873, and
the 7th of July, 1875, and no
Page 227 U. S. 588
evidence has been introduced tending to show that the same has
been duly and finally liquidated, there being several circumstances
showing that said partnership continued, although, perhaps in an
irregular manner, for several years longer."
"The plaintiff claims as owner of a certain co ownership, and
the evidence shows that she contributed said co ownership to a
mercantile partnership, to the fate of which said co ownership was
subject from that time. And the evidence shows further that a
balance of said partnership having been made on the 30th of
November, 1875, it appeared that the contribution of the plaintiff
was reduced to $2,478.52, such as is shown by the deed containing
the partition proceedings of the properties left at the death of
Dona Bernardina Franco, widow of Rabainne, executed before a notary
public, on the 6th of May, 1876, by the plaintiff herself and other
persons, and that there are circumstances showing that, years
afterwards, the plaintiff was debtor of the partnership, as shown
apparently by the books of the latter."
"Such being the case, it follows that the first fact, which is
the fundamental fact of the complaint filed in this case, has not
been proven, and, consequently, that the judgment rendered by the
district court is just and proper."
The numerous exceptions to the rulings of the trial court upon
matters of evidence were then reviewed, with the result of
determining that there was no legal error therein.
The resulting judgment was expressed as follows:
"SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO, March 11th 1910"
"This Court has carefully examined the transcript of record
filed in this case, and considered the briefs and arguments of
counsel for both sides, and for the reasons given in the opinion
filed herewith, the court decides to dismiss the appeal and to
affirm the judgment appealed
Page 227 U. S. 589
from, rendered by the district court of Ponce on the 26th of
April, 1909."
An appeal having been taken to this Court, the following order
was made:
"SAN JUAN, PORTO RICO,
19th of May, 1910"
"As the statement of facts and bill of exceptions which was
approved by the Hon. Charles E. Foote, District Judge for the
Judicial District of Ponce, on the 15th of July, 1909, and which
forms a part of the record on the appeal taken in the
above-entitled case, was the statement of facts and bill of
exceptions considered and acted upon by this court in the
discussion and decision of said appeal, it is hereby ordered that
the same be used as statement of facts and bill of exceptions in
this case. in the appeal taken by the plaintiff herein to the
Supreme Court of the United States from the judgment rendered by
the Supreme Court of Porto Rico."
"JOSE C. HERNANDEZ"
"
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Porto Rico"
The cause has been argued here very much at large, and as if it
were the duty of this Court to review the evidence and reach its
own conclusions of fact therefrom. This is a misapprehension of the
proper function of this Court in the premises. At the time the
appeal was taken and the record made up, § 35 of the Act of April
12, 1900, c. 191, known as the Foraker Act, was in force (31 Stat.
77, 85, since superseded by § 244 of the Judicial Code of March 3,
1911, 36 Stat. 1157, c. 231), by which it was enacted
"that writs of error and appeals from the final decisions of the
Supreme Court of Porto Rico and the district court of the United
States shall be allowed and may be taken to the Supreme Court of
the United States in the same manner and under the same
Page 227 U. S. 590
regulations and in the same cases as from the supreme courts of
the territories of the United States,"
etc. Writs of error and appeals from the supreme courts of the
territories were regulated by Act of April 7, 1874, c. 80, § 2, 18
Stat. 27, 28, by which it was provided:
"That on appeal, instead of the evidence at large, a statement
of the facts of the case in the nature of a special verdict, and
also the rulings of the court on the admission or rejection of
evidence when excepted to, shall be made and certified by the court
below, and transmitted to the Supreme Court, together with the
transcript of the proceedings and judgment or decree."
Our jurisdiction therefore is confined to determining whether
the facts found by the Supreme Court of Porto Rico support its
judgment, and whether there was material and prejudicial error in
the admission or rejection of evidence, manifested by exceptions
duly certified.
Gonzales v. Buist, 224 U.
S. 126,
224 U. S. 130;
Nielsen v. Steinfeld, 224 U. S. 534,
224 U. S. 538;
Eagle Mining Co. v. Hamilton, 218 U.
S. 513,
218 U. S. 515;
Stringfellow v. Cain, 99 U. S. 610,
99 U. S. 613;
Neslin v. Wells, Fargo & Co., 428
U. S. 428,
104 U. S. 429;
Haws v. Victoria Copper Mining Co., 160 U.
S. 303,
160 U. S. 313;
Harrison v. Perea, 168 U. S. 311,
168 U. S. 323;
Young v. Amy, 171 U. S. 179,
171 U. S.
183.
An examination of the "statement of facts and bill of
exceptions" shows that it contains nothing that could by any
stretch of construction be deemed a finding of facts in the nature
of a special verdict. In the absence of such findings, there is
nothing for us to review except the rulings upon evidence, and, in
the absence of error in those rulings, the judgment must be
affirmed.
Thompson v. Ferry, 180 U.
S. 484;
Gonzales v. Buist, supra; Eagle Mining Co.
v. Hamilton, supra.
But since the judgment record itself discloses that the opinion
delivered by Mr. Justice del Toro was made a part of the judgment,
we may, for present purposes,
Page 227 U. S. 591
accept the statement of facts contained in that opinion in lieu
of more formal findings.
The essential facts, as recited in the opinion, may be
summarized as follows: that, prior to the year 1868, Don Mateo
Rabainne and his son, Don Luis Rabainne, as partners in the name of
M. Rabainne e Hijos, were the owners of the property in question;
that Don Mateo died April 23, 1868, and Don Luis died April 8,
1869; that the partnership was liquidated by deed executed January
29, 1870, by the heirs and representatives of the deceased
partners; that in the liquidation, a certain part of the interest
of Don Luis was found to belong to his widow, the present plaintiff
and appellant; that she, together with the widow of Don Mateo, and
with Don Jobo Lopez, son-in-law of the latter, entered into a new
partnership to continue the former business, under the firm name of
M. Rabainne e Hijos, to which partnership the plaintiff contributed
all her interest in the property in question; that the plaintiff's
interest in the firm was subsequently reduced by withdrawals of
capital, and finally extinguished, so that she became a debtor of
the partnership. Therefore the supreme court held that the
fundamental fact of the plaintiff's interest in the property at the
time of her action against the defendant had not been proven. This
is equivalent to a negative finding upon a fact essential to the
maintenance of her suit, and it, of course, supports the judgment
affirming the judgment of the district court that dismissed the
action.
There remains only the question whether prejudicial error was
committed by the trial court respecting the admission or exclusion
of evidence. There are numerous exceptions, with assignments of
error based thereon. They have been examined without finding
substantial error in the rulings complained of. They do not merit
detailed discussion here.
Judgment affirmed.