Natural gas, after severance from the soil, being a commodity
which may be dealt in like other products of the earth and a
legitimate subject of interstate commerce, no state can prohibit
its being transported in interstate commerce beyond the lines of
the state, and the act of Oklahoma attempting so to do is an
unconstitutional interference with interstate commerce as held in
this case,
221 U. S. 229.
A state may by proper legislation regulate the removal from the
earth of natural gas by the owner thereof, but may not discriminate
against corporations doing an interstate business by denying them
the right to cross highways of the state while domestic
corporations engaged in the same business are permitted to use the
highways.
Regulations in a state statute which may be valid as to
individuals and domestic corporations engaged in business wholly
within the state are not applicable to corporations engaged in
doing the same business in interstate commerce when the statute
expressly forbids such commerce; this Court will not, therefore,
direct that regulations of that nature become applicable to the
latter class of such corporations because the prohibition has been
declared unconstitutional as an interference with interstate
commerce.
A decree of this Court must be read in view of the issues made
and the relief sought and granted, and a decree declaring a state
statute unconstitutional so far as it prohibits, or is a burden
upon, interstate commerce will not be construed as preventing the
enforcement of such legislation as is legitimately within the
police power of the state and not in conflict with the federal
Constitution.
172 F. 545 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the construction of the decree entered
in this case and reported in
221 U. S. 229, are
stated in the opinion.
Page 224 U. S. 218
MR. JUSTICE DAY delivered the opinion of the Court.
The appellees in this case brought suit in the Circuit Court of
the United States for the Eastern District of Oklahoma against the
appellants, who were the Governor, Attorney General, Deputy
Attorney General, County Attorney and Deputy County Attorney of
Washington County, Corporation Commissioners and Mine Inspector, of
the State of Oklahoma, to enjoin the enforcement of certain
statutes of the State of Oklahoma, which undertook to prevent the
complainants, now appellees, from transporting natural gas in
interstate commerce beyond the borders of the State of Oklahoma.
Upon final hearing in that court, such statutes were held void as
against the Constitution of the United States, and the enforcement
thereof was enjoined. The case came to this Court on appeal, and
was argued and decided at the October Term, 1910, being reported in
221 U. S. 221 U.S.
229.
On May 29, 1911, the last day of the term, a motion was made in
this Court by the Attorney General of Oklahoma to modify the
affirmance of the decree in the court below. The parts objected to
are found in the margin.
*
Page 224 U. S. 219
This motion was overruled, with leave to either party to apply
to the circuit court from whence the case came for such
modification of the decree as would make it conform to the opinion
of this Court. Thereafter, the present proceeding was instituted by
the Attorney General's filing a motion in the Circuit Court of the
United States for the Eastern District of Oklahoma for the
modification of such decree. The former complainants, defendants in
this proceeding, appeared and filed a motion in the nature of a
demurrer, and also filed an answer in the case. The circuit court,
treating the pleadings of the defendants as in the nature of a
demurrer, without hearing evidence in support of or against the
granting of the motion, and without considering the affidavits or
exhibits filed, overruled
Page 224 U. S. 220
the same, and ordered the mandate of this Court affirming the
former decree to be spread upon the records. Thereupon this appeal
was prosecuted.
In order to properly consider this motion, it is necessary to
notice the holding in the case in 221 U.S.,
supra. The
original proceeding was brought to enjoin the officers of the State
of Oklahoma from preventing the carriage in interstate commerce,
beyond the lines of the state, of natural gas which had been
severed from the earth by the owners of such gas, and particularly
to enjoin the enforcement of a certain statute of the state, passed
in 1907, known as chapter 67 of the Session Laws of Oklahoma,
1907-08, which is inserted in full in the margin of the report of
the case in 221 U.S. at
221 U. S. 239.
This Court held that natural gas after severance is a commodity
which might be dealt in like other products of the earth, as coal
and other minerals, and is a legitimate subject of interstate
commerce, and that no state, by such laws as were involved in the
case, can prohibit its transportation in interstate commerce beyond
the lines of that state. The Court held, after considering and
construing the provisions of the Act of 1907, that it was, upon its
face, a law undertaking to prohibit the transmission or
transportation in interstate commerce of natural gas to points
beyond the state; that it was an unconstitutional interference with
the rights of the complainants, who were legitimately engaged in
that commerce, and that therefore the act was null and void.
