One of the parties interested in and having control of a mining
company purchased a neighboring group of mines and agreed that the
company should have the opportunity of taking them on reimbursing
him for outlay; if not availed of, he to keep them for his own.
Subsequently, the combined groups being sold, he claimed the
agreement had by reason of certain resolutions been rescinded, and
that he was entitled to the proceeds of the purchased group. The
case was twice before the supreme court of the territory: on the
first appeal, that court held that the agreement had been
rescinded.
Held that:
The findings of fact sent up from the territorial court must
alone be the basis of the judgment of this Court.
In interpreting the action of stockholders in passing
resolutions regarding the relative rights of the corporation and
one of the stockholders and officers in property of the
corporation, the surrounding facts and circumstances may be
considered.
Page 225 U. S. 446
The agreement that the company could acquire the purchased group
was carried out, and not rescinded.
Whatever effect the decision of the supreme court of a territory
may have, as the law of the case, on the lower court or on the
supreme court itself, prior to an appeal to this Court, it is not
the law of the case for this Court.
Under the circumstances, the appointment of a receiver and his
continuance for final settlement of the affairs of the company was
proper.
The facts, which involve the construction of contracts relating
to sale of mining properties in Arizona, are stated in the
opinion.
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
Louis Zeckendorf brought this suit in the district court of Pima
County, Territory of Arizona, as a stockholder of the Silver Bell
Copper Company, hereinafter called the Silver Bell Company, for and
on its behalf, against Albert Steinfeld, J. N. Curtis, and R. K.
Shelton, as individuals and as officers and directors of the Silver
Bell Company, the Silver Bell Company, and a certain company known
as the Mammoth Copper Company. He sought to recover $338,710.15 for
so much money wrongfully appropriated by and to the use of the
defendant Steinfeld, which rightfully belonged to the Silver Bell
Company, and to recover, as belonging to the company, 300 shares of
stock in the Silver Bell Company. There was also a prayer for an
accounting and the return of the money and shares and
Page 225 U. S. 447
for the appointment of a receiver. Steinfeld answered that the
money, a portion of which was the proceeds of certain mining
properties which had belonged to him and had been sold in
conjunction with properties belonging to the Silver Bell Company,
and shares of stock, belonged to him, and for reasons set forth
were rightfully in his possession.
The district court, upon the first trial, found in favor of
Zeckendorf. This judgment was reversed by the Supreme Court of
Arizona and the case sent back for further findings. 10 Ariz. 221.
The pleadings were amended, the amended complaint dividing the
controversy into two causes of action, the first embracing the
ownership of the proceeds of sale taken by Steinfeld and the second
the title to the 300 shares of stock and dividends thereon. Upon
the second trial, the district court found against Zeckendorf on
the first cause of action and against Steinfeld on the second cause
of action upon the facts found, made certain provisions as to
attorney fees, and, in view of the situation of the Silver Bell
Company, appointed a receiver and ordered that the property and the
assets of the company be turned over to him for distribution
according to the order and judgment of the court, and that, upon
final hearing, the Silver Bell Company be dissolved, its debts
paid, and assets distributed among the stockholders according to
their rights. The court further ordered that Steinfeld should hold
in his hands the sum of $25,750 to secure him against his liability
as garnishee in a case by one Franklin against the Silver Bell
Company, Steinfeld to account to the company for the money on the
final determination of the action. An appeal was again taken to the
Supreme Court of the Territory of Arizona, and that court affirmed
the judgment and orders of the district court. 12 Ariz. 245.
Both parties appealed. No. 139 is the appeal of Zeckendorf from
that part of the judgment dismissing on the
Page 225 U. S. 448
merits his first cause of action, concerning the moneys paid to
Steinfeld. No. 140 is the appeal of Steinfeld from the order and
judgment holding that the 300 shares of stock belong to the
company, and requiring him to account for the dividends thereon.
