Section 1582 of the Code of Civil Procedure of California, as
construed by the supreme court of that state, is not
unconstitutional as denying due process of law to an heir of a
mortgagor because it permits foreclosure against the administrator
without making the heir a party to the suit.
The legislative power of the state is the source of the rights
in real estate and remedies in regard thereto.
Page 224 U. S. 559
The highest court of the state can construe the laws of that
state so as to make of them a consistent system of jurisprudence
accommodating the rights and the remedies dealt with by the
legislature.
152 Cal. 615, affirmed.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality under the due
process clause of the Constitution of a statute of California, are
stated in the opinion.
Page 224 U. S. 561
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
This writ of error is directed to a judgment of the Supreme
Court of the State of California, sustaining the title of
defendants in error to certain lands in that state derived through
a sheriff's sale of the same upon suit for foreclosure of a
mortgage. The suit was instituted and prosecuted against the
administratrix of the estate of the father of plaintiffs in error,
they not having been made parties nor given notice of the pendency
of the suit.
The facts, as stated in the opinion of the court, are as
follows:
"George McCaughey died intestate on March 1, 1890. The
plaintiffs are his children and heirs at law. During his lifetime,
on June 6, 1889, the deceased executed a mortgage on certain land
to one H. J. Finger to secure a promissory note for $500, which was
due and unpaid at the death of the decedent. After his death, Susan
McCaughey was duly appointed and qualified as administratrix of his
estate. The note and mortgage were duly presented to the
administratrix, and were allowed by her and approved by the probate
judge. In January, 1894, Finger commenced an action against the
administratrix to foreclose the mortgage, but did not make
plaintiffs parties to such action. Such proceedings were had that a
judgment of foreclosure was regularly rendered under which the land
was duly sold by the sheriff on April 10, 1895, to defendant Lyall,
who in due time received a sheriff's deed therefor. Several years
afterwards, this present action was brought by said heirs to
have
Page 224 U. S. 562
it adjudicated that they are the owners of an undivided one-half
of the said land, that the claim of the defendants thereto be
adjudged null and void, that plaintiffs recover the possession of
the land, etc. A general demurrer to the complaint was interposed
by the defendant Lyall and by other defendants. The demurrers were
sustained, and, plaintiffs declining to amend, judgment was
rendered for defendants."
The judgment was affirmed by Department 2 of the supreme court,
and a petition for rehearing in bank was denied. Thereupon the
chief justice of the court granted this writ of error.
The contention of plaintiffs in error is that the law cast upon
them the title to the land upon the death of their intestate
ancestor, and that such title could not be divested in a suit in
which they were not parties.
To sustain the contention, plaintiffs in error make, as we shall
see, one part of the law of the state paramount to another part,
certain decisions of the courts of the state paramount to other
decisions, putting out of view that necessarily the coordination of
the laws of the state and the accommodation of the decisions of its
courts is the function and province of the tribunals of the state,
legislative and judicial, respectively.
For their rights of property, plaintiffs adduce § 1384 of the
Civil Code of the state, which provides that
"the property, both real and personal, of one who dies without
disposing of it by will, passes to the heirs of the intestate,
subject to the control of the probate court, and to the possession
of any administrator appointed by that court, for the purposes of
administration."
And decisions of the supreme court are cited, holding, it is
said, "that, upon the death of the ancestor, the title to the real
estate vests immediately in the heir." From the Code and the
decisions it is deduced that, the descent being cast at the instant
of the death of ancestor, the
"right of the heir is
Page 224 U. S. 563
fixed by such positive law, and he becomes invested with the
measure of title which that law has fixed, and cannot be divested
of such title without due process of law."
It is admitted that the heir takes subject to administration,
but with that limitation only, it being contended further that "he
holds precisely the title held by the ancestor." Section 1582 of
the Code of Civil Procedure of the state is cited as defining the
limitation. It provides that
"actions for the recovery of any property, real or personal, or
for the possession thereof, or to quiet title thereto, or to
determine any adverse claim thereon, and all actions founded upon
contracts, may be maintained by and against executors and
administrators in all cases in which the same might have been
maintained by or against their respective testators or
intestates."
The supreme court of the state, in a number of decisions, has
considered that section to mean that an heir is not a necessary
party with the administrator.
Cunningham v. Ashley, 45
Cal. 485;
Bayly v. Muche, 65 Cal. 345;
Finger v.
McCaughey, 119 Cal. 59;
Dickey v. Gibson, 121 Cal.
276. This is conceded by plaintiffs in error, but they say that,
because § 1582 of the Code of Civil Procedure "is made the basis of
the rule established by the supreme court of the state," they
complain of it, and respectfully urge that it "is repugnant to the
Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, §
1." This is equivalent to saying that the legislative power of the
state, being the source of the rights and the remedies, has so
dealt with one as to make the other repugnant to the Constitution
of the United States; or, if the complaint be of the decisions,
that the supreme court of the state cannot construe the laws of the
state and make of them a consistent system of jurisprudence,
accommodating rights and remedies. Both contentions are so clearly
untenable that further discussion is unnecessary.
Judgment affirmed.