The evidence in this case, upon which the order of deportation
of an alien on the ground that she was a prostitute and was found
practicing
Page 226 U. S. 273
prostitution within three years after her entry into the United
States was based, being adequate to support the conclusions of fact
of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, and there having been a
fair hearing, those findings are not subject to review by the
courts.
The authority of Congress to prohibit aliens from coming within
the United States includes the authority to impose condition upon
the performance of which the continued liberty of the alien to
reside within the country depends.
A proceeding to enforce regulations under which alien may
continue to reside within the United States is not a criminal
proceeding within the meaning of the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments.
Congress may properly devolve a proceeding to enforce
regulations under which aliens are permitted to remain within the
United States upon an executive department or subordinate officials
thereof, and may make conclusive the findings of fact reached by
such officials after a summary hearing, if fair.
Section 3 of the Act of February 20, 1907, 34 Stat. 898, c.
1134, providing for deportation of alien prostitutes within three
years after entry into the United States and providing a summary
proceeding for determining the fact by the Secretary of Commerce
and Labor, does not violate either the Fifth or Sixth Amendment by
depriving the alien of her liberty without due process of law or by
denying her a jury trial.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Memorandum opinion, by direction of the Court, by MR. JUSTICE
PITNEY:
The appellant, having been arrested and held in custody under
warrants of arrest and deportation issued by the Acting Secretary
of Commerce and Labor under the Immigration Act of February 20,
1907, sought to be discharged upon habeas corpus issued out of the
district
Page 226 U. S. 274
court, and that court having upon hearing ordered the dismissal
of the writ, she prosecutes this appeal.
From the return and supplemental return of the respondent, it
appears that the appellant is an alien, and that, as the result of
a hearing and rehearing conducted in compliance with Rule 35,
Paragraph E of the Rules and Regulations of the Department of
Commerce and Labor, she was found to be in the United States in
violation of § 3 of the act referred to, and subject to
deportation, in that she was a prostitute, and had been found
practicing prostitution within three years after her entry into the
United States.
In her behalf, it was contended in the court below and is here
contended, first, that there was no evidence before the Secretary
of Commerce and Labor sufficient to warrant the findings of fact
upon which the order of deportation was based, and, secondly, that
§ 3 of the Act of February 20, 1907 (34 Stat. 898, 899, c. 1134),
which provides that
"any alien woman or girl who shall be found an inmate of a house
of prostitution or practicing prostitution at any time within three
years after she shall have entered the United States shall be
deemed to be unlawfully within the United States, and shall be
deported as provided by sections twenty and twenty-one of this
Act,"
is unconstitutional because violative of the guaranties that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law, and that in all criminal prosecutions the accused
shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial
jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have been
committed, as contained in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
As to the first point, an examination of the evidence upon which
the order of deportation was based convinces us that it was
adequate to support the Secretary's conclusion
Page 226 U. S. 275
of fact. That being so, and the appellant having had a fair
hearing, the findings are not subject to review by the courts.
With respect to the second point, little more need be said. It
is entirely settled that the authority of Congress to prohibit
aliens from coming within the United States, and to regulate their
coming, includes authority to impose conditions upon the
performance of which the continued liberty of the alien to reside
within the bounds of this country may be made to depend; that a
proceeding to enforce such regulations is not a criminal
prosecution within the meaning of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments;
that such an inquiry may be properly devolved upon an executive
department or subordinate officials thereof, and that the findings
of fact reached by such officials, after a fair though summary
hearing, may constitutionally be made conclusive, as they are made
by the provisions of the act in question.
Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U. S. 698,
149 U. S. 730;
United States v. Zucker, 161 U. S. 481;
Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.
S. 228,
163 U. S. 237;
Turner v. Williams, 194 U. S. 279,
194 U. S. 289;
Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S.
8,
208 U. S. 11;
Tang Tun v. Edsell, 223 U. S. 673,
223 U. S. 675;
Low Wah Suey v. Backus, 225 U. S. 460,
225 U. S.
46.
The appellant raises some other constitutional objections,
viz.: that the Immigration Act vests in the federal
authorities the power to try an immigrant for a violation of the
penal laws of the State of which he has become a resident, and so
interferes with the police power of the state; that the act vests
judicial powers in an executive branch of the government; that it
violates the constitutional guaranty of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus, and the like. These are without substance, and
require no discussion.
Final order affirmed.
