Damages caused by failure to deliver goods is not traceable to a
violation of the Interstate Commerce Law, and is not within the
provisions of §§ 8 and 9 of the act; the jurisdiction of the
Commission and the United States courts is not exclusive.
Texas
& Pacific Railway v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.
S. 426, distinguished.
While statutes have no extraterritorial operation and courts of
one government cannot enforce the penal laws of another, state
courts have jurisdiction of civil and transitory actions created by
a foreign statute, provided it is not of a character opposed to the
public policy of the state in which it is brought.
Jurisdiction is not defeated by implication, and there is no
presumption that Congress intends to prevent state courts from
exercising jurisdiction already possessed by them, and under which
they have power to hear and determine causes of action created by
federal statute.
Robb v. Connolly, 111
U. S. 637.
When a federal statute creating an action, such as the Carmack
Amendment, is silent on the subject of jurisdiction, the
presumption is that the action may be asserted in a state, as well
as in a federal, court.
The Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn Act of June 29, 1906, 34
Stat. 584, 595, c. 3591, is not unconstitutional.
Atlantic
Coast Lin v. Riverside Mills, 219 U.
S. 186.
Quaere, and not determinable in this action, as the
carrier failed to plead or prove the cause of nondelivery, whether
the Carmack Amendment makes the initial carrier an insurer, or
deprives it of the right to contract with the shipper against
liability for damages not caused by its own or the connecting
carrier's negligence.
Under the Carmack Amendment, wherever the carrier voluntarily
accepts goods for shipment to a point on another line in
another
Page 223 U. S. 482
state, it is conclusively treated as having made a through
contract,
Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills,
219 U. S. 186; it
thereby elects to treat connecting carriers as its agents, and the
presumptions are that, if goods are lost, the loss results from the
negligence of itself or of its agents.
Under the Carmack Amendment, when a carrier accepts goods for
shipment to a point on another line in another state, the burden of
proof falls on it as the initial carrier to prove that the loss has
not resulted from some cause for which it is in law or by contract
responsible.
The facts, which involve the liability of an initial common
carrier for nondelivery of goods by the connecting carrier, are
stated in the opinion.
Page 223 U. S. 488
MR. JUSTICE LAMAR delivered the opinion of the Court.
In both these cases, the plaintiff in error was held liable as
"initial carrier" for failure to deliver mohair shipped from points
in Texas to the consignee in Lowell. The company denied liability
on the ground that, under the contract expressed in the bills of
lading, its obligation and liability ceased when it duly and safely
delivered the goods
Page 223 U. S. 489
to the next carrier. It excepts to various rulings of the trial
court by which it was prevented from proving that it had fully
complied with its contract, had duly delivered the mohair at
Galveston, to the first connecting carrier, which delivered it at
New York, to the next carrier, which, in turn, delivered it to the
Boston & Maine Railroad. Neither the pleadings nor proof showed
what this company did with the mohair, nor the cause of its
nondelivery, if indeed it was not delivered. For there was some
evidence tending to show that this mohair might have been among
other sacks, the marks of which had been destroyed, and were still
held by the consignee awaiting identification. This contention,
however, was found against the carrier, and it was held liable to
the plaintiffs. 117 S.W. 169, 170.
The question as to whether the plaintiff was entitled to recover
the value of the goods at Lowell, or, as provided in the bill of
lading at the point of shipment, is suggested in one of the briefs.
No such issue was made in the lower court, nor is it referred to in
any of the many assignments of error involving the construction and
constitutionality of the Carmack Amendment to the Hepburn bill of
1906, providing that, where goods are received for shipment in
interstate commerce, the initial carrier shall be liable for
damages caused by itself or connecting carriers, and making void
any contract of exemption against such liability, 34 Stat. 584.
1. The jurisdiction of the state court was attacked first on the
ground that § 9 of the original Act of 1887 provided that persons
damaged by a violation of the statute "might make complaint before
the Commission . . . or in any district or circuit court of the
United States." 24 Stat. 379.
