The government of Porto Rico cannot be sued without its
consent.
The government of Porto Rico, as established by the Organic Act,
with some possible exceptions, comes within the general rule
exempting a government sovereign in its attributes.
That government of Porto Rico, as established by the Organic Act
of April 12, 1900, is a strong likeness of that established for
Hawaii which has immunity from suit.
Kawananakoa v.
Polyblank, 205 U. S. 349.
The provision in § 7 of the Organic Act of Porto Rico that the
people of Porto Rico shall have power to sue and be sued is not to
be construed as destroying the grant of sovereignty given by the
act itself.
Like words may have one significance in one context and a
different signification in another.
In construing an organic act of a territory, this Court will
consider that Congress intended to create a government conforming
to the American system of divided powers -- legislative, executive
and judicial -- and did not intend to give to any one branch of
that government power by which the government itself so created
could be destroyed.
The words "to sue and be sued" as used in § 7 of the Organic Act
of Porto Rico, when construed in connection with the grant of
governmental powers therein contained, amount only to a recognition
of a liability to be sued in case of consent duly given.
16 P.R. 481 reversed.
Page 227 U. S. 271
The facts, which involve the construction of § 7 of the Organic
Act of Porto Rico and whether the government of that Island can be
sued without its consent, are stated in the opinion.
Page 227 U. S. 273
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellee was plaintiff in the first instance. The defendants
were the People of Porto Rico (the government of the Island) and
several named individuals. Recovery was sought of property in
possession of the defendants, and for rents and profits. The
individual defendants defaulted. The government defended, and from
a judgment ousting it from the property, and for rents and profits,
appealed to the supreme court. The court, giving its reasons for
affirmance, thus stated the only issue presented and which was
decided:
"The appeal was taken by the People of Porto Rico, the only
ground alleged in support thereof in this Supreme Court being that,
inasmuch as the People of Porto Rico cannot be sued without its
consent, and it appears that such consent had not been given in the
present case, the district court acted without jurisdiction,
wherefore the judgment rendered by it was null and void."
The court did not overlook the importance of the question, as is
shown by its careful and perspicuous opinion. A member of the court
fully stated his reasons for dissenting. On this appeal, taken by
the People of Porto Rico, the case having been tried without a
jury, the question for decision is narrower than would seem to be
the case, regarding alone the general terms in which the question
is mentioned in the passage previously quoted from the opinion of
the court below.
It is not open to controversy that, aside from the existence of
some exception, the government which the organic act established in
Porto Rico is of such nature as to come within the general rule
exempting a government sovereign in its attributes from being sued
without its consent. In the first place, this is true because, in a
general sense, so far as concerns the framework of the Porto Rican
government and the legislative, judicial, and executive authority
with which it is endowed, there is, if not a complete
Page 227 U. S. 274
identity at least, in all essential matters, a strong likeness
to the powers usually given to organized territories, and,
moreover, a striking similarity to the organic act of the Hawaiian
Islands (act of April 30, 1900, c. 339, §§ 6, 55, 31 Stat. 141, 142
and 150). But, as the incorporated territories have always been
held to possess an immunity from suit, and as it has been,
moreover, settled that the government created for Hawaii is of such
a character as to give it immunity from suit without its consent,
it follows that this is also the case as to Porto Rico.
Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.
S. 349,
205 U. S. 353.
This, moreover, is additionally beyond question because, in
considering the nature and character of the government of Porto
Rico in
Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.
S. 468, it was said (p.
211 U. S.
476):
"It may be justly asserted that Porto Rico is a completely
organized territory, although not a territory incorporated into the
United States, and that there is no reason why Porto Rico should
not be held to be such a territory."
Besides, in
Gromer v. Standard Dredging Co.,
224 U. S. 362, in
considering the subject and giving due weight to "the precaution
against abuse" of the People of Porto Rican legislative power, and
after calling attention to the reservation made by Congress of the
right to repeal any Porto Rican act of legislation, it was
nevertheless declared (p.
224 U. S.
370): "The purpose of the act is to give local
self-government conferring an autonomy similar to that of the
states." There being, then, no doubt that immunity from suit
without it consent is necessarily inferable from a mere
consideration of the nature of the Porto Rican government, the
issue is whether there is any ground which removes Porto Rico from
the general rule. That such an exception is the result of the
concluding portion of § 7 of the organic act was the sole basis
upon which the court below rested its conclusion, and the
correctness of that view is the only issue we are called upon to
decide.