The supreme court of the territory made elaborate findings of fact,
adopting the findings of the district court and making certain
findings of its own. So far as necessary to determine the case as
we view it, the findings may be summarized as follows:
Since 1878, Albert Steinfeld and Louis Zeckendorf have been
partners under the firm name of Louis Zeckendorf & Company.
Zeckenford lived in the City of New York. Steinfeld resided in the
City of Tucson, Arizona, and was the active member of the firm in
its mining operations. William and Julia Zeckendorf were the owners
of a certain mine known as the Old Boot or Mammoth mine, which was
being operated by the Carl Nielsen under contract with Steinfeld as
trustee of the owners. Nielsen became so indebted to the
partnership that, in order to secure such indebtedness, in January,
1899, a company was incorporated under the laws of Arizona known as
the Nielsen Mining & Smelting Company, the name being changed
on January 14, 1901, to the Silver Bell Mining Company, and all the
stock of the company was originally issued to Carl Nielsen, in
consideration of the transfer to the company of his rights in the
Old Boot mine, and a like transfer of personal property used in
working the mine. The stock was divided as follows: 499 shares to
L. Zeckendorf & Company, 30 shares to Albert Steinfeld, trustee
of William and Julia Zeckendorf, 170 shares to J. N. Curtis, 300
shares to Carl Nielsen, and one share to R. K. Shelton, but being
in fact the property of L. Zeckendorf & Company. In January,
1901, the 300 shares in Nielsen's name were transferred on the
books of the company to the name of Albert Steinfeld, trustee. On
the sixth of June, 1903, the 499 shares of L. Zeckendorf &
Company were
Page 225 U. S. 449
divided, 250 shares to Louis Zeckendorf and 249 shares to Albert
Steinfeld, Steinfeld taking the one share standing in the name of
Shelton, which was in Steinfeld's possession until December 9,
1903, when it was given to Shelton. At the meeting of the
stockholders, Steinfeld voted the stock in his name as trustee, and
the stock of L. Zeckendorf & Company, and Louis Zeckendorf was
never at any stockholders' meeting and did not vote therein by
proxy until the stockholders' meeting of December 26, 1903, at
which he was present. Subsequent to January 14, 1901, Albert
Steinfeld, J. N. Curtis, and R. K. Shelton were the directors of
the corporation, all residing in Tucson, Arizona. Shelton was at
all times the representative of Steinfeld on the board of directors
of the company, and at all times involved in this action voted as
ordered, directed, and requested by Steinfeld. After June 6, 1903,
J. N. Curtis, as director and other officer of the Silver Bell
Company, was under the dominion and control of Steinfeld, and did
as he directed.
In the year 1900, Steinfeld purchased, in his own name and in
the name of the Mammoth Copper Company, which was owned and
controlled by him, certain mining properties in the neighborhood of
the Old Boot Mine, known as the English Group of mines, and in
September, 1900, proceeded to Europe, and there concluded the
purchase of the English title to that group.
The findings of fact sent up to us, and which must alone be the
basis of our judgment (
Eagle Mining Co. v. Hamilton,
218 U. S. 513,
218 U. S.
515), showing that Steinfeld, in purchasing the English
Group of mines, did not purchase them with the intent that they
should thereby become the property of the Silver Bell Company, but
that at that time he purposed to give the Silver Bell Company an
opportunity to take the mines upon reimbursing him for his outlays
and expenditures in that connection, which he expected the Silver
Bell Company would do, intending, if it did not,
Page 225 U. S. 450
to keep them for his own. In our view, the facts found show that
Steinfeld and the company effectually carried out this purpose, and
that the subsequent attempt to rescind the action by which the
proceeds of the sale of the English Group of mines became the
property of the Silver Bell Company, and to give the proceeds to
Steinfeld, must be held for naught.
