Action by Congress on a subject within its domain under the
commerce clause of the Constitution results in excluding the states
from acting on that subject.
As applied to interstate shipments, the state cannot now impose
penalties for delay in delivery to consignee, as Congress has acted
on that subject by the passage of the Hepburn Act.
Chicago,
R.I. & P. Ry. Co. v. Hardwick Elevator Co., 226 U.
S. 426.
The so-called Demurrage Statute of 1907 of Arkansas requiring
railroad companies to give notice to consignees of arrival of
shipments and penalizing them for noncompliance is an
unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce so far as
interstate shipments are concerned.
94 Ark. 394 reversed.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the
commerce clause of the Constitution of the United
Page 227 U. S. 266
States of the Arkansas Demurrage Statute, are stated in the
opinion.
Page 227 U. S. 267
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the opinion of the Court.
This writ of error is prosecuted to secure the reversal of a
judgment for $75, the amount of penalties imposed upon the
plaintiff in error for delay in giving notice to the consignee,
defendant in error, of the arrival of a carload of freight at the
termination of an interstate commerce shipment. The exaction was
authorized by § 3 of a law of the State of Arkansas, approved April
19, 1907, entitled, "An Act to Regulate Freight Transportation by
Railroad Companies Doing Business in the Arkansas." The section is
copied in the margin. [
Footnote
1]
Page 227 U. S. 268
The right to impose the penalty was challenged and the validity
of the § of the statute authorizing it was assailed by demurrer on
the ground of repugnancy to the commerce clause of the Constitution
of the United States. The question here for decision is whether the
court below was right in overruling the federal defense which was
thus relied upon. 94 Ark. 394.
The Arkansas statute is styled in the opinion of the court below
"the demurrage statute," and the penalty imposed by § 3 is referred
to as a "demurrage charge." And, in the same connection, it is
observed:
"There are other sections of the statute imposing demurrage
charges on consignees for failure to remove freight, thus making
the burdens of the whole statute reciprocal."
It follows that the section under consideration was but intended
to subject carriers to the penalties which the section provides
because of a failure to make prompt delivery of freight on arrival
at destination. As applied to interstate commerce, however, we
think such penalties were not enforceable because of a want of
power in the state to impose them, in view of the legislation of
Congress existing at the time the alleged duty to give notice
arose. Recently, in
Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway
Co. v. Hardwick Farmers' Elevator Co., 226 U.
S. 426, a regulation of the State of Minnesota enacted
after the passage of the Hepburn Act, imposing penalties on
carriers for failing on demand to furnish a supply of cars for the
movement of interstate traffic, was held invalid because of the
absence of power in a state, in consequence of the Hepburn Act, to
provide for such penalties. While the case before us concerns the
power of a state over the delivery of cars in consummation of an
interstate shipment, we nevertheless think that the
Hardwick case is controlling, because the legislation of
Congress as clearly excludes the right of a state to penalize for
failure to deliver interstate freight at the termination of an
interstate shipment as it was
Page 227 U. S. 269
found to prevent a state from penalizing for failure to furnish
cars for the initiation of the movement of interstate traffic. This
conclusion is necessary, since the amendment to § 1 of the Act to
Regulate Commerce, by which a definition is given to the term
"transportation," and which, in the
Hardwick case, was
held to exclude the right of a state to penalize for the
nondelivery of cars to initiate the movement of an interstate
shipment, by its very terms embraces the obligation of a carrier to
deliver to the consignee, and therefore, by the same token,
excludes the right of a state to penalize on that subject. The
provision of the Hepburn Act in question is copied in the margin.
[
Footnote 2]
We are referred in argument to no other provision of the act
tending in the slightest degree to indicate that the duties which
were united by the provisions of one section of the act were
divorced by another, and were made therefore subject to the
possibility of varying and it may be conflicting state penalties.
On the contrary, in this instance, as in the one considered in the
Hardwick case, the context of the act adds strength to the
conviction produced by the definition of the first section, and
therefore gives rise to the conviction that the context of the
statute, not only as was held in the
Hardwick case,
excludes the right of a state to regulate by penalties or demurrage
charges the obligation of furnishing the means of interstate
transportation, but also excludes power in a state to impose
penalties as a means of compelling the performance of the duty to
promptly deliver in consummation of such transportation.
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Arkansas is reversed with
costs, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.
Reversed.
[
Footnote 1]
"SEC. 3. Railroad companies shall, within twenty-four hours
after the arrival of shipments, give notice, by mail or otherwise,
to consignee of the arrival of shipments, together with the weight
and amount of freight charges due thereon, and where goods or
freight in carload quantities arrive, such notices shall contain
also identifying numbers, letter and initials of the car or cars,
and if transferred in transit, the number and initials of the car
in which originally shipped. Any railroad company failing to give
such notice shall forfeit and pay to the shipper, or other party
whose interest is affected, the sum of five dollars per car per
day, or fraction of a day's delay, on all carload shipments, and
one cent per hundred pounds per day, or fraction thereof, on
freight in less than carloads, with a minimum charge of five cents
for any one package, after the expiration of the said twenty-four
hours; provided, that not more than five dollars per day be charged
for any one consignment not in excess of a carload."
[
Footnote 2]
". . . the term 'transportation' shall include cars and other
vehicles and all instrumentalities and facilities of shipment or
carriage, irrespective of ownership or of any contract, express or
implied, for the use thereof, and all services in connection with
the receipt, delivery, elevation, and transfer in transit,
ventilation, refrigeration, or icing, storage and handling of
property transported, and it shall be the duty of every carrier
subject to the provisions of this act to provide and furnish such
transportation upon reasonable request therefor, and to establish
through routes and just and reasonable rates applicable
thereto."