Hoke v. United States, ante, p.
227 U. S. 308,
followed to effect that the White Slave Traffic Act of June 25,
1910, is constitutional.
A variance in names cannot prejudice defendant if the allegation
in the indictment and the proof so correspond that the defendant is
informed of the charge and protected against another prosecution
for the same offense.
Variances as to the name of the woman transported or in the
place where the tickets were procured or as to the number
transported, between the indictment and proof of offense under the
White Slave Traffic Act
held not to have prejudiced the
defendants, and not to be reversible error.
Instructions to the jury that there is testimony tending to
corroborate the testimony of a witness charged with being an
accomplice and that it is for the jury to consider the force and
value of the testimony and the weight to be given to it is
sufficient to properly leave the matter with the jury.
194 F. 630 affirmed.
Page 227 U. S. 334
The facts, which involve the constitutionality and construction
of the White Slave Act and the validity of an indictment and
conviction thereunder, are stated in the opinion.
Page 227 U. S. 337
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Plaintiff in error and petitioner was indicted in the District
Court for the Southern District of Ohio for the violation of the
Act of June 25, 1910. She filed a motion to quash and a demurrer to
the indictment, which were overruled, and upon a plea of not guilty
she was tried, convicted, and sentenced to eleven months'
imprisonment in the county jail in Miami County, Ohio, and to pay
the costs of the prosecution.
She made motions for a new trial and in arrest of judgment,
which were overruled, and she then prosecuted error to the circuit
court of appeals, where the judgment against her was affirmed. 194
F. 630.
The demurrer and the motion in arrest of judgment raised the
question of the constitutionality of the statute, and the decision
of the circuit court of appeals sustaining the ruling of the
district court, is assigned as error. The constitutionality of the
law was decided in No. 381
Hoke v. United States, ante, p.
227 U. S. 308, and
the reasons there given need not be repeated.
Rulings of the district court and the decision of the circuit
court of appeals upon them are also assigned as error.
Page 227 U. S. 338
(1) Defendant was indicted for having caused the transportation
of Opal Clarke, and, it is said, the testimony showed that her
correct name was Jeanette, but that she had gone by the names of
Opal and Nellie, her real name, however, being Jeanette Laplante. A
variance is hence asserted between the allegation and the proof.
The court of appeals rightly disposed of the contention. As the
court said, the essential thing in the requirement of
correspondence between the allegation of the name of the woman
transported and the proof is that the record be in such shape as to
inform the defendant of the charge against her and to protect her
against another prosecution for the same offense. The record is
sufficient for both purposes. As the court of appeals said:
"This leaves no possible ground for prejudice resulting from the
double variance between the name used in the indictment and the
name known to the respondent and the real name."
(2) The defendant, at the conclusion of the testimony, moved the
court to instruct the jury to return a verdict of not guilty on the
second count of the indictment for the reason that the indictment
alleged that the tickets were procured at Chicago, Illinois,
whereas the testimony showed that they were procured in Cincinnati,
Ohio. The circuit court of appeals did not pass on that assignment.
It was either not made or it was considered to have no substantial
support by the testimony. The only testimony referred to is that
the tickets were purchased in Cincinnati and sent to the depot at
Chicago, where the women transported got them and used them for
transportation from there. It is not possible to imagine that the
variance caused any prejudice, and the assignment may be passed
without further comment.
(3) Another variance is asserted in that the indictment charged
the transportation of two women and the proof established the
transportation of one. This again is a contention which has more of
technicality than substance.
Page 227 U. S. 339
How what the defendant did not do can be considered material
description of what she did do is not easy to imagine.
(4) There are errors assigned on instructions requested and
instructions refused. The contention of defendant apparently is
that both women charged to have been transported should have been
objects of her intention and purpose. That aspect of the contention
we have disposed of. So far as the instructions refused directed
the attention of the jury to the intent and purpose alleged, they
were covered by the general charge of the court.
(5) The basis of this contention is that Opal Clarke was the
accomplice of defendant as to Ella Parks, and that hence the court
erred in its instructions to the jury in regard to the extent of
the corroboration Opal Clarke's testimony had received.
The instruction complained of submitted to the jury the fact,
and warned against a conviction upon the uncorroborated testimony
of an accomplice, and said:
"Necessarily, if you find that she was an accomplice with
respect to these charges or any of them, you will then necessarily
have to inquire into the facts as to whether or not there is
corroborating testimony. There is evidence tending to corroborate
her testimony, and it is for you to consider its force and value
and the weight to give to it."
The contention is that this was error,
"as the court instructed the jury that there was corroborating
evidence, when the court should have charged the jury that it was
for them to ascertain from the testimony whether or not there was
corroborating testimony."
The objection is hypercritical. The court did not instruct the
jury that there was corroborating testimony, but testimony of that
tendency, and added that the force and weight of its corroborating
power was for the jury to determine.
The record presents no error, and the judgment is
Affirmed.