The findings show that, after the acquisition of the English
Group of mines, Steinfeld turned them over to the possession of the
Nielsen Mining & Smelting Company (the name of which was
subsequently changed to the Silver Bell Copper Company), which
assumed the possession and control of them; that they were operated
in connection with the other mining property of the company, known
as the Old Boot Mine; that maps were prepared, under the direction
of Steinfeld, showing the mining properties as one entire group of
mines, and that the president of the company made reports of the
mines as the properties of the Silver Bell Company; that these maps
and reports were sent to Zeckendorf and others, and that efforts
were made by Steinfeld to sell the properties as a whole, including
the English Group.
In the early part of 1901, Curtis, who was president of the
Silver Bell Company, holding certain shares in his own right,
contended that the English Group of mines was held in trust by
Steinfeld for the Silver Bell Company. Both parties consulted one
Franklin, an attorney, who advised that Steinfeld could not hold
the properties as his own until he had given the company an
opportunity to take them upon reimbursing him for his outlays and
expenses, and it had declined to do so.
Steinfeld acquiesced in this position, and on July 15, 1901,
made a proposition in writing to the Silver Bell Company. The
substance of this proposal was that he would hold in trust for the
Silver Bell Company all the mining properties controlled by him,
the company to assume
Page 225 U. S. 451
all obligations, counsel fees, etc., to pay for the annual
assessment work, and to reimburse him for his outlays on or before
the fifteenth of October, 1901 (and that he would also turn over
the Nielsen stock in controversy in the second cause of the action
upon the assumption of certain obligations). And, upon compliance
with the terms of the proposition, the mining properties were to
belong to the Silver Bell Company. Steinfeld stated in this
proposal:
"I am of the opinion that all of the mining claims and mill
sites and property acquired, as above set forth, by the Mammoth
Mining Company and by myself, are of great value to you, and that
your company should own the same, and as an inducement to you to
purchase and acquire the same, I am willing to place you in my
shoes -- that is to say, to sell and convey to you all the interest
so acquired by me upon my being repaid the amounts of money I have
expended, with interest, and upon your assuming and guaranteeing
with security satisfactory to me the performance on your part, of
all the matters and things and payments which, under the various
contracts, I am liable or responsible for. To this end, I herewith
submit to you the following proposition."
The Silver Bell Company was given until October 15, 1901, to
accept the proposition, and, in the event it failed to do so and to
comply therewith by such date, the option was to be at an end. This
proposition was presented to the board of directors on July 15,
1901, and it was ordered that a meeting of the stockholders should
be called to decide upon it. Another meeting of the directors took
place October 1, 1901, at which Steinfeld stated that he would
agree, on condition that the company pay for the assessment work
done and to be done in 1900, 1901, and 1902, and pay interest for
the interval on the amount named in his original proposition, to
extend the time for acceptance of his proposal to the 15th day of
September, 1902. This proposition of extension was accepted by
Page 225 U. S. 452
the board, and it was further resolved that a stockholders'
meeting should be called not later than September 15, 1902, and a
stockholders' meeting was held later on that day, October 1, 1901,
but Zeckendorf was not present, and no action was taken. And the
Silver Bell Company continued to possess, use, and work the
properties as its own with the full knowledge and consent of
Steinfeld and the Mammoth Copper Company.
