A state statute which makes special entries in public records
prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence of the validity
of the proceedings referred to deals with rules of evidence, and
not with substantive rights.
One is not deprived of his property without due process of law
by a statute making entries in public records
prima facie,
but not conclusive, evidence, of the validity of the proceedings
referred to.
A contract of sale of state lands, on which periodic payments
are to be made, with forfeiture in case of nonpayment, is not
impaired by
Page 223 U. S. 438
a subsequent state statute making the official entries in public
records
prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence of the
validity of proceedings for forfeiture.
The statute of Kansas of 1907, c. 373, making entries of default
and proceedings for forfeiture made in usual course of business in
the records of sales of school lands
prima facie, but not
conclusive, evidence of the validity of forfeiture proceedings is
not unconstitutional either as depriving one who had previously
purchased land under the Act of 1879, c. 161, § 2, of his property
without due process of law or as impairing the obligation of the
contract under the Act of 1879.
80 Kan. 148 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the constitutionality of certain
provisions of the laws of the Kansas in regard to sale of school
lands, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was an action in a district court of the State of Kansas to
recover the possession of a quarter section of land to which the
parties were asserting adverse claims under the school land laws of
the state. The plaintiff's claim originated in a contract of
purchase with the state whereby he was required annually to pay
interest on the unpaid purchase price at a stipulated rate. He
failed for three years to comply with that requirement, and
proceedings looking to a forfeiture of his rights under the
contract resulted, in 1901, in a notation of forfeiture, as
hereinafter explained. The defendant claimed under a like contract
made, in 1902, upon the supposition that all rights under the prior
contract had been extinguished.
Page 223 U. S. 439
In 1906, while the defendant was in possession and complying
with his contract, the plaintiff made payment of the purchase price
and interest under his contract, and a patent was issued to him.
The action was begun in 1907, when the defendant was still in
possession and complying with his contract. The controversy turned
upon the validity of the forfeiture proceedings. If they were
valid, the plaintiff was not entitled to recover; otherwise he
was.
The statute (Laws Kansas 1879, c. 161, § 2, p. 288), prescribing
the mode of forfeiture in force since before the plaintiff's
contract was made, reads as follows:
"If any purchaser of school land shall fail to pay the annual
interest when the same becomes due, or the balance of the purchase
money when the same becomes due, it shall be the duty of the county
clerk of the county in which such land is situated immediately to
issue to the purchaser a notice in writing notifying such purchaser
of such default, and that, if such purchaser fail to pay or cause
to be paid the amount so due, together with the costs of issuing
and serving such notice, within sixty days from the service
thereof, the said purchaser, and all persons claiming under him,
will forfeit absolutely all right and interest in and to such land
under said purchase. . . . The notice above provided for shall be
served by the sheriff of the county by delivering a copy thereof to
such purchaser, if found in the county, also to all persons in
possession of such land, and if such purchaser cannot be found, and
no person is in possession of said land, then by posting the same
up in a conspicuous place in the office of the county clerk. . . .
Said sheriff shall serve such notice, and make due return of the
time and manner of such service, within fifteen days from the time
of his receipt of the same. . . . If such purchaser shall fail to
pay the sum so due, and all costs incident to the issue and service
of said notice, within sixty days from the time of the service or
posting of such notice, as above
Page 223 U. S. 440
provided, such purchaser, and all persons claiming under him,
shall forfeit absolutely all rights and interest in and to such
land, under and by virtue of such purchase."
Upon the trial, it appeared that, while the plaintiff was in
default, as before indicated, the county clerk of the county
wherein the land was situate issued a notice to him in conformity
with this statute; that the sheriff made a return thereon within
the time prescribed, reading:
"Received this notice this 13th day of July, 1901, and served
the same by leaving a copy with C. C. Potter, who occupied the
within premises, July 17, 1907;"
that, although not so stated in his return, the sheriff duly
posted the notice in the office of the county clerk; that, when the
notice was served the plaintiff, although not so stated in the
sheriff's return, was not a resident of the state, and was absent
therefrom; that he failed to pay the sum due within sixty days from
the time of the service and posting of the notice, and that, upon
the expiration of that period, the county clerk entered upon the
school land record of the county the notation "Land forfeited," in
such connection as to refer to the plaintiff's contract. Whether or
not C. C. Potter, to whom a copy of the notice was delivered was
the only person in possession of the land at the time did not
appear.
After the issuance of the patent to the plaintiff, and after the
action was begun, but before it was brought to trial, the state
legislature enacted a statute (Laws Kansas 1907, c. 373, pp.
538-539) containing these provisions:
"SECTION 1. Where entries which appear upon the records of
school land sales, or of school land sale certificates, in the
office of the county clerk of any county in this state, and
purporting or shown to have been made in the usual course of the
business of that office, indicate that the interest of the
purchaser in the tract of land in connection with which such
entries were made had been
Page 223 U. S. 441
forfeited for default in the payment of money due the state on
such purchase, and such land was thereafter sold to a new
purchaser, such entries shall be
prima facie evidence, in
any action or proceeding in any court in this state, that proper
notice of the purchaser's default had been issued and legal service
thereof made, and that all things necessary to be done as
conditions precedent to the forfeiture of the right and interest of
the purchaser, and all persons claiming under him, in and to such
land, had been duly and properly done and performed, and that such
forfeiture had been duly declared. Any entry upon said records of
the county clerk as 'cancelled,' 'forfeited,' 'reverted to state,'
'state,' and the like, with or without date shall be held to be an
entry indicating that the interest of the purchaser had been
forfeited."
The district court ruled that this statute was applicable to
pending causes; that the notation "Land forfeited" upon the school
land record in the county clerk's office was
prima facie
evidence of the lawful service of the forfeiture notice and of the
due declaration of the forfeiture, and that this
prima
facie evidence was not overcome by the other facts disclosed
at the trial, and so gave judgment for the defendant. The judgment
was affirmed by the supreme court of the state (80 Kan. 148), and
the plaintiff then brought the case here upon the contention,
denied by that court, that the statute of 1907 impaired the
obligation of his contract, and therefore was violative of the
contract clause of the Constitution of the United States.
In our opinion, the contention cannot be sustained. The
plaintiff's rights arising out of his contract were in no wise
impaired by the statute of 1907. It did not interpose any obstacle
to their assertion by him, and neither did it leave him without a
suitable remedy for their ascertainment and enforcement. If the
attempted forfeiture was invalid before, it continued to be so
thereafter. The
Page 223 U. S. 442
statute dealt only with a rule of evidence, not with any
substantive right. By making the entry of forfeiture upon the
official record
prima facie, but not conclusive, evidence
that all preliminary steps essential to a valid forfeiture were
properly taken, and that the forfeiture was duly declared, it but
established a rebuttable presumption, which he was at liberty to
overcome by other evidence. That such a statute does not offend
against either the contract clause or the due process of law clause
of the Constitution, even where the change is made applicable to
pending causes, is now well settled.
Pillow v.
Roberts, 13 How. 472,
54 U. S. 476;
Marx v. Hanthorn, 148 U. S. 172,
148 U. S. 181;
Turpin v. Lemon, 187 U. S. 51,
187 U. S. 59;
Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S.
61,
220 U. S. 81;
Curtis v.
Whitney, 13 Wall. 68; Cooley, Const.Lim., 7th ed.,
409, 524-526.
It was because the plaintiff failed to assume and carry the
burden of overcoming the rebuttable presumption established by the
statute that he failed in his action.
Judgment affirmed.