Page 227 U. S. 275
The section in question, § 7, is the one which enumerates the
classes of persons who, by the act, are made constituent elements
of the government for which the act provides, and after making such
enumeration the section declares that the persons embraced in its
provisions
"shall constitute a body politic under the name of the People of
Porto Rico, with governmental powers as hereinafter conferred, and
with power to sue and be sued as such."
Unquestionably the provision, disconnected from its context,
would sustain the conclusion that there exists a general liability
to be sued without reference to consent. Indeed, the words "to sue
and be sued" are but a crystallized form of expression resorted to
for the purpose of aptly stating the right to sue and the liability
to be sued, which springs from a grant of corporate existence,
private or public. But this does not solve the question here
arising, which is the meaning of the words in the act under
consideration, for it may be that like words may have one
significance in one context and a different signification in
another. And this is made clear by bearing in mind that, as usually
applied, the words "to sue and be sued" but express implications as
to the existence of powers flowing from the matter to which they
relate, while here, if the words have the meaning insisted on, they
serve, if not to destroy, at least to seriously modify or greatly
restrict, the grant of powers conferred by the organic act. The
destructive potency of the words if given the meaning insisted upon
is self-evident, since the claim here is that they denature the
government created by the organic act by depriving it of an
immunity which has been frequently decided by this Court would
otherwise necessarily arise from the scope of the powers conferred.
As, however, a full appreciation of the operation of the words, if
they are interpreted as insisted upon, affords the truest means of
ascertaining their real signification, we do not rest content with
that which is self-evident, but pursue the subject further.
Page 227 U. S. 276
The proposition is that, by giving to the words the meaning
insisted upon, it has come to pass that the existence of claims of
every kind and nature, whether in contract or in tort, against the
government is a matter for exclusive judicial determination. But as
the essence of paramount judicial power over a subject confers the
authority and imposes the duty to enforce a judgment rendered in
the exercise of such power (
Gordon v. United States, 117
U.S.Appx. 697, 702;
La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United
States, 175 U. S. 423,
175 U. S. 457;
District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U. S.
62,
183 U. S. 65),
it follows that the contention is that the government created by
the organic act is not the character of government which this Court
has declared it to be in the cases to which we have referred, that
is, one founded upon the American system, but is, on the contrary,
one in which the legislative power concerning claims of every kind
against the government is subordinated to the judicial. That such
was the view taken by the court below of the result of the meaning
which it affixed to the clause in questions was plainly stated in
the opinion as follows:
"The presence of the words 'with power to sue and be sued' in
our organic act cannot be ascribed to an oversight of Congress,
but, on the contrary, it may be presumed that Congress employed
them having in mind the obligations contracted in the Treaty of
Paris, and with the desire of giving to the persons included in its
stipulations ready access to courts of justice against any invasion
of their rights by governmental action. And, indeed, there should
be no fear of entrusting to the courts the protection, not only of
the persons mentioned in the treaty, but of any other persons,
without excluding the people of Porto Rico. This has been
demonstrated sufficiently by an experience of more than ten
years."
In view, however, of the terms of the organic act, of the prior
decisions recognizing that, the purpose of Congress
Page 227 U. S. 277
in adopting it was to follow the plan applied from the beginning
to the organized territories by creating a government conforming to
the American system, with defined and divided powers --
legislative, executive, and judicial, -- in further view of the
fact that the exercise of the judicial power here claimed would be
destructive of that system, we are of opinion that it cannot be
supposed that Congress intended by the clause in question to
destroy the government which it was its purpose to create. In a
sense, the words "to sue and be sued," applied, as they normally
have been, in grants of private or public charters, are redundant,
since they but express the existence of powers which would
naturally be implied. It may be true also to say that, if they be
likewise confined in the case before us, they will also be in a
sense redundant. Despite this, we think they should be construed
with reference to the powers conferred by the provisions to which
they relate, and therefore cannot be treated as destructive of the
authority otherwise conferred by the act. Thus interpreting the
clause, it is but an expression of the power to sue arising from
the terms of the organic fact, and a recognition of a liability to
be sued consistently with the nature and character of the
government -- that is, only in case of consent duly given. The
words, "shall have the government powers hereinafter conferred and
with the power to sue," etc., exclude the possibility in reason of
holding that the right to sue and be sued which was given, "and
with," that is, because of or along with the powers conferred, was
intended to or does distort of limit the powers of government which
the act conferred.
Reversed.