The object of § 19 of the Immigration Act of 1907, prohibiting
the owners of vessels from making any charge or receiving any
security for return passage of aliens brought to this country, was
to carry out a policy of preventing the transportation of aliens
within the excluded class by rendering it unprofitable, instead of
profitable, for the vessel owner.
While a statute has no extraterritorial force, and one cannot be
indicted here for what he does in a foreign country, the making of
a contract in a foreign country may, as in this case, create a
condition operative in this country under which acts of omission or
commission can be punished here.
American Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347,
distinguished.
A vessel owner taking security in a foreign country for the
return passage of aliens brought to a port of the United States
violates § 19 of the Immigration Act of 1907, and the retention of
the money in the United States for the return passage is an offense
at the place where it is retained.
185 F. 158 reversed.
Writ of error to review a judgment sustaining a demurrer to an
indictment charging the defendant with taking security and making
charge for the return passage of aliens unlawfully brought into the
United States, and ordered to be returned in pursuance of the
Immigration Act of February, 1907.
The indictment charges that the Nord Deutscher Lloyd, a German
corporation, operated a line of steamers between Bremen and New
York, maintaining an office and place of business in both cities.
On November 25, 1910, in Bremen, it sold tickets to two aliens
entitling them to passage to New York and return. Before their
embarkation, the defendant collected from them 150 rubles for the
return passage money in steerage. On arrival in New
Page 223 U. S. 513
York, the aliens were ordered to be deported to Germany as
likely to become public charges because of senility and inability
to make a living. On December 16, 1910, after the unlawful bringing
into this country of said aliens, and while they were liable to
deportation on the vessel by which they came, the said 150 rubles
were still held and retained in possession of the defendant up to
(April 3, 1911) the date of filing the indictment,
"the defendant so holding and retaining the same and making
charge thereof for the return of such aliens, and being taken and
continuously held by the said defendant, as security from the said
aliens, for the payment of such charge for their return passage to
Germany aforesaid, in violation and evasion of § 19 of the
immigration laws of the United States, approved February 20, 1907.
The defendant . . . , by the means aforesaid at and within the
Southern District of New York, on December 16, 1910, unlawfully and
willfully did make charge for the return of aliens, so as aforesaid
brought into this country in violation of law, and take security
from them and keep and hold the same for the payment of such
charge, then and there well knowing that such aliens had been
brought to this country in violation of law."
The court sustained the demurrer on the ground that the money
was paid and received in Germany, and that the facts did not amount
to a violation of § 19, which provides:
"That all aliens brought to this country in violation of law
shall, if practicable, be immediately sent back to the country
whence they respectively came, on the vessels bringing them. The
cost of their maintenance while on land, as well as the expense of
the return of such aliens, shall be borne by the owner or owners of
the vessels on which they respectively came."
And
". . . if such owner shall refuse to pay the cost of their
maintenance while on land, or shall
make any charge for the
return of any such alien, or shall take any security from him for
the
Page 223 U. S. 514
payment of such charge,"
such owner shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
Page 223 U. S. 516
MR. JUSTICE LAMAR, after making the foregoing statement,
delivered the opinion of the Court.
Section 19 of the immigration Act of 1907 (Feb. 20,
Page 223 U. S. 517
1907, 34 Stat. 898, 904, c. 1134), is not aimed at the aliens of
the excluded class, but at the owners of vessels unlawfully
bringing them into this country. The government might in large
measure protect itself by inspection, rejection, and order of
deportation, but it is purposed, also, as far as possible, to
protect the alien. He might be ignorant of our laws, and ought to
be deterred from incurring the expense of making a passage which
could only end in his being returned to the country from whence he
came. This policy could best be subserved by securing the
cooperation of the transportation companies, and to this end the
statute required that they should not only maintain the aliens
unlawfully brought by them into this country, but should take them
back free of charge. In the absence of this last provision, the
company might well afford to accept as passengers those known or
suspected to belong to the excluded class. It would receive from
them their passage money from Europe to America. If they passed the
inspection, the transaction was ended. If they were deported, the
company would be at the trifling expense of maintaining them while
here. But if it could charge and secure payment for the return
passage, it would collect two fares instead of one. This would have
made the transportation of an excluded alien more profitable than
the carrying of one who could lawfully enter. This was so obvious
that the statute not only required the cost of their passage to be
borne by the transportation company, but prohibited the making of a
charge, or the taking of security, for the return passage, which
might be collected or enforced at the end of the journey.
It is said, however, that no such charge was made in New York;
that the indictment shows only the case of an ordinary sale of a
round-trip steerage ticket from Bremen to New York, and that what
was lawfully done in Germany cannot be punished as a crime in New
York.
The statute, of course, has no extraterritorial operation,
Page 223 U. S. 518
and the defendant cannot be indicted here for what he did in a
foreign country.
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.,
213 U. S. 347. But
the parties in Germany could make a contract which would be of
force in the United States. When, therefore, in Bremen, the alien
paid and the defendant received the 150 rubles for a return
passage, they created a condition which was operative in New York.
If, in that city, the company had refused to honor the ticket, the
alien could there have enforced his rights. In like manner, if, by
reason of facts occurring in New York, the statute operated to
rescind the contract, the rights and duties of the parties could
there be determined, and acts of commission or omission, which, as
a result of the rescission, were there unlawful could there be
punished.
If, as argued, the company did nothing in New York except to
retain money which had been lawfully paid in Germany, the result is
not different, because, under the circumstances, nonaction was
equivalent to action. The indictment charges that, on December 16,
1910, it was found that the aliens had been unlawfully brought into
this country. The company at once was under the duty of taking them
back at its own cost. Instead of returning to them the money
previously received for such transportation, the defendant retained
it up to the date of the indictment, April 3, 1911, with intent to
make charge and secure payment for their passage to Bremen. This
retention of the money, with such intent, was an affirmative
violation of the statute. The company could not take the aliens
back free of charge, as required by law, and at the same time
retain the fare covering the same trip.
The demurrer admits that, with knowledge that it was bound to
carry the excluded aliens back at its own cost, the defendant in
New York made a charge, and retained the 150 rubles, with intent to
apply that money in satisfaction thereof. If that be true, the
defendant violated
Page 223 U. S. 519
the statute within the Southern District of New York, and can
there be indicted and tried.
The judgment must therefore be
Reversed.