It was contended that
Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene
Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 426,
ruled that this jurisdiction was exclusive, and from that it was
argued that no suit
Page 223 U. S. 490
could be maintained in a state court on any cause of action
created either by the original Act of 1887 or by the amendment of
1906. But damage caused by failure to deliver goods is in no way
traceable to a violation of the statute, and is not therefore
within the provisions of §§ 8 and 9 of the Act to Regulate
Commerce.
Atlantic Coast Line v. Riverside Mills,
219 U. S.
208.
The real question, therefore, presented by this assignment of
error is whether a state court may enforce a right of action
arising under an act of Congress.
Statutes have no extraterritorial operation, and the courts of
one government cannot enforce the penal laws of another. At one
time, there was some question both as to the duty and power to try
civil cases arising solely under the statutes of another state. But
it is now recognized that the jurisdiction of state courts extends
to the hearing and determination of any civil and transitory cause
of action created by a foreign statute, provided it is not of a
character opposed to the public policy of the state in which the
suit is brought. Where the statute creating the right provides an
exclusive remedy, to be enforced in a particular way, or before a
special tribunal, the aggrieved party will be left to the remedy
given by the statute which created the right. But jurisdiction is
not defeated by implication. And, considering the relation between
the federal and state government, there is no presumption that
Congress intended to prevent state courts from exercising the
general jurisdiction already possessed by them, and under which
they had the power to hear and determine causes of action created
by federal statute.
Robb v. Connolly, 111
U. S. 637.
On the contrary, the absence of such provision would be
construed as recognizing that, where the cause of action was not
penal, but civil and transitory, it was to be subject to the
principles governing that class of cases, and might be asserted in
a state court as well as in those of
Page 223 U. S. 491
the United States. This presumption would be strengthened as to
a statute like this, passed not only for the purpose of giving a
right, but of affording a convenient remedy.
2. The question as to the constitutionality of the Carmack
Amendment, though ably and elaborately argued, is out of the case,
having been decided adversely to the contention of the plaintiff in
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Riverside Mills,
219 U. S. 186,
after the present suit was instituted.
The company, however, seeks to distinguish this from that on the
ground that, in the
Riverside case, it was admitted that
the damage to the freight was caused by the negligence of the
connecting carrier. And, as the statute applies to cases where the
damage is caused by the initial or connecting carrier, and as the
cause of the loss of the goods does not appear here, it is argued
that liability is to be governed by the contract, which provides
that the initial carrier should not be responsible beyond its own
line. Plaintiff in error insists that the Carmack Amendment did not
make it an insurer. Under the construction given that statute in In
re Released Rates, 13 I.C.C. 550;
Bernard v. Adams Express
Co., 205 Mass. 254;
Travis v. Wells, Fargo & Co.,
79 N.J.L. 83, it claims that the initial carrier is not deprived of
its right to contract with the shipper against liability for
damages not caused by either carrier's negligence. But the failure
to plead and to prove the cause of the nondelivery of the goods at
destination precludes any determination of such questions.
Under the Carmack Amendment, as already construed in the
Riverside Mills case, wherever the carrier voluntarily
accepts goods for shipment to a point on another line in another
state, it is conclusively treated as having made a through
contract. It thereby elected to treat the connecting carriers as
its agents for all purposes of transportation
Page 223 U. S. 492
and delivery. This case, then, must be treated as though the
point of destination was on its own line, and is to be governed by
the same rules of pleading, practice, and presumption as would have
applied if the shipment had been between stations in different
states, but both on the company's railroad. Thus considered, when
the holders of the bills of lading proved the goods had not been
delivered to the consignee, the presumption arose that they had
been lost by reason of the negligence of the carrier or its agents.
The burden of proof that the loss resulted from some cause for
which the initial carrier was not responsible in law or by contract
was then cast upon the carrier. The plaintiffs were not obliged
both to prove their case and to disprove the existence of a
defense. The carrier and its agents, having received possession of
the goods, were charged with the duty of delivering them or
explaining why that had not been done. This must be so, because
carriers not only have better means, but often the only means, of
making such proof. If the failure to deliver was due to the act of
God, the public enemy, or some cause against which it might
lawfully contract, it was for the carrier to bring itself within
such exception. In the absence of such proof, the plaintiffs were
entitled to recover, and the judgment is
Affirmed.