Whether prescription goes only to the remedy or extinguishes the
right, it affects the jurisdiction no more than any other
defense.
The judgment of a court that a right is established cannot be
impeached collaterally by proof that the judgment was wrong.
The provisions of Article 137 of the Civil Code of Porto Rico of
1889 and of § 199 of the Act of March 1, 1902, of Porto Rico,
requiring actions to claim filiation to be commenced within
prescribed periods, do not deprive the court of jurisdiction in
case the action is not brought until after the prescribed period.
It is a defense that must be pleaded.
This Court will be slow to control the discretion of the Supreme
Court of Porto Rico as to a matter wholly within its power, such as
sending a case back to the lower court for further opportunity to
cross-examine.
13 Porto Rico, 18, affirmed.
The facts are stated in the opinion.
Page 226 U. S. 146
MR. JUSTICE HOLMES delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was a proceeding by the appellees, as illegitimate children
of Adolfo Desmornes, deceased, to be adjudged his recognized
children. The appellant answered that he was the nephew and heir of
Desmornes, and denied that the appellees were his children or ever
were recognized as such. The district court held that the action
had prescribed under the limitations imposed upon actions of this
class by the Civil Codes of 1889 and 1902. This decision was
reversed by the supreme court on the ground that the bar to the
action had not been pleaded, and a decree was entered for the
appellees upon a consideration of the evidence taken below.
The case was argued in this Court in behalf of the appellant
only, and we shall content ourselves with discussing the argument
made by him. By the Civil Code of 1889, Art. 137, actions of this
kind "can be instituted only during the life of the presumed
parents," with certain exceptions. It appears by the complaint that
Desmornes died on November 2, 1905, before this suit was brought.
By the statute of Porto Rico approved March 1, 1902, § 199, under
which the appellant says that the appellees proceed, "An action to
claim filiation may be filed at any time within two years after the
child shall become of age," etc. It appeared in evidence that the
appellees became of age more than two years before this action was
filed. It is urged that the words of both statutes are
jurisdictional, and constitute a condition precedent. It is said
further that the Supreme Court of Porto Rico in later decisions has
shown an inclination to recede from the doctrine of the present
one; but as this case has not been overruled in terms, we shall do
no more than indicate why we think the decision right.
Page 226 U. S. 147
Whether prescription goes only to the remedy or extinguishes the
right, it affects the jurisdiction no more than any other defense.
When a court has general jurisdiction to try the question whether
an alleged right exists, the rules that determine the existence of
the right ordinarily govern the duty only of the court, not its
power. Its judgment that the right is established cannot be
impeached collaterally by proof that the judgment was wrong. For
instance, a common law court ought not to give judgment for the
plaintiff upon a parol promise without consideration, but if it
does so, the judgment is not open to collateral attack. Even words
in a statute that might seem to affect the power of the court, such
as "no action shall be brought," in the statute of frauds, are
assumed without question merely to fix the law by which the court
should decide, as is explained in
Fauntleroy v. Lum,
210 U. S. 230,
210 U. S. 235.
We see no reason why the ordinary rule should not apply to this
case.
But it is said that, whether the statutes go to the jurisdiction
or not, they establish a condition precedent. Of course, all
defenses disclose conditions precedent to the successful
maintaining of the action, but more than that must be meant, and we
take the argument to be that the statute extinguishes the right if
the suit is not brought in time, and therefore creates a condition
precedent to the right of the appellees. But that abstract
proposition does not decide the case. The question before us is a
question of pleading, and not every matter that may affect the
existence of the right at the time of bringing suit must be dealt
with by the plaintiff in stating his cause of action. A release
under seal destroys a right as fully as prescription could, yet a
plaintiff does not have to deny a release in his declaration.
Usually, if facts have arisen since the cause of action accrued
that take it away, it is more convenient and it is required that
the defendant should allege them, rather than that the plaintiff
should be called
Page 226 U. S. 148
on to deny in the first place all possible matters of that sort.
Sawyer v. Boston, 144 Mass. 470, 472. "For if he should do
so, the declaration would be more prolix than was convenient."
Hawkings v. Billhead, Cro.Car. 404.
"The mere fact that the time of bringing suit goes in some sense
to the jurisdiction of the court does not necessarily take the case
out of the general rules of pleading."
Sawyer v. Boston, supra. It would seem, as observed by
the court below, that the defendant was free to renounce the
objection if he saw fit. We know of no public policy that would
prevent his permitting the appellees to acquire rights that earlier
they were entitled to. So that, on this ground as well as on that
of convenience, we are of opinion that the general rule of pleading
applies.
The only matter remaining to be mentioned is a suggestion that
the supreme court should have sent the case back to the lower court
to give the appellant an opportunity to cross-examine the
appellees; but, there being no question of the power of the supreme
court, we should be slow to control its discretion on this
point.
Judgment affirmed.