In the course of the opinion, the Court recognized the right of
the state by proper legislation to regulate the removal from the
earth of natural gas by the owner thereof, so as to prevent its
undue waste, but maintained the decree of the court below,
declaring this particular act unconstitutional upon the grounds of
its prohibitory character in attempting to prevent the transmission
from the state through the pipelines of the complainants of a
Page 224 U. S. 221
legitimate subject of interstate commerce. As to the provisions
of the statute concerning the right to use the highways of the
state, the court declined to discuss the extent of the rights of
public or private ownership therein in the State of Oklahoma, but
placed the decision in this respect upon the manifest attempt to
discriminate against the appellees, engaged in interstate commerce,
in giving to domestic corporations engaged in intrastate
transportation of natural gas the right to the use of the highways,
even longitudinally, while denying to corporations transporting the
gas in interstate commerce the right to pass under or over them,
and this in the face of the admission in the pleadings that the
greater use given to domestic corporations is no obstruction to the
highways.
The particular parts of the Oklahoma Act of 1907 which it is now
contended should be excepted from the operation of the decree are
comprised in §§ 5, 6, and 7 of chapter 67, which read as
follows:
"SEC. 5. The laying, constructing, building and maintaining a
gas pipeline or lines for the transportation or transmission of
natural gas along, over, under, across, or through the highways,
roads, bridges, streets, or alleys in this state, or of any county,
city, municipal corporation, of any other private or public
premises within this state is hereby declared an additional burden
upon said highway, bridge, road, street, or alley, and any other
private or public premises, may only be done when the right is
granted by express charter from the state, and shall not be
constructed, maintained, or operated until all damages to adjacent
owners are ascertained and paid as provided by law."
"SEC. 6. All pipelines for the transportation or transmission of
natural gas in this state shall be laid under the direction and
inspection of proper persons skilled in such business, to be
designated by the chief mining inspector for such duty, and the
expenses of such inspection and
Page 224 U. S. 222
supervision shall be borne and paid for by the parties laying
and constructing such pipelines for the transportation or
transmission of natural gas."
"SEC. 7. No pipeline for the transportation or transmission of
natural gas shall be subjected to a greater pressure than 300
pounds to the square inch, except for the purpose of testing such
lines, and gas pumps shall not be used on any gas pipelines for the
transportation or transmission of natural gas, or used on or in any
gas well within this state;"
and also in the Act of March 27, 1909, Compiled Laws of
Oklahoma, 1909, article 3, chapter 75, § 11, regulating domestic
corporations, which prohibits the use of pumps or other artificial
means in the transmission of gas, when used to the injury of other
corporations, consumers, and producers, producing or consuming
natural gas in the same gas district.
It is contended for the appellants herein that each and all of
these sections of the law are constitutionally valid, and can be
enforced consistently with the opinion of this Court when the case
was here upon its merits. Without entering upon a discussion of
these sections, it is sufficient to say that, insofar as they are
part of the statute the main and controlling purpose of which was
to prohibit the transportation of natural gas in the lawful
channels of interstate commerce, they were for that reason
condemned and held void by the former opinion of this Court
affirming the circuit court.
Furthermore, if the laws named (§§ 5, 6, and 7 of the Act of
1907 and the Act of March 27, 1909) might be valid as statutory
regulations, as to individuals and domestic corporations engaged in
transporting gas wholly within the state, they are not, by the very
terms of these statutes, made applicable to foreign corporations,
such as the defendants, engaged in interstate commerce. Such
corporations and such commerce are forbidden by the act. We see,
therefore, no reason to modify the decree so as to except
Page 224 U. S. 223
from its provisions the sections of the Act of 1907 and the Act
of 1909, and thus apply them to those which the act itself
excludes.
