The Safety Appliance Act of March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. 531, c.196,
did not embrace all cars on the lines of interstate carriers, but
only those engaged in interstate commerce. It did not, until
amended by the Act of March 2, 1903, 32 Stat. 943, C. 976, embrace
all cars used on railroads engaged in interstate commerce.
A declaration for injuries sustained prior to the amendment of
March 2, 1903, which did not allege that the car involved was
engaged in interstate commerce, was properly held defective.
The rule that decisions of the state court on questions of
pleading and practice under the laws of a state are not reviewable
by this Court
held to include the denial, on the ground
that the period of limitation had expired, of an application made
after trial to amend the declaration, so as to state a cause of
action.
Texas & New Orleans R. Co. v. Miller,
221 U. S. 408.
Although the petition may declare under a federal statute, if it
states no cause of action thereunder, but at most a right of
recovery at common law, rulings on the sufficiency of evidence do
not involve federal questions.
81 Kan. 101 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the construction of the Safety
Appliance Acts, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action to recover for personal injuries
Page 224 U. S. 269
sustained by a brakeman while coupling two freight cars on a
side track of the defendant railway company at Hutchinson, Kansas.
The defendant prevailed in the state courts, 81 Kan. 101, and the
plaintiff brings the case here. The injury occurred November 12,
1900, and the action was begun March 15, 1901.
The question first presented for decision is whether the
petition stated a cause of action under the original Safety
Appliance Act of March 2, 1893, 27 Stat. 531, c. 196, which made it
unlawful for any common carrier engaged in interstate commerce by
railroad "to haul or permit to be hauled or used on its line any
car used in moving interstate traffic, not equipped with couplers
coupling automatically by impact," etc. The petition, if liberally
construed, charged that defendant was a common carrier engaged in
interstate commerce by railroad; that the cars in question were not
equipped with couplers of the prescribed type, and that the
plaintiff's injuries proximately resulted from the absence of such
couplers, but there was no allegation that either of the cars was
then or at any time used in moving interstate traffic. The supreme
court of the state held that, in the absence of such an allegation,
the petition did not state a cause of action under the original
act. We think that ruling was right. The terms of that act were
such that its application depended first, upon the carrier's being
engaged in interstate commerce by railroad, and second upon the use
of the car in moving interstate traffic. It did not embrace all
cars used on the line of such a carrier, but only such as were used
in interstate commerce.
Southern Railway Co. v. United
States, 222 U. S. 20. The
act was amended March 2, 1903, 32 Stat. 943, c. 976, so as to
include all cars "used on any railroad engaged in interstate
commerce," but the amendment came too late to be of any avail to
the plaintiff.
In 1908, after the case had been twice tried without any
Page 224 U. S. 270
decisive result, the plaintiff sought to amend his petition by
charging that the cars were used in moving interstate traffic, but
the application was denied, the period of limitation having expired
in the meantime. Error is assigned upon this ruling, but, as it
involved only a question of pleading and practice under the laws of
the state, it is not subject to review by us.
Texas & New
Orleans R. Co. v. Miller, 221 U. S. 408,
221 U. S.
416.
It also was held that the evidence produced upon the third trial
was not sufficient to sustain a recovery under the petition, and
error is assigned upon this. As the petition did not state a cause
of action under the Safety Appliance Act, but at most a right of
recovery at common law, the ruling upon the sufficiency of the
evidence did not involve a federal question, and so is not open to
reexamination in this Court.
Finding no error in the record in respect of any federal right,
the judgment must be
Affirmed.