In this situation of affairs, Steinfeld negotiated the sale of
all of the properties, and on May 13, 1903, reported to the board
of directors that he had, on behalf of himself, the Mammoth Copper
Company, and the Silver Bell Company, given an option for the sale
of the properties for $515,000, as one entire property, and
requested that his action be confirmed, which was done, Steinfeld
himself voting in favor of such confirmance. At the time the price
of $515,000 was fixed, Steinfeld intended to renew and permit the
corporation to accept the terms of his proposition of July 15,
1901, as extended, and the officers of the Silver Bell Company
expected the corporation to avail itself of the offer, so that the
whole of the purchase money would be paid to and become the
property of the Silver Bell Company. On May 20, 1903, all the
properties were conveyed to the Imperial Copper Company for the
purchase price of $515,000, $115,000 in cash and the balance in
notes payable in four equal quarterly installments. The cash and
notes were turned over to Steinfeld as the treasurer of the Silver
Bell Company, and were to be held by him under a certain agreement,
dated May 20, 1903, which permitted Steinfeld to hold the money and
notes as indemnity for the obligations and liabilities to the
Imperial Copper Company which he had assumed, the latter company
having required Steinfeld to guarantee the titles to the mines sold
for one year. It was mutually agreed in the agreement of May 20,
1903, that the purchase price paid and to be paid upon the sale
should belong to
Page 225 U. S. 453
the Silver Bell Company. Between May 20, 1903, and January 20,
1904, the Imperial Copper Company paid to Steinfeld, as treasurer
and trustee of the Silver Bell Company, $319,487.50, representing
the cash payment and the proceeds of the first two notes, with
interest, out of which money was paid $118,000, including $18,117
to Steinfeld. In October and November, 1903, Steinfeld sent all the
money, except $50,000 which had been attached in his hands at the
suit of Franklin, to the Bank of California at San Francisco,
California, and deposited it there in his individual name.
On the day the contract of May 20, 1903, was executed, the board
of directors held a meeting, Steinfeld, Curtis, and Shelton being
present, at which the president reported the various transactions
attending the sale and submitted certain documents. He further
reported that Steinfeld, who had conducted the negotiations with
the Imperial Copper Company, had again submitted for acceptance his
proposition of July 15, 1901, with the modifications that the
company forthwith pay him in cash the sum of $18,117, being the sum
named in the original proposal, with interest, and assume all
obligations incurred in past and present negotiations and
transactions with respect to such mining properties, and the
president stated that it was necessary to adjust with the Mammoth
Copper Company the disposition of the purchase money, and submitted
the agreement of May 20, 1903. Five several resolutions were
thereupon unanimously adopted: (1) ratifying the sale, (2)
accepting Steinfeld's proposition and directing the payment
forthwith of the $18,117, and providing for certain other payments,
(3) authorizing the payment of certain commissions on the sale: (4)
fully empowering the president and secretary of the company to
indemnify Steinfeld against loss or damage for having guaranteed
the titles to the properties, and (5) specifically ratifying and
approving the agreement of May 20, 1903,
Page 225 U. S. 454
providing for the disposition of the proceeds of the sale and
indemnifying Steinfeld. And on the day following, May 21, 1903, the
$18,117 was paid to Steinfeld. Zeckendorf was not at this meeting
or any of the meetings except the stockholders' meeting on December
26, 1903.
In December, 1903, Zeckendorf brought a suit in California to
enjoin the bank there from turning over to Steinfeld the moneys and
notes so deposited by him, and obtained an injunction restraining
Steinfeld from receiving and the bank from delivering to him the
money and notes.
Thereafter, on December 26 1903, a stockholders' meeting was
held in Tucson, Arizona, all the stockholders and the respective
attorneys of Zeckendorf and Steinfeld being present, and it was at
this meeting, it is contended, that the action theretofore taken
vesting the proceeds of sale in the Silver Bell Company was
rescinded. The Supreme Court of Arizona, on the first appeal of
this case to that court (10 Ariz. 221), found that such rescission
was accomplished, notwithstanding the stockholders may have
intended to do no more than rescind the indemnity feature of the
former agreement and resolutions, and sent the case back for
findings of fact as to the ownership of the English Group of mines
and also of the 300 shares of stock, and as to the rights of the
parties as to the distribution of the proceeds of the sale. This
conclusion as to the rescission of the agreement of May 20, 1903,
it is said, has become the law of the case and binding in its
subsequent stages. Whatever might be the holding of the Supreme
Court of Arizona as to the effect of this decision upon its own
judgment and that of the district court, the case reached this
Court for the first time upon the present appeal, and certainly the
holding of the Supreme Court of Arizona at any of the stages of the
case prior to this appeal would not be the law of the case for this
Court.