It is furthermore objected that that part of the decree which
undertakes to enjoin not only the execution of the statute law of
Oklahoma, chapter 67 in controversy, but prevents interference with
the pipelines of complainants
"by reason of any other claimed authority or statute of said
state, or common law right, rule of action, or unwritten law
whatsoever, and from in any manner instituting, prosecuting, or
conducting any suits, or suing out any writs of process in any of
the state courts of the State of Oklahoma . . . under the authority
of said legislative act . . . or under any other law or statute of
the State of Oklahoma, or under any common law right, rule of
action, or unwritten law of the State of Oklahoma"
is so broad as to prevent the state from enforcing any of its
lawful enactments at any time passed or to be passed under
authority of the state, or from taking any action whatsoever for
protecting the lawful authority of the commonwealth. But the decree
must be read in view of the issues made and the relief sought and
granted. Looking to the pleadings, and reading the opinion of this
Court in the case when it was considered upon its merits, and thus
construing the decree, we are of opinion that it cannot be given
any such broad construction as is intimated by the Attorney
General, and will not prevent the enforcement of legitimate
legislation of the State of Oklahoma, if such is passed in the
exercise of its police powers, and not conflicting with rights
protected by the federal Constitution. As we have said, this Court
in its decision affirmed the right of the complainants, in the
conduct of interstate commerce, to take natural gas out of the
state, and declared that a state could not prohibit the
transportation of such product beyond its borders, and that the
legislative act in question was an act the main purpose and effect
of
Page 224 U. S. 224
which were to prohibit the exercise of lawful rights secured by
the federal Constitution.
Construing the decree as we do, we think there is no occasion to
modify its terms. The order in this proceeding will therefore
be
Affirmed.
*
"3. The court doth find the issues and equities herein in favor
of the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff is entitled to the relief
prayed for in the bill of complaint herein, and doth find, adjudge,
and decree that chapter 67 of the Session Laws of the State of
Oklahoma of 1907-08, passed and enacted by the Legislature of said
State of Oklahoma, and approved by the Governor of said state on
the 21st day of December, 1907, and referred to in plaintiff's bill
of complaint herein, is unreasonable, unconstitutional, invalid,
and void, and of no force or effect whatever."
"4. The temporary injunction heretofore ordered and entered
herein is hereby made permanent and perpetual, and the defendants
and each and every of them, their representatives, agents,
servants, attorneys, workmen, and employees, and all other persons
whomsoever, advised, inspired, influenced, incited, or prompted by
them, or either of them, are hereby forever restrained and enjoined
from committing any of the acts complained of by complainant in
its, or his bill of complaint, and from tearing up or destroying,
or in any way interfering with, the laying, building, and
construction of complainant's pipelines, or any of the pipelines
referred to in the prayer of complainant's bill of complaint, in,
through, or out of the State of Oklahoma, by reason of any of the
terms or provisions or contents of chapter 67 of the Session Laws
of 1907-1908, passed and enacted by the Legislature of the State of
Oklahoma, or by reason of any other claimed authority or statute of
said state, or common law right, rule of action, or unwritten law
whatsoever, and from in any manner instituting, prosecuting, or
conducting any suits, or suing out any writs of process in any of
the state courts of the State of Oklahoma against the complainants,
or anyone representing it or him, for the purpose of enjoining,
restraining, or interfering with either of them in the laying,
building, construction, maintenance, or operation of any gas
pipeline, either under the authority of said legislative act
contained in said chapter 67 of the Session Laws of Oklahoma,
1907-08, above referred to, or under any other law or statute of
the State of Oklahoma, or under any common law right, rule of
action, or unwritten law of the State of Oklahoma."