Where the jurisdiction is coextensive with the district,
multiplication of places at which courts may be held or mere
creation of divisions does not nullify it.
Barrett v. United
States, 169 U. S. 231.
Jurors summoned by the district judge in Alaska before the Act
of March 3, 1909, creating a Fourth Division, became effective, to
attend the first term of the court in that division when the act
did become effective,
held properly summoned, as the act
did not create a new tribunal or revoke the power of the district
judges to summon jurors to attend at any session of the court.
It is the duty of the judge to determine whether nonexperts are
qualified to express an opinion as to sanity of the accused, and in
this case there does not appear to have been any abuse of
discretion.
An instruction that, while the burden of proof is on defendant
to establish the fact of insanity, the jury cannot convict if they
had reasonable doubt as to his sanity,
held proper and
sufficient.
Davis v. United States, 160 U.
S. 469.
The court properly instructed the jury as to the definition of
insanity and as to what relieves defendant from criminal
responsibility by giving the charge approved in
Davis v. United
States, 165 U. S. 373.
The facts, which involve the construction of certain provision
of the Alaska Code of 1900 and the validity of a trial and
conviction for murder in Alaska, are stated in the opinion.
Page 227 U. S. 541
MR. JUSTICE LAMAR delivered the opinion of the Court.
Congress, by the Act of June 6, 1900 (31 Stat. 322, c. 786),
established a district court for Alaska, with general civil and
criminal jurisdiction. There were three judges who, though given
jurisdiction over the entire district, were required to reside in
that one of the three divisions to which they were respectively
assigned by the President. On December 29, 1908, the grand jury of
the third division indicted Matheson for murder. On the next day,
he was arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty. Before his case
was called for trial, Congress passed the Act of March 3, 1909 (35
Stat. 839, c. 269), providing for a fourth division, to be held at
Fairbanks by the judge of the former third division. This act was
not to become effective until July 1, 1909, but, in preparation for
the first term convened thereunder, the district judge assigned to
the fourth division passed an order under which jurors were drawn
and summoned in June to attend at the session of court to be held
in July at Fairbanks.
On July 13, during this term, the defendant applied for and
obtained an order to have his witnesses subpoenaed at the expense
of the government. His case was called for trial in September. He
announced ready, and without making any question as to the
qualification of the jurors or the method and regularity of their
selection, objected to the entire panel on the ground that the
judge of the third division was without jurisdiction to issue the
call at a time when the fourth division had not come into
existence. The objection was overruled. Several of those on the
jury which tried his case were taken from this panel. After a
verdict of guilty and sentence to imprisonment for life, the case
was brought here by writ of
Page 227 U. S. 542
error in which complaint is made of the action of the judge in
allowing a jury to be selected from a panel drawn in June, before
the act creating the fourth division became effective.
The Alaskan Code (31 Stat. 322, ยงยง 4 & 5, c. 786) created
one district court with three judges having general civil and
criminal jurisdiction over the entire district, and authority to
hold regular terms at Juneau, St. Michael's, and Eagle City, and
special terms at such times and places in the district as they or
any of them might deem expedient. The Act of March 3, 1909 (35
Stat. 839, c. 269), in providing for a fourth division, did not
contemplate an interruption of the functions of the judge
throughout the entire district, nor did it destroy the unity of the
district court. But, while preserving unimpaired the power of the
court and judges, it fixed a new place at which the same district
court must be held. It did not create a new tribunal, with new
officers, to be organized in a new political division, but it
continued the jurisdiction and power of the judge to be exercised
anywhere in Alaska. It did not revoke his authority to summon
jurors to attend at any session of the district court, whether
permitted to be held at Fairbanks, under the Act of 1900, or
required there to be held after July 1, under the Act of 1909. The
principle involved is, in some of its aspects, like that considered
in
Rosencrans v. United States, 165 U.
S. 257, where it was said that "jurisdiction is
coextensive with district, and no mere multiplication of places at
which courts are to be held or mere creation of division nullifies
it."
Barrett v. United States, 169
U. S. 219;
Bird v. United States, 187 U.
S. 118. There was no error in overruling the objection
made by the defendant to the panel.
There are 37 assignments of error, none of which presents a
ground requiring a reversal. One relates to the giving of a charge
requested by the defendant; others to
Page 227 U. S. 543
rulings as to which no exception was taken at the time, or as to
matters not set out in the assignments, and requiring a search
through the record to determine the subject of the complaint;
others, to the exclusion of testimony as to facts subsequently
proved.
Those which relate to the refusal of the court to permit
nonexperts to express the opinion that the defendant was insane,
until after they had given facts on which it was based, are without
merit. It was the duty of the judge to determine whether such
witnesses had qualified themselves to give opinion evidence, and
there was no abuse of the court's discretion in passing on these
matters (
Turner v. American Security & Trust Co.,
213 U. S.
260), but his rulings were favorable to the
defendant.
It would serve no useful purpose to discuss the ruling as to the
burden of proof and the definitions of insanity, since they present
no new propositions. In both these matters, the court followed
cases in which those subjects have been fully treated. He
instructed the jury that, while the burden of proof was upon the
defendant to establish the fact that he was insane at the time of
the killing, yet they could not convict if they had a reasonable
doubt as to his sanity.
Davis v. United States,
160 U. S. 469. His
definition of insanity and as to what would relieve the defendant
of criminal responsibility was in accord with the principle
declared in
Davis v. United States, 165
U. S. 378; in fact, the court gave the exact charge
there held to be correct. The case was one peculiarly for the jury,
and, finding no error in matter of law, the judgment must be
Affirmed.