United States v. Denver & Rio Grande Railroad
Co., 191 U. S. 84,
191 U. S. 93.
Page 225 U. S. 455
We cannot agree with the Supreme Court of Arizona that the
effect of this stockholders' meeting was to rescind so much of the
former action as vested the proceeds of the sale in the Silver Bell
Company. Nor can we agree, as the court held, that, if the parties
did intend to rescind only the former action as to the custody of
the proceeds of the sale, they made a mistake only as to the legal
effect of the rescinding resolution. On the other hand, we think it
is apparent from a consideration of the proceedings of that
meeting, which the Supreme Court of Arizona has made a finding of
itself, that the objection of Zeckendorf, the principal stockholder
other than Steinfeld, was to so much of the former action as
pertained to the turning over of the proceeds of the sale to
Steinfeld to be held by him for his indemnity. At the meeting, no
disposition was manifested to give Steinfeld the ownership of the
proceeds of the sale of the English mines, nor to treat any
modification of the former action as a rescission of the entire
matter.
The discussion at that meeting throughout shows that the object
of Zeckendorf was to get the money and the proceeds of the notes
into the hands of a treasurer of the company, who would give
security therefor, and to have the entire proceeds of the sale
divided among the stockholders. There was no intimation that the
money or notes then held by the treasurer would be taken from the
Silver Bell Company and one-half thereof turned over to Steinfeld
as the vendor of the English Group of mines. As the counsel of
Steinfeld said:
"We are unwilling to admit that we did not have the right to
this money. We still assert that this resolution and agreement was
honest and valid, and that Mr. Steinfeld, under it, had the right
to this money, and had the right to act as he has done. But since
you attack it, we are willing to agree to pass a resolution in the
language of your prayer in which we will rescind the resolution
and
Page 225 U. S. 456
agreement, and
relinquish all right whatever to the personal
custody of that money, and turn it over to the company."
"Now, I drew a little resolution, which I would suggest one of
you gentlemen (I am not a member of the board) should offer."
(Italics ours.)
Thereupon the resolution in the following language was
offered:
"Resolved, that the agreement executed on May 20th by the
president and secretary of the corporation, the Mammoth Copper
Company, and Albert Steinfeld, be and the same is hereby rescinded,
and that the said agreement and resolution passed on said day be
declared null and void."
After the resolution had been offered and before the vote was
taken, counsel for Steinfeld said further:
"We are acquiescing in your demand. . . ."
"We will now organize as a stockholders' meeting."
"Our desire is in good faith to rescind that resolution,
but
we will never admit we acted wrongfully in taking the money;
you attacked the resolution, and we are willing, if you wish, to
rescind it."
(Italics ours.)
What resolution does this refer to? Certainly not the one (1)
ratifying and approving the sale to the Imperial Copper Company,
nor the one (2) accepting Steinfeld's proposition and authorizing
payments to Steinfeld and those from whom he had purchased, nor (3)
the payment of commissions. But manifestly all parties had in mind
so much of the resolutions as referred to the right of Steinfeld to
continue to hold the proceeds of the sale, cash and notes, for his
indemnity.
At the stockholders' meeting, the entire 1,000 shares,
representing those belonging to Zeckendorf, Steinfeld, Shelton, and
Curtis, were all voted in favor of the resolution.
We will not stop to recite the other parts of the long finding
which includes all the proceedings of this meeting.
Page 225 U. S. 457
At the end of the findings of fact in this connection, the
Supreme Court of Arizona makes this significant statement:
"In the stockholders' meeting held on the 26th day of December,
1903, hereinabove set out, plaintiff, in voting to rescind said
agreement of May 20, 1903, and the resolution hereinabove
mentioned, did not understand or know or believe that anybody
claimed or would claim that the action taken on that day by the
stockholders of the Silver Bell Copper Company would operate to
give either Albert Steinfeld or the Mammoth Copper Company any
right or claim to any of said proceeds of said sale,
nor did
the directors in good faith understand or believe that the
stockholders intended to instruct them to rescind any portion of
the agreement and resolution other than that relating to the
indemnity agreement hereinbefore mentioned."
(Italics ours.)
