In allotting Indian lands, Congress can determine the conditions
under which they shall be alienated by the allottees, and titles
resting on deeds of Commissioners and consents of the allottees
required by the statute under which the lands were allotted are to
be determined by the federal statute, and not by the laws of the
states.
Under the Act of March 3, 1893, 27 Stat. 612, c. 209, and the
amendatory act of June 7, 1897, 30 Stat. 62, c. 3, carrying out the
treaty with the Omaha Indians of 1854, the consent required to be
given to the Commissioner for sale of land of allottee Indians in
the Puyallup Reservation in Washington was not a mere power to
sell
Page 223 U. S. 201
which terminated with the death of the giver, but an agreement
which continued in force after death.
The rule that, where ambiguity exists, courts will follow the
construction placed on a statute by the department charged with its
execution is strengthened where the statute itself directs such
department to make the necessary regulations to carry it into
effect.
Habits of Indian life will be considered in construing a statute
providing methods for a sale of Indian lands, and it will not be
presumed that Congress would insert therein a condition which
defeats an approved sale by the death of a roving Indian before the
delivery of the deed.
46 Wash. 562 affirmed.
The facts, which involve the title to lands in the Puyallup
Indian Reservation allotted under the treaty with the Omaha Indians
and the Acts of March 3, 1893, and June 7, 1897, are stated in the
opinion.
Page 223 U. S. 207
MR. JUSTICE McKENNA delivered the opinion of the Court.
Error to the Supreme Court of Washington to review a decree of
that court which affirmed a decree of the Superior Court of the
County of Pierce adjudging defendant in error, who was plaintiff in
the trial court, to be the owner of the East Half and the East Half
of the East Half to the West Half of the Northeast Quarter of the
Northwest Quarter of Section 35, Township 21 N., R. 3 East of the
Willamette Meridian, Pierce County, Washington, formerly in King
County, Washington.
The land lies in the Puyallup Indian Reservation, and was
allotted or patented by the United States on January 30, 1886, to
Charley Jacobs, the head of a family consisting of himself, Julia,
Annie, Frank, and Oscar, all Puyallup Indians, the allotment or
patent being subject to the stipulations and conditions contained
in Art. 6 of the treaty of the United States with the Omaha
Indians. Plaintiffs in error were not named in the patent, they not
then being born.
Page 223 U. S. 208
Defendant in error claims title under a deed dated February 27,
1901, from C. A. Snowden, Trustee and Commissioner of Puyallup
Lands, appointed by the United States government under an act of
Congress dated March 3, 1893, 27 Stat. 612, c. 209, and an
amendatory act passed June 7, 1897, 30 Stat. 62, c. 3.
Plaintiffs in error claim title to an undivided one-third part
of the lands as heirs of Charley and Julia Jacobs, deceased, and
contend that the deed from Snowden is void as to them or as to the
interest they would take as such heirs for the reason that the
Snowden sale and deed were after the death of Charley and Julia
Jacobs.
Article 6 of the treaty of the United States with the Omaha
Indians, to the conditions of which the patent to Charley Jacobs
was made subject, empowered the President to cause allotments to be
made from reservation lands to such Indians as were willing to
avail themselves of the privilege, and who would locate on the same
as permanent homes. The patent was to be issued upon the further
condition that the assigned land should not "be aliened or leased
for a longer term than two years," and "should be exempt from levy,
sale, or forfeiture." Upon the formation of a state, these
restrictions could be removed by the legislature, but it was
provided that they could not be removed without the consent of
Congress. It was also provided that lands not necessary for
assignment might be sold for the benefit of the Indians under such
rules and regulations as might thereafter be prescribed by Congress
or the President of the United States.
Under the Act of March 3, 1893, the President was empowered to
appoint a commission of three persons to select and appraise such
portion of the allotted lands not required for homes of the Indian
allottees. It was provided that, if the Secretary of the Interior
approved the selections and the appraisement, the lands selected
should
Page 223 U. S. 209
be sold for the benefit of the allottees, after due notice at
public auction at no less than the appraised value.
It was the duty of the commission to superintend the sale of the
lands, ascertain the true owners thereof, and have guardians
appointed for minor heirs of deceased allottees, and make deeds of
the lands to the purchasers thereof, subject to the approval of the
Secretary of the Interior. The deeds, it was provided, should
operate as a complete conveyance of the lands upon a full payment
of the purchase money. The disposition of the money was provided
for, and it was provided further that no part of the lands should
be offered for sale until the Indian or Indians entitled to the
same should sign a written agreement consenting to the sale
thereof, and appointing the commissioners, or a majority of them,
trustees to sell the land and make deeds to the purchasers. The
approval of the Secretary was made necessary to the validity of the
deeds, and he was directed to make all necessary regulations to
carry out the provisions of the act.
On November 6, 1893, the Secretary instructed the commissioners,
in accordance with the terms of the act, as to the appraisement of
the lands, and to ascertain who were allottees or the heirs of
allottees, or heads of families under the laws of Washington, to
have guardians appointed for the minor heirs of deceased allottees,
and to obtain the consent of the heirs to twenty-one years and of
such guardians. The commissioners were directed to report to the
Secretary their action for approval, and, if approved, further
instructions were to be given.
By an act subsequent to that of March 3, 1893, to-wit, an Act of
June 7, 1897, the number of commissioners was reduced to one, and
Clinton A. Snowden was appointed commissioner. Instructions were
given to him, and he was informed as follows:
"That the title under these patents vests in the family whose
names are recited in the patent, and not in the head of the family.
It is
Page 223 U. S. 210
necessary to obtain the written consent of all the members of
the family named in the patent. That it is necessary to have legal
guardians appointed for minors who are themselves allottees, but
not minor heirs of deceased allottees. It is necessary to obtain
the written consent of sale of allotments of all members of the
family named in the patent, and natural guardians and parents of
minors are incompetent for this purpose, as in the case of minor
heirs of deceased allottees."
On January 18, 1901, in answer to an inquiry of Snowden, the
Secretary instructed him that, where the allottees and true owners
of the lands had executed consents of sale which had been approved
by the Secretary, it was the practice of the Department to continue
the sale of the lands covered thereby, though the allottee or owner
died, and to distribute the funds arising therefrom to his or her
heirs, the department regarding the "consents as remaining in full
force upon the decease of the Indian executing the same," they
being "in the nature of an agreement or contract to be carried out
for the sole benefit of his heirs in case of his decease." The
Secretary added:
"These lands are sold under the provision of the Act of
Congress, March 3, 1893, and not under the laws of Washington. . .
. It is for the department to pass upon the sufficiency of
consents, and not the courts of Washington."
Charley Jacobs was, as we have seen, the grantee in the patent
as the head of a family consisting of himself, Julia, Annie, Frank,
and Oscar. Julia was his wife, Annie his sister, Frank his son by a
former wife, and Oscar his son by his wife, Julia.
Lillie Jacobs and Ruther Jacobs, plaintiffs in error, are,
respectively, a daughter and son of Charley and Julia, and were
born, respectively, in the years 1888 and 1891 -- that is, after
the patent was issued -- and necessarily were not named
therein.
Page 223 U. S. 211
Annie, who was named in the patent, died in November, 1888,
never having been married, and leaving Charley Jacobs her sole
heir. He, on the seventh of March, 1898, Julia Jacobs, and Frank
Jacobs, all of age and named in the patent, executed a written
consent required by the statute, directing Commissioner Snowden to
sell the lands.
Charley Jacobs, as guardian of Oscar Jacobs, named in the
patent, having been previously appointed by the Superior Court of
Pierce County, executed a similar consent, and also a similar
consent as the sole heir of Annie, named in the patent.
These consents and other papers were duly transmitted to the
Secretary of the Interior and approved by him, and Snowden, on the
twenty-seventh of February, 1901, duly offered the lands for sale
at public auction. They were purchased by A. G. Prichard, trustee,
in accordance with the statute, he making the payment required.
Snowden executed a deed to him, which was duly approved by the
Secretary of the Interior and duly recorded in the Office of Indian
Affairs.
Prior to the commencement of this action, Prichard made the
payments required, which were received and accepted by the Interior
Department for distribution to those entitled to the same,
including Ruther Jacobs and Lillie Jacobs, plaintiffs in error.
Their guardian, E. D. Wilcox, has not received the same, and
refused to accept the sum except a cash payment of $420.
Charley Jacobs died January 2, 1900, leaving surviving him,
among others, the plaintiffs in error, who, as we have said, were
not named in the patent. His death was reported to the Commissioner
of Indian Affairs by Snowden May 1, 1900.
Wilcox is the duly appointed guardian of plaintiffs in error,
and reported to the court the receipt by him of the payment of
$420, made by Prichard. He did not know, however, that the sale by
Snowden was after the death of
Page 223 U. S. 212
Charley Jacobs, father of plaintiffs in error, until after the
commencement of this suit, and, as soon as he discovered that fact,
refused to receive any further payment. The money received by
plaintiffs in error as their share of the purchase price of the
land was tendered to defendant in error prior to the trial of the
action.
At the time Prichard, defendant in error, purchased the land, he
did not know of the death of Charley Jacobs, and was at no time
advised of it or of the existence of plaintiffs in error until
shortly before bringing this action. He purchased the property in
good faith, relying upon the representations of Snowden, and in the
full belief of the regularity of the proceedings.
We have stated the facts thus fully, although they are not
disputed, as they exhibit clearly upon what right the Secretary of
the Interior proceeded in his instructions to Commissioner Snowden,
and the strict compliance of the latter with those instructions. It
will be observed that where the allottees and true owners executed
consents which had been approved by the Secretary, it was the
practice of the department to continue the sale of the lands
covered thereby, though the allottee or owner died, and to
distribute the funds arising therefrom to his or her heirs, the
department regarding the "consents as remaining in full force upon
the decease of the Indian executing the same," they being "in the
nature of an agreement or contract to be carried out for the sole
benefit of his heirs in case of his decease." The Secretary
expressed the view that the
"lands are sold under the provisions of the Act of Congress,
March 3, 1893, and not under the laws of Washington. . . . It is
for the department to pass upon the sufficiency of consents, and
not the courts of Washington."
Defendant in error takes the view that the consents remained
good after the decease of the Indian who gave them, in this case
Charley Jacobs, and were "in the nature
Page 223 U. S. 213
of a permanent power or trusteeship." On the other hand,
plaintiffs in error contend that the consent was a "naked power to
sell," and terminated with the death of the giver.
There can be no doubt of the power of Congress to give character
to the consents.
United States ex Rel. Lowe v. Fisher,
ante, p.
223 U. S. 95;
Cherokee Nation v. Whitmire, Trustee, ante, p.
223 U. S. 108. The
questions in the case therefore turn upon the statute, and both
sides invoke it to sustain their respective contentions.
The patent to Charley Jacobs was made subject to the conditions
and restrictions of the sixth article of the treaty. In other
words, there was a limitation upon the right of alienation of the
patented lands, and the ultimate power to remove this restriction
and grant a right of full alienation was reserved to Congress. The
Act of 1893 was an exercise of this power. It provided for the sale
of such part of the allotted lands as was not required for the
homes of the Indians, and prescribed the conditions of the sale to
be "a written agreement consenting to the sale," signed by the
Indian or Indians entitled to the allotted land offered for sale.
And it was provided further that the agreement should constitute
the commissioners, or a majority of them (subsequently, one
commissioner), trustees to sell the lands and "make deeds to the
purchasers for the same," subject to the approval of the Secretary
of the Interior, which deeds should "operate as a complete
conveyance of the land upon the full payment of the purchase
money." It is manifest that the "consent" required created
something more than a mere revocable agency. It was a written
agreement giving the commissioner (we drop the plural) full power
to execute the provision and policy of the Act of Congress -- a
power which could be confidently counted on as continuing against
contingencies, and to terminate in a "complete conveyance of the
land."
That the "consent" was to have this character was the
Page 223 U. S. 214
immediate and continued construction of the act of Congress by
the Interior Department, and such construction would determine
against ambiguity in the act even if we should admit ambiguity
existed. The rule which gives strength to the construction of the
officers who are directed to execute the law, and who, it has been
said, may have written or suggested it, is given an added force
from one of the provisions of the act of Congress. It directs the
Secretary of the Interior "to make the necessary regulations to
carry out the purposes" of its enactment.
But we find no ambiguity in the act when we consider its purpose
and the habits of Indian life. It could not have been intended
that, when proceedings had been instituted under it, they should be
embarrassed always by the possibility of defeat, and, it may be,
progressing up to the moment of the delivery of the deed to a
purchaser, should be made useless and nugatory by the death of some
roving Indian. It is to be noted that all the proceedings are under
the control of the Secretary of the Interior, and that any
irregularity in them or improvidence in the consents can be
corrected by him.
We do not answer in detail the argument of plaintiffs in error
based on the law of agency, because we do not think its analogies
are applicable to the situation.
The Supreme Court of Washington has repeated its ruling in this
case in two others,
Little Bill v. Swanson, 64 Wash. 650;
Little Bill v. Dyslin, 64 Wash. 697.
Judgment affirmed.