The specification of the identity of a defendant and precise
nature of his offense is the end, and not the beginning, of a grand
jury proceeding.
Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S.
43.
An indictment for subornation of perjury committed before a
grand jury inquiry into certain criminal violations of the law of
the United States relating to the public lands, disposal of the
same, and the unlawful fencing thereof, is not insufficient, as
failing to set forth the nature and cause of the accusation,
because it does not state the particular matter brought under
inquiry.
Markham v. United States, 160 U.
S. 319.
The facts, which involve the sufficiency of an indictment for
perjury and the rights of the accused under the
Page 223 U. S. 179
Sixth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, are
stated in the opinion.
Page 223 U. S. 180
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WHITE delivered the the opinion of the
court:
The plaintiff in error, upon a conviction and sentence for
subornation of perjury, in violation of ยง 5393, Revised Statutes,
prosecutes this writ of error upon the theory that a question of
constitutional right was involved, arising upon a claim made in the
court below that the indictment was repugnant to the Sixth
Amendment to the Constitution. On the assumption that there was
jurisdiction to entertain the writ, counsel also in argument
assailed as erroneous certain rulings of the trial court "admitting
evidence and instructions given and refused in the course of the
trial."
The indictment consisted of two counts -- the first charging the
subornation of one George W. Hawk, and the second the subornation
of one Clyde Brown, to commit perjury in giving the testimony
before a federal grand jury.
Page 223 U. S. 181
As, however, on the trial, the government elected to rely upon
the charge of the subornation of Hawk, we are concerned alone with
the first count. The sufficiency of this count was assailed by
demurrer, it being alleged
"that the said count of said indictment and the matters and
facts therein contained, in manner and form as the same are stated,
are not sufficient in law, and are not sufficient to constitute a
crime, and are not direct and certain."
The protection of the Constitution was not, however, invoked
until after conviction, when a motion to arrest judgment was
made,
"based upon the ground that the indictment in this case does not
charge a crime, and is insufficient, and does not sufficiently
describe the offense, 'and does not inform the defendant of the
nature and cause of the accusation' against him, and is in
violation of and insufficient under the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States."
The portions of the indictment which relate to the particular
matter which was under investigation before the grand jury, or
which refer to the materiality of the alleged testimony, and which
it is claimed exhibit the repugnancy of the indictment to the Sixth
Amendment, are contained in the excerpt which is in the margin,
* the italics
being
Page 223 U. S. 182
those of counsel, who assert that the italicized portion "is the
portion bearing upon the question."
It is urged that the indictment did not sufficiently set
Page 223 U. S. 183
forth "the nature and cause of the accusation" within the
meaning of the Sixth Amendment, because it did not
"set forth in some definite way the matter or thing which was
under investigation at the particular time, so that the defendant
may know as to what particular controversy the alleged false
testimony is claimed to be material, and how to meet the allegation
of materiality."
It is claimed
"that the indictment, in order to be sufficient, should have
stated
the particular matter which was being investigated
by the grand jury at the time, and to which it was claimed the
alleged false testimony was material,"
and that, if the alleged false testimony concerning Hawk's final
proof upon his land
"became material collaterally in some other later matter, of
which the grand jury did have jurisdiction, . . . the collateral
matter should have been set forth, and the indictment should have
alleged that it was material in relation to that matter, so that
the defendant could have an opportunity to intelligently defend as
to the materiality of the alleged evidence, as well as to other
elements of the offense."
Reduced to their final analysis, the contentions but assert that
the indictment did not apprise the accused of the crime charged
with such reasonable certainty that he could make his defense and
be protected after judgment against another prosecution for the
same offense. We are of opinion, however, that the principles
settled by many prior adjudications of this Court are so
controlling as to foreclose discussion of the matter.
The description, in the indictment, of the proceeding in which
the perjury was committed, is as follows:
". . . sitting as a grand jury . . . and, among other matters,
inquiring into certain criminal violations of the laws of the said
United States relating to the public lands and the disposal of the
same, and the unlawful fencing thereof, which had then lately
before been committed within the said district. "
Page 223 U. S. 184
That this description adequately advised the defendant as to the
identity of the proceeding in which the perjury was committed is
settled by the following authorities:
Markham v. United
States, 160 U. S. 319,
160 U. S. 320;
Williamson v. United States, 207 U.
S. 425;
Rosen v. United States, 161 U. S.