It is argued that this is but a conclusion, and not in any
proper sense a finding of fact. If this be so, we think it is the
proper conclusion from the facts stated. In our view, it cannot be
reasonably maintained that, in passing the resolution, when it is
read in the light of the proceedings at the meeting and the known
facts surrounding the parties at the time, the stockholders
intending to rescind any more of the transaction than related to
the indemnity agreement. On the other hand, the fair inference from
the proceedings at this meeting leaves no doubt in our minds that
the stockholders intended to affirm the previous transactions
except so far as they related to Steinfeld's right to hold the
money and notes for his indemnity, and that Steinfeld acquiesced in
such modification as one of the stockholders.
In interpreting the action of the stockholders in passing the
resolution, the facts and circumstances surrounding them may
legitimately be looked to.
Canal Co. v.
Hill, 15 Wall. 94,
82 U. S.
100-101. In construing written documents,
Page 225 U. S. 458
"this kind of evidence," said Mr. Justice Bradley, speaking for
the court, "is especially pertinent when the inquiry is as to the
subject matter of the agreement" (p.
82 U. S. 101).
To the same effect,
Reed v. Insurance Co., 95 U. S.
23,
95 U. S.
30-31.
Notwithstanding the directors did not, in good faith, understand
the rescission to go beyond the indemnity feature, as above stated,
on December 26, 1903, the directors, Steinfeld, Shelton, and
Curtis, met and undertook to rescind their former action. It is
specifically found that Zeckendorf had no knowledge of this
meeting, although it was held on the same day as the meeting of the
stockholders to which we have referred. On January 16, 1904, Curtis
and Shelton, for the directors, without notice to the other
stockholders, and no one else being present but Steinfeld and his
counsel at the request of Steinfeld, adopted the resolution which
divided the $515,000, the proceeds of the sale to the Imperial
Copper Company, by awarding to Steinfeld and his company, the
Mammoth Copper Company, as the owners of one-half of the property
sold, one-half of the cash and notes, less certain payments which
are recited. Under that supposed authority, Curtis, as treasurer,
turned over to Steinfeld $145,743.75 in cash and one of the notes.
In so voting and acting, it is specifically found that Curtis and
Shelton consulted with no person whatsoever except Steinfeld and
his attorney, and that they were under the complete dominion and
control of Steinfeld, and voted and acted on his orders, and not
otherwise. For the reasons stated, we are of the opinion that the
Supreme Court of Arizona erred in affirming so much of the judgment
as dismissed the first cause of action. This conclusion renders it
unnecessary to consider whether Steinfeld, in view of his relation
to the company, could have held the title acquired by him except in
trust for the company.
As to the second cause of action:
Page 225 U. S. 459
On the twentieth of January, 1904, Steinfeld received $33,300 as
dividends upon the stock standing in his name as trustee and which
is in controversy in the second cause of action, a dividend of $111
per share having been declared by the board of directors. As to
this phase of the case, it is unnecessary to recite the facts found
by the Supreme Court of Arizona. They are clear and distinct, and
there can be no doubt that Steinfeld held the 300 shares of stock
purchased from Nielsen for the company, and the court was right in
affirming the judgment upon the second cause of action upon the
facts found.
It is contended that it was wrong to appoint a receiver in the
case, but we think that, in view of the situation of the property
and the final winding up of the company, the appointment of the
receiver was proper, and that that officer should be continued for
the final settlement of the affairs of the company.
It follows that the judgment of the Supreme Court of the
Territory of Arizona should be reversed insofar as it affirms the
judgment of the district court on the first cause of action, and
affirmed insofar as the supreme court affirms the district court on
the second cause of action, and the case remanded to the Supreme
Court of the State of Arizona, as successor of the territorial
supreme court (36 Stat. c. 310, pp. 557, 576-577;
Nielsen v.
Steinfeld, 224 U. S. 534),
for such further proceedings as may not be inconsistent with the
opinion of this Court.
Judgment accordingly.