When two or more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct
demands, unite for convenience and economy in a single suit, it is
essential that the demand of each be of the requisite
jurisdictional amount; but when several plaintiffs unite to enforce
a single title or right, in which they have a common and undivided
interest, it is enough if their interest collectively equal the
jurisdictional amount.
The Circuit Court has jurisdiction of a suit brought by several
plaintiffs to enforce a vendor's lien equally securing notes
aggregating more than $2,000 held by them and which neither can
enforce in the absence of the other, even though the claims of each
plaintiff is less than $2,000.
184 F. 932 reversed.
The facts, which involve the question of whether the sum or
value of the matter in dispute was sufficient to give the circuit
court jurisdiction, are stated in the opinion.
MR. JUSTICE VAN DEVANTER delivered the opinion of the Court.
This was a suit in equity wherein the jurisdiction of the
circuit court was invoked on the ground of diverse citizenship, and
the sole question now presented for decision
Page 222 U. S. 40
is whether the sum or value of the matter in dispute exceeded
$2,000, exclusive of interest and costs, as required by the Act of
August 13, 1888, c. 866, § 1, 25 Stat. 433. The facts are
these:
Upon a sale of land situated in the Western District of
Kentucky, the vendor lawfully reserved a vendor's lien for the
unpaid portion of the purchase price, for which he took two
promissory notes of $1,200 each, payable in one and two years.
Shortly thereafter, the notes were assigned to the present
appellants, one to each, and by the law of Kentucky the vendor's
lien passed to the assignees, as a common security for the payment
of both notes, without any priority of right in either assignee.
After the maturity of the notes, both remaining wholly unpaid, the
assignees jointly brought this suit to enforce the vendor's lien.
They and their assignor were citizens of Indiana, and the
defendant, who acquired the land with notice of the lien, was a
citizen of Kentucky.
By a demurrer to the bill, the defendant challenged the
jurisdiction of the circuit court, upon the ground that the matter
in dispute was not of the requisite jurisdictional value, and the
court, being of opinion that such value was not to be measured by
the extent to which the plaintiffs collectively were seeking to
enforce the lien as a common security, but by the extent to which
each was interested in its enforcement, sustained the demurrer and
dismissed the bill for want of jurisdiction. 184 F. 932. The
plaintiffs then appealed directly to this Court, and the circuit
court appropriately certified the question of jurisdiction. Act of
March 3, 1891, c. 517, § 5, 26 Stat. 826.
When two or more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct
demands, unite for convenience and economy in a single suit, it is
essential that the demand of each be of the requisite
jurisdictional amount; but when several plaintiffs unite to enforce
a single title or right, in which
Page 222 U. S. 41
they have a common and undivided interest, it is enough if their
interests collectively equal the jurisdictional amount.
Shields v.
Thomas, 17 How. 3;
Rodd v.
Heartt, 17 Wall. 354;
Davies v. Corbin,
112 U. S. 36,
112 U. S. 40;
Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 27;
New Orleans Pacific Railway Co. v. Parker, 143 U. S.
42;
Walter v. Northeastern Railroad Co.,
147 U. S. 370,
147 U. S. 373;
Davis v. Schwartz, 155 U. S. 631,
155 U. S. 647;
Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Adams, 180 U. S.
28.
The present suit is of the latter class. Its controlling object
-- that which makes it cognizable in equity -- is the enforcement
of the vendor's lien, which is a single thing or entity in which
the plaintiffs have a common and undivided interest, and which
neither can enforce in the absence of the other. Thus, while their
claims under the notes were separate and distinct, their claim
under the vendor's lien was single and undivided, and the lien was
sought to be enforced as a common security for the payment of both
notes.
It follows that the Circuit Court erred in holding that it was
without jurisdiction, and its decree is accordingly
Reversed, with directions to overrule the demurrer to the
bill, and to take such further proceedings in the case as may be
appropriate.