29,
161 U. S. 34,
161 U. S. 40;
Dunbar v. United States, 156 U. S. 185,
156 U. S. 192;
Bannon v. United States, 156 U. S. 464,
156 U. S. 468;
Coffin v. United States, 156 U. S. 432,
156 U. S. 452,
and
Kirby v. United States, 174 U. S.
47,
174 U. S. 64. A
less definite description was held sufficient in the
Markham case, where the indictment specified "an inquiry
then pending before and within the jurisdiction of the Commissioner
of Pensions of the United States at Washington, in the District of
Columbia." As the specification of the identity of a defendant and
the precise nature of his offense is normally the end, and not the
beginning, of grand jury proceedings (
Hale v. Kenkel,
201 U. S. 43,
201 U. S. 61,
201 U. S. 65),
and the very object of the proceeding may have been to determine
the identity of the criminal, it was not essential that the
proceedings should state the name of a specified defendant under
investigation.
That the indictment was not wanting in definiteness because
therein it was in effect simply alleged that, before the grand
jury, after Hawk had been sworn, the truth of the recited matters
concerning which it was subsequently alleged Hawk testified falsely
"became and was a material question," and it was not specified in
just what evidentiary way the perjured testimony became material,
is settled by the
Markham case (160 U.S.
160 U. S.
324-325), where a similar point was directly held to be
without merit.
As, in view of prior decisions, the contention based upon the
Sixth Amendment was manifestly frivolous, it results that the writ
of error must be dismissed.
Writ of error dismissed.
*
"That Hamilton H. Hendricks, late of County of Wheeler, in the
said district, on the 15th day of January, in the year of our Lord
1905 at and within the said County of Wheeler, in the said
district, unlawfully did willfully and corruptly suborn, instigate,
and procure one George W. Hawk to appear in person before them, the
said grand jurors, then and from thence hitherto sitting at the
City of Portland, in the said district, as a grand jury of the
circuit court of the said United States for the said district,
and, amongst other matters, inquiring into certain criminal
violations of the laws of the said United States relating to the
public lands and the disposal of the same, and the unlawful fencing
thereof, which had then lately before been committed within the
said district, and to take his oath before the said grand
jury, and upon his oath so taken to testify, depose, and swear
before the said grand jury in substance and to the effect
that,
when he, the said George W. Hawk, made his application dated
October 19, 1898, and filed in the land office of the said United
States at The Dalles, Oregon, on October 21, 1898, to enter
certain public lands known and described as the Southeast Quarter
of the Southeast Quarter of Section 2, the East Half of the
Northeast Quarter of Section 11, and the Southwest Quarter of the
Northwest Quarter of Section 12, in Township 7 South and Range 22
East, reference being had to the Willamette Meridian and base line,
as a homestead, under the laws of the said United States concerning
homesteads, the same was honestly and in good faith made for the
purpose of actual settlement and cultivation, and not for the
benefit of any other person, persons, or corporation; that he, the
said George W. Hawk, was not acting as agent of any person,
corporation, or syndicate in making such entry, nor in collusion
with any person, corporation, or syndicate to give them the benefit
of the land so entered, or any part thereof, or the timber thereon;
that he was not applying to enter the said lands for the purpose of
speculation, but in good faith, and to obtain a home for himself;
that he had not made, and would not make, any agreement or contract
with any person or persons, corporation or syndicate, by which the
title which he should acquire from the said United States in the
said lands would inure to the benefit of any person except himself,
and that he himself paid the fees required by law to be paid upon
the filing of such application; that, when he, the said George W.
Hawk,
on the second day of March, in the year nineteen
hundred, subscribed and swore to his affidavit and testimony
of final proof of settlement upon and cultivation of the said
lands, he had theretofore, to-wit, in the month of April, 1899,
commenced his residence on the said lands, and had not sold,
conveyed, or mortgaged any portion of the said lands, and thereupon
the said George W. Hawk, in consequence and by means of the said
willful and corrupt subornation, instigation, and procurement of
the said Hamilton H. Hendricks, afterwards, to-wit,
on the
twenty-third day of January, in the year nineteen hundred and
five, in the said district, did appear in person before the
said grand jury at Portland aforesaid, and then and there was in
due manner sworn by the foreman thereof, and then and there took
his, the said George W. Hawk's oath before the said grand jury that
he would testify truly, and true answers make . . . and whether he
himself paid the fees required by law to be paid upon the making of
